CI/CD Pipeline Poisoning & Supply-Chain Attacks

When to Activate

• Auditing or attacking GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins pipelines for code execution
• Hunting pull_request_target / workflow_run "pwn requests" and Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE)
• Assessing compromised third-party Actions, mutable version tags, and Actions cache poisoning
• Dependency confusion, typo/slopsquatting, and malicious package/install-hook payloads
• Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse and runner backdoors
• CI secret exfiltration and OIDC cloud-role (AWS/GCP/Azure) trust-policy abuse
• Validating SLSA build provenance and signing gates (defense / blue-team validation)

Technique Map

Technique	ATT&CK	CWE	Reference	Script
Pwn request (pull_request_target checkout of fork head)	T1195.001	CWE-269	references/pipeline-poisoning.md	scripts/workflow_auditor.py
Script injection (${{ github.event.* }} into run:)	T1059	CWE-94	references/pipeline-poisoning.md	scripts/workflow_auditor.py
Direct / Indirect PPE (workflow or build-file modification)	T1195.001	CWE-913	references/pipeline-poisoning.md	scripts/workflow_auditor.py
GitLab .gitlab-ci.yml poisoning / pipeline-as-user (CVE-2024-6678)	T1648	CWE-863	references/pipeline-poisoning.md	scripts/workflow_auditor.py
Compromised Action via mutable tag (CVE-2025-30066 tj-actions)	T1195.001	CWE-494	references/action-dependency-compromise.md	scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py
Transitive Action compromise (CVE-2025-30154 reviewdog)	T1195.001	CWE-1357	references/action-dependency-compromise.md	scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py
Actions cache poisoning (cross-workflow escalation)	T1525	CWE-349	references/action-dependency-compromise.md	scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py
Dependency confusion (internal name on public registry)	T1195.002	CWE-427	references/package-registry-attacks.md	scripts/dependency_confusion.py
Typo / slopsquatting + malicious install hook	T1195.002	CWE-829	references/package-registry-attacks.md	scripts/dependency_confusion.py
Self-replicating registry worm (Shai-Hulud npm)	T1195.002	CWE-829	references/package-registry-attacks.md	scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py
Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse & backdoor	T1199	CWE-668	references/runner-attacks.md	scripts/runner_recon.sh
Jenkins Script Console RCE (/script, CVE-2024-23897)	T1648	CWE-306	references/runner-attacks.md	scripts/runner_recon.sh
CI secret exfiltration (toJSON(secrets), GhostAction)	T1552.004	CWE-522	references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md	scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py
OIDC trust-policy abuse (missing/* sub, wrong org wildcard)	T1078.004	CWE-1390	references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md	scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py
Build provenance / signing gate validation (defense)	T1195	CWE-347	references/build-integrity-defense.md	scripts/provenance_verify.sh

Quick Start

# 0. Recon: enumerate workflows, triggers, used actions across an org (read-only token)
gh repo list ORG --limit 1000 --json nameWithOwner -q '.[].nameWithOwner' > repos.txt
python3 scripts/workflow_auditor.py --repos repos.txt --token "$GH_TOKEN" --out findings.json

# 1. Static audit any cloned repo for pwn-requests + injection sinks (offline, no token)
git clone https://github.com/ORG/REPO && python3 scripts/workflow_auditor.py --path REPO

# 2. Flag risky/mutable third-party Action refs (unpinned tags = supply-chain exposure)
python3 scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py --path REPO --check-pins --check-known-bad

# 3. Dependency confusion: find internal names not registered on public registries
python3 scripts/dependency_confusion.py --manifest REPO/package.json --registry npm
python3 scripts/dependency_confusion.py --manifest REPO/requirements.txt --registry pypi

# 4. OIDC abuse: audit AWS IAM trust policies tied to GitHub's OIDC provider
python3 scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --provider github --cloud aws --profile target

# 5. Runner recon (run ON a compromised self-hosted runner during an engagement)
bash scripts/runner_recon.sh

# 6. Defensive validation: verify SLSA provenance + cosign signature before promote
bash scripts/provenance_verify.sh --image ghcr.io/org/app:tag --repo org/app

Recommended OSS tooling: gato-x (offensive GHA enumeration/PPE), zizmor/octoscan/poutine/raven (static workflow analysis), step-security/harden-runner (egress control), cosign+slsa-verifier (gates).

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

Technique	Telemetry / IOC	Detection (Sigma/EDR)	OPSEC note
Pwn request / PPE	Fork PR triggering privileged run; new .github/workflows/* in PR; outbound to non-allowlisted host	GH audit log workflows; Sigma on runner egress to new domains; zizmor in CI	Payload runs in build log; public-repo logs are world-readable — assume detection
Compromised Action / mutable tag	Action ref resolves to new SHA; tag force-push event; base64 in action source	Diff resolved SHA vs lockfile; alert on tag re-point in audit log	Tag re-point is logged org-side; SHA-pin victims are immune
Cache poisoning	Cache key written by read-only/low-priv job, restored by release job	Monitor actions/cache save/restore key ownership; provenance mismatch	Survives across workflows; harder to attribute than direct edit
Dependency confusion	Install-time outbound from build host; package version anomaly (very high ver)	EDR proc-tree npm/pip -> curl/node -e; registry telemetry	Higher public version wins resolver; noisy if scoped registries enforced
Registry worm (Shai-Hulud)	bundle.js postinstall; trufflehog filesystem /; public Shai-Hulud repo; shai-hulud-workflow.yml	EDR: npm child spawns trufflehog/git push; Sigma on workflow file creation	Self-propagating = loud and fast; burns the maintainer token
Runner backdoor	Rogue runner registration; persistent proc on host; outbound only to github.com	Runner-host EDR; GH audit self_hosted_runner events; one-job-per-runner	Traffic blends with github.com; non-ephemeral = persistence
Secret exfil / toJSON(secrets)	${{ toJSON(secrets) }} in run step; POST of base64 to webhook	Static scan for toJSON(secrets); egress allowlist	GitHub masks *** in logs — encoding evades the mask
OIDC trust abuse	AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity; CloudTrail userName = repo:org/repo:ref	CloudTrail filter on federated principals; IAM Access Analyzer external findings	Short-lived creds, attributed to repo in logs; AWS blocks new bad policies (Jun 2025)

Deep Dives

• references/pipeline-poisoning.md — Pwn requests, PPE (direct/indirect), script injection, GitLab/Jenkins pipeline poisoning, with vulnerable+fixed YAML and a working exploit PR payload.
• references/action-dependency-compromise.md — Third-party Action compromise, mutable git tags, the tj-actions (CVE-2025-30066) / reviewdog (CVE-2025-30154) chain, and Actions cache poisoning; SHA-pinning detection.
• references/package-registry-attacks.md — Dependency confusion, typo/slopsquatting, malicious install hooks, and the Shai-Hulud self-replicating npm worm with concrete IOCs.
• references/runner-attacks.md — Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse, JIT/ephemeral hardening, runner backdoors, and Jenkins Script Console RCE.
• references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md — CI secret enumeration/exfiltration (GhostAction), toJSON(secrets), and AWS/GCP/Azure OIDC trust-policy misconfigurations.
• references/build-integrity-defense.md — SLSA provenance, in-toto attestations, Sigstore/cosign keyless signing, slsa-verifier gates, and admission-control enforcement (the defensive counterweight).