security-maturity-assessment

Rate how mature a module's security posture is — category by category, every rating backed by file:line evidence — instead of hunting individual vulnerabilities. The output is a scorecard a maintainer can re-run and diff, not a finding list.

When to use

• "How mature / well-set-up is this module's security?" — posture, not holes
• Baseline before a hardening effort, or re-assessment after one
• A stakeholder needs a defensible rating per category with cited evidence

Do NOT use when:

• Hunting concrete vulnerabilities — route to security-audit
• One route/action's authorization chain — route to authz-review
• Pre-implementation threat model for a new feature — route to threat-modeling
• Writing new secure code — route to security
• AI-agent config/behaviour review — route to agent-security-review

The nine categories

#	Category	Critical?	What to inspect
1	Input validation	Yes	Request-boundary validation primitives on every entry point; no inline ad-hoc checks
2	Authorization	Yes	Per-object ownership/tenant checks, policy coverage, field-level access
3	Secrets handling	Yes	No hardcoded creds; env/vault usage; secrets absent from logs and VCS
4	Error handling	No	No swallowed exceptions; no stack traces / internals leaked to clients
5	Logging & audit	No	Security events (auth, permission denials, admin actions) logged; no PII in logs
6	Dependency hygiene	No	Lockfiles present; known-CVE scan wired; update cadence visible
7	Data boundaries	No	Serializers/resources whitelist fields; exports/queues don't leak internals
8	Tenant isolation	Yes (multi-tenant only; else N/A)	Tenant scoping on queries, jobs, caches; cross-tenant negative tests
9	Security test coverage	No	Negative tests exist (401/403/404 paths, abuse cases), not only happy-path

Rating rubric

Rating	Meaning
Missing	No control exists for the category
Weak	Ad-hoc, inconsistent — some paths covered, most not
Moderate	Control present and usual, with named gaps
Satisfactory	Consistent across the surface; minor gaps only
Strong	Consistent AND enforced (CI gate, test, linter) or negatively tested

Procedure

1. Scope — name the module/paths under assessment; list entry points (routes, jobs, commands, webhooks). A scorecard without a stated scope is not reproducible.
2. Assess each category — inspect the code the category names. Every rating cites evidence:
   • Positive evidence: file:line of the control (app/Http/Requests/…:12, src/guards/auth.guard.ts:12).
   • Absence evidence: the searches run that came back empty (name the grep patterns) — "not found" beats "probably missing".
   • Multi-tenant N/A: single-tenant systems rate category 8 N/A; it drops out of the roll-up.
3. Roll up deterministically — the overall rating is computed, not vibed:
   • overall = min( median(all rated categories), one step above the lowest critical-category rating )
   • Consequences: any critical category Missing caps overall at Weak; any critical Weak caps overall at Moderate. Non-critical categories move the median but can never lift the cap.
4. Recommend — max 3 next steps, ordered by which would raise the overall rating (i.e. fix the lowest critical category first).

Output format

1. Scope block — module/paths + entry-point list, so the scorecard is re-runnable.
2. Scorecard table — one row per category: Category | Rating | Evidence (file:line or named empty searches) | Gap. Every row MUST carry evidence; a rating without a citation is invalid.
3. Overall rating — with the roll-up shown (median=…, lowest critical=…, cap=… → overall=…), never a bare verdict.
4. Top-3 next steps — ordered by roll-up impact.

Gotcha

• The model tends to rate from vibes ("looks well-structured") — a rating row without file:line or named empty searches is invalid; redo it.
• Don't let a Strong non-critical category mask a Weak critical one — the cap rule exists precisely because a polished logging setup does not offset missing authorization.
• A vulnerability found mid-assessment is out of scope for the scorecard — note it and route to security-audit (with its false-positive gate) instead of inlining findings here.

Do NOT

• Do NOT emit a rating without evidence — every row cites file:line or the empty searches that prove absence.
• Do NOT average away critical categories — the deterministic cap always wins.
• Do NOT turn the scorecard into a finding list — posture assessment and vulnerability hunting are different deliverables.
• Do NOT assess unscoped ("the whole app") when the user named a module.

See also

• security-audit — vulnerability hunting with the false-positive gate.
• defense-in-depth — layering controls the scorecard checks for.
• ai-code-blindspots — the per-surface invisible-controls checklist.