Results for “aes-gcm”

Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA AES-GCM work on a BlueField DPU or ConnectX NIC — configuring `doca_aes_gcm_task_encrypt` / `_task_decrypt`, querying `doca_aes_gcm_cap_*` for per-key-type (only `DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_128` / `_256` — AES-192 not supported) and per-task support, sizing plaintext against the max-buf cap, setting source / destination mmap permissions, validating with a NIST GCMVS or RFC 5288 vector, or debugging DOCA_ERROR_* including the security-critical tag-verification-failed outcome on decrypt. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "DOCA AES-GCM" or "AEAD" — typical implicit phrasings: "decrypt completion IO_FAILED", "auth tag isn't verifying", "NOT_PERMITTED on my encrypt buffer", "is AES-192-GCM on this BlueField" (no), or "encrypted record came back tampered". Refuse and route elsewhere for non-GCM AES modes (CBC / CTR / XTS — CPU OpenSSL), key management (KMS / HSM / rotation), SHA (doca-sha), or general AEAD background.

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Checks cryptographic code against known attacks and edge cases using Project Wycheproof test vectors, predefined inputs and expected results. Helps load cases, interpret failures, compare implementations, and integrate checks into automated testing.

• Testing cryptographic code against known attacks
• Comparing results across cryptographic libraries
• Investigating rejected or incorrectly accepted signatures

Assess how applications use encryption, signed tokens, and random values. Identify implementation weaknesses, select relevant testing tools, and document causes and fixes for issues involving encryption modes, RSA parameters, predictable randomness, and key derivation.

• Assessing encrypted cookies and tokens
• Checking RSA keys and cryptographic settings
• Testing session token predictability

AES-GCM ve ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce yeniden kullanımı saldırısı — GF(2^128) polinom kök bulma ile Hash Key kurtarma ve MAC sahteciliği.

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Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA SHA programming — offloading SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 hashing onto a BlueField DPU or ConnectX accelerator, picking between one-shot `doca_sha_task_hash` and incremental `doca_sha_task_partial_hash`, querying `doca_sha_cap_*` for algorithm support and min destination / max source buffer sizes, setting source / destination `doca_mmap` permissions, or decoding DOCA_ERROR_* returns from the SHA API. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "DOCA SHA" or "doca_sha_task" — typical implicit phrasings include "hash a multi-GiB file on the DPU", "offload SHA-256 to the BlueField", "streaming hash over chunks", "partial hash returns BAD_STATE", "destination buffer too small for digest", or "is SHA-512 available on this card". Refuse and route elsewhere for general cryptographic-hash theory (collision resistance, SHA-3 selection), other DOCA crypto libraries (AES-GCM, Compress, DMA), or DOCA install / BFB bring-up — those belong to other skills.

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Run `doca_bench` (DOCA 2.7.0 or newer) to measure throughput, bulk latency, precision latency, or maximum bandwidth for RDMA, Compress, AES-GCM, SHA, DMA, EC, Ethernet, Comch, or GPUNetIO on a host or BlueField Arm. Use it to discover enabled benchmark libraries, capture a reproducible command/version/device/environment baseline, compare stable runs against a declared tolerance, or diagnose configuration, device-binding, workload-precondition, and measurement failures. Trigger for requests such as measuring BlueField compression speed, NIC RDMA throughput, crypto latency, or a pre-upgrade baseline. Do not use for application end-to-end timing, custom benchmark code, DOCA installation, or binary patches.

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Hardware-offloaded erasure coding with DOCA Erasure Coding (Reed-Solomon, doca_ec) on a BlueField DPU, ConnectX NIC, or host: generating parity for data blocks, rebuilding lost blocks from the survivors, and refreshing parity after a change. Trigger on "one data block changed, how do I refresh parity without re-encoding", "a disk failed and 2 parity blocks are gone, can I rebuild", "RAID-6 resilience across 12 disks", "my doca_ec_task_create returns NOT_PERMITTED", or "is this N+K layout still recoverable", even without naming DOCA Erasure Coding. Covers bringing up a doca_ec context, the create / recover / update tasks, matrix type / N / K / block size, doca_ec_cap_* queries before sizing, doca_mmap src/dst permissions, and DOCA_ERROR_* from doca_ec_task_*. Refuse and route elsewhere for non-Reed-Solomon codes (fountain / LDPC / raptor), pure-replication designs, network FEC, or other DOCA accelerator libraries (SHA / Compress / AES-GCM / DMA).

