security-triage
Use this skill to assess suspected Apache StreamPipes vulnerabilities, including exploit claims and scanner findings. It checks the project’s threat model, identifies the affected component and boundary, and produces a short disposition note with the reporting route when valid.
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Assess, route and report a suspected security vulnerability in Apache StreamPipes against the project's threat model. Use when a task involves a potential vulnerability, an exploit claim, a security finding from a scanner, or a decision about whether something is in or out of the security model.
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See how to installGood for
- Triage a suspected vulnerability in Apache StreamPipes
- Assess an exploit claim against the threat model
- Review a scanner finding and decide how to route it
Files included (1)
- SKILL.md2.3 KB
SKILL.md (original)
Review the instructions the agent will receive before you install.
Security triage for Apache StreamPipes
You are helping assess whether a reported or suspected issue is a security vulnerability in Apache StreamPipes and how it should be routed. Complete these steps before drafting any report or reaching any conclusion.
Step 1 — Read the threat model
Read THREAT_MODEL.md at the repository root: the trust boundaries (the REST front door,
the external-data ingestion boundary at the adapters, the extension runtime), the
adversaries in and out of scope, and what StreamPipes upholds versus what it leaves to the
operator. The model is v0; cite sections by number.
Step 2 — Read the security policy
Read SECURITY.md for how findings are reported (security@apache.org). Do not open a
public issue or pull request for a suspected vulnerability.
Key scoping facts (details in THREAT_MODEL.md)
- The
streampipes-restHTTP layer is the primary control boundary; the external-data ingestion boundary is at the adapters. The broker, datastore and extension-runtime services are assumed to run inside an operator-controlled perimeter. - Installed extensions (custom adapters, processors, sinks) are code execution by design, not a sandbox.
- An adapter ingesting data from an external source is the intended function; source trust and the handling guarantee for hostile ingested data are spelled out in the threat model.
- Transport security (TLS), network isolation and extension vetting are operator responsibilities, not engine invariants.
Step 3 — Route the finding
Route the finding to exactly one disposition in THREAT_MODEL.md §10 — VALID, or one of
the OUT-OF-MODEL / BY-DESIGN dispositions — and cite the section that justifies the
call. State the affected component from the §2 table and the boundary it crosses.
Output
A short triage note: disposition, justification with section citations, affected
component and boundary, and — only for VALID — the reporting route from SECURITY.md.
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