Skill: Permission Scope Audit

<!-- SEO: over-broad permission always location full photo library contacts data minimization scope iOS App Store rejection -->

Purpose

Detects over-broad permission requests where a narrower permission or privacy-preserving alternative API is sufficient, violating Guideline 5.1.1(iii) data minimization requirements.

Apple Guideline

• Primary: 5.1.1(iii) — Data Collection and Storage: Accessing User Data — Data Minimization
• Related: 5.1.1(ii), 5.1.2
• Reference: references/guidelines/5-legal.md

Real-World Rejection Cases

• Case: App requested Always location when WhenInUse was sufficient — reviewer flagged over-collection Source: Apple Developer Forums, multiple threads Root cause: Always location requires explicit justification (navigation, fitness tracking, delivery); requesting it for simple map display violates data minimization — reviewers check that the scope of the requested permission matches the declared use case

Trigger

Invoke on any iOS/macOS project to detect permission scope mismatches and suggest privacy-preserving alternative APIs.

Inputs

Name	Type	Default	Description
project_root	path	cwd	iOS/macOS project root
shared_context	object	nil	Pre-collected context from appstore-full-audit Phase 1

Actions

Phase 1: Context Collection

Skip this phase if shared_context is provided.

1. Glob **/*.swift — collect all Swift source files.
2. Glob **/*.m — collect Objective-C source files.
3. Glob **/Info.plist — locate Info.plist.
4. Glob **/*.entitlements — locate entitlement files (check background location entitlement).

Phase 2: Checks

1. Always location permission scope Grep pattern requestAlwaysAuthorization in **/*.swift and **/*.m. If found, Read surrounding context and check for navigation, fitness, delivery, or background tracking use case. If app category does not clearly require background location (e.g., simple map display, location tagging for posts), flag → 🟠 HIGH. Also Grep com.apple.location.always in **/*.entitlements — if entitlement absent but requestAlwaysAuthorization called → 🟠 HIGH.

2. Full photo library access when only selection needed Grep pattern PHPhotoLibrary.*requestAuthorization.*readWrite in **/*.swift. If found without accompanying PHPickerViewController usage (Grep PHPickerViewController in **/*.swift), flag → 🟠 HIGH. PHPickerViewController provides privacy-preserving photo selection without requiring full library authorization.

3. Full contacts access when only picker needed Grep pattern CNContactStore.*requestAccess|requestAccess.*forEntityType.*contacts in **/*.swift and **/*.m. If found, Read surrounding context. If app only needs to select an email or phone number (not programmatic contact access), suggest CNContactPickerViewController which requires no permission → 🟠 HIGH.

Phase 3: Output

Collect all findings from Phase 2 and build the prioritised findings list below. Include file paths and line numbers. Omit tiers with no findings.

Output Format

## Permission Scope Audit — Findings

### 🔴 CRITICAL — Guaranteed rejection
- [ ] TODO: <exact actionable step> — `file:line` — Guideline 5.1.1(iii)

### 🟠 HIGH — Very likely rejection
- [ ] TODO: Replace requestAlwaysAuthorization with requestWhenInUseAuthorization — background location is not justified for this app's stated purpose — `LocationManager.swift:34` — Guideline 5.1.1(iii)
- [ ] TODO: Replace PHPhotoLibrary.requestAuthorization(.readWrite) with PHPickerViewController — no full library access needed for profile photo selection — `ProfileViewController.swift:67` — Guideline 5.1.1(iii)
- [ ] TODO: Replace CNContactStore.requestAccess with CNContactPickerViewController — system contact picker requires no permission and is privacy-preserving — `ContactsManager.swift:21` — Guideline 5.1.1(iii)

### 🟡 MEDIUM — Possible rejection
- [ ] TODO: Verify Always location entitlement is present in .entitlements file if requestAlwaysAuthorization is intentionally used

### 🟢 LOW — Best practice
- [ ] TODO: Audit all permission requests against Apple's privacy-preserving API alternatives (PHPickerViewController, CNContactPickerViewController, CLLocationButton)

Tools Used

Glob, Grep, Read

Constraints

• Read-only. No file edits.
• No network calls.
• Skip Phase 1 if shared_context is provided by orchestrating agent.
• Works on Swift, Objective-C, React Native, Flutter projects.

Quick Commands

Run these in your project root to check manually:

# Check for Always location (high scrutiny permission)
!grep -rn "requestAlwaysAuthorization" . --include="*.swift"

# Check for full photo library access vs picker
!grep -rn "PHPhotoLibrary.requestAuthorization\|PHPickerViewController" . --include="*.swift"

# Check for full contacts access vs picker
!grep -rn "CNContactStore\|CNContactPickerViewController" . --include="*.swift"

Swift Anti-Pattern Reference

examples/swift/PermissionPatterns.swift

Detection Steps

1. Find target files

   • Glob: **/*.swift, **/*.m, **/Info.plist

2. Search for rejection patterns

   • Grep requestAlwaysAuthorization — always-on location (highest scope)
   • Grep requestWhenInUseAuthorization — when-in-use location (acceptable default)
   • Grep CNContactStore.*requestAccess + absence of CNContactPickerViewController — full contacts vs picker
   • Grep PHPhotoLibrary.requestAuthorization + absence of PHPickerViewController — full library vs picker
   • Read Info.plist → check if both NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription and NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription present

3. Determine verdict

   • requestAlwaysAuthorization for non-navigation/fitness app → 🟠 HIGH (Guideline 5.1.1(iii))
   • Full CNContactStore access when picker would suffice → 🟠 HIGH
   • Full photo library access when PHPickerViewController would suffice → 🟠 HIGH
   • Minimum necessary scope used for each permission → 🟢 pass

4. Report

   • File path + line of over-scoped permission request
   • Fix: Use requestWhenInUseAuthorization unless navigation tracking is core; use CNContactPickerViewController and PHPickerViewController instead of direct library access