Set up decoy credentials, storage, and secrets across AWS, Azure, and GCP to detect suspicious access. Connect audit logs to security alerts, verify detection, and document permissions, resource inventories, and maintenance plans.
- Detecting use of leaked cloud credentials
- Monitoring suspicious access to decoy storage and secrets
- Extending on-premises deception coverage to cloud environments
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills☆ 34.7KUpdated Aug 31, 2026
Deploy cloud-native deception across AWS, Azure, and GCP using decoy (honey) resources whose only purpose is to generate a high-fidelity alert the instant an attacker touches them: canary IAM access keys, permission-less decoy users/roles/service principals, honey object-storage buckets, and decoy secrets in Secrets Manager / Key Vault / Secret Manager. Wires detection through CloudTrail + EventBridge, Azure Sentinel honeytoken watchlists + Defender, and GCP Cloud Audit Logs, so any use of a decoy is routed to the SOC with near-zero false positives. Use when protecting cloud accounts and data stores, when an org has only on-prem honeypots and needs cloud coverage, when seeding fake AWS keys to catch credential theft and code-leak exposure, or when detecting cloud reconnaissance and lateral movement. Keywords: cloud deception, canary token AWS, honey S3 bucket, decoy IAM credentials, CloudTrail alert, GuardDuty, Sentinel honeytoken, decoy secret, honey service account, cloud honeypot, breach detection.
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andycungkrinx91/konoha☆ 9Updated Oct 19, 2026