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Use when working with iOS/macOS Keychain Services (SecItem queries, kSecClass, OSStatus errors), biometric authentication (LAContext, Face ID, Touch ID), CryptoKit (AES-GCM, ChaChaPoly, ECDSA, ECDH, HPKE, ML-KEM), Secure Enclave, secure credential storage (OAuth tokens, API keys), certificate pinning (SecTrust, SPKI), keychain sharing across apps/extensions, migrating secrets from UserDefaults or plists, or OWASP MASVS/MASTG mobile compliance on Apple platforms.

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Use Apple CryptoKit for Swift cryptographic primitives. Use when hashing with SHA-2 or SHA-3, generating HMACs, encrypting with AES-GCM or ChaChaPoly, signing with P256/P384/P521/Curve25519 or ML-DSA keys, performing ECDH, HPKE, ML-KEM, or X-Wing key exchange, using Secure Enclave CryptoKit keys, or migrating CommonCrypto code to CryptoKit.

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Audit cryptography implementation — algorithm choice, key sizes, KDF parameters, IV/nonce handling, signature verification, randomness, TLS configuration, and key rotation. Deeper than owasp-audit A02. Use when the user mentions 'crypto review,' 'cryptography audit,' 'encryption review,' 'KDF,' 'PBKDF2,' 'Argon2,' 'bcrypt cost,' 'IV reuse,' 'nonce reuse,' 'AES mode,' 'AES-GCM,' 'AES-ECB,' 'signature verification,' 'TLS configuration,' 'cipher suites,' 'key rotation,' 'libsodium,' 'BoringSSL,' or 'is this crypto right.'

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Think and work like an expert Cryptographer. Use when a task calls for Cryptographer judgment. Reasons from IND-CCA/EUF-CMA games and tight reductions through AES-GCM/RSA-OAEP/ECDSA, ML-KEM/ML-DSA (FIPS 203/204), ProVerif/Tamarin/EasyCrypt, dudect constant-time, CAVP/ACVP and FIPS 140-3 CMVP—not pure number theory or vuln fuzzing.

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Use when working with iOS/macOS Keychain Services (SecItem queries, kSecClass, OSStatus errors), biometric authentication (LAContext, Face ID, Touch ID), CryptoKit (AES-GCM, ChaChaPoly, ECDSA, ECDH, HPKE, ML-KEM), Secure Enclave, secure credential storage (OAuth tokens, API keys), certificate pinning (SecTrust, SPKI), keychain sharing across apps/extensions, migrating secrets from UserDefaults or plists, or OWASP MASVS/MASTG mobile compliance on Apple platforms.

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Use when working with iOS/macOS Keychain Services (SecItem queries, kSecClass, OSStatus errors), biometric authentication (LAContext, Face ID, Touch ID), CryptoKit (AES-GCM, ChaChaPoly, ECDSA, ECDH, HPKE, ML-KEM), Secure Enclave, secure credential storage (OAuth tokens, API keys), certificate pinning (SecTrust, SPKI), keychain sharing across apps/extensions, migrating secrets from UserDefaults or plists, or OWASP MASVS/MASTG mobile compliance on Apple platforms.

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Perform cryptographic operations using Apple CryptoKit. Use when hashing data with SHA256/SHA384/SHA512, generating HMAC authentication codes, encrypting with AES-GCM or ChaChaPoly, signing with P256/P384/P521/Curve25519 keys, performing ECDH key agreement, storing keys in the Secure Enclave, or migrating from CommonCrypto to CryptoKit.

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Selects crypto algorithms and usage. Hashing, AES-GCM, RSA, ECDSA, PQC key derivation.

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Systematic methodology for identifying and exploiting cryptographic implementation weaknesses in real-world applications. Covers padding oracle attacks against CBC-mode ciphers with PKCS7 padding (Vaudenay's original attack through modern padbuster automation), ECB mode exploitation including block cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time decryption, hash length extension attacks against SHA1/SHA256/MD5-based MACs using HashPump, RSA vulnerabilities including small public exponent, common modulus, Bleichenbacher PKCS1v1.5 padding oracle, and Coppersmith's method for partial key recovery. Addresses weak PRNG exploitation targeting time-seeded generators and Mersenne Twister MT19937 state recovery from observed outputs, timing side-channel attacks against comparison operations, nonce reuse in AES-GCM leading to authentication key recovery, and key derivation weaknesses including insufficient iteration counts and missing salts. Primary tooling includes padbuster, RsaCtfTool, hashpump, and PyCryptodome for building c...

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