Skip to content
cccskills
FreePublished on GitHub

spec-implementation-review

Passive, citation-grounded review of security-relevant specifications, protocols, standards, APIs, and implementations. Use when a reviewer must trace external preconditions and invariants into source code without treating a cited claim as proof of a vulnerability.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

See how to install

Files included (1)

  • SKILL.md4.6 KB

SKILL.md (original)

Review the instructions the agent will receive before you install.

Spec-Implementation Review

Use this skill when security depends on a protocol property, formal precondition, API contract, standard, parser grammar, authorization rule, sandbox boundary, distributed-systems guarantee, or optimization condition.

Division of labor: deterministic repo/diff candidate scans live in code-security-review; citation-grounded spec/protocol invariant tracing lives here.

Ground Rules

  • Work passively unless the user explicitly authorizes build, test, shell, network, browser, or mutation actions.
  • Use primary sources whenever possible: standards, specifications, original papers, official API documentation, source repositories, security advisories, or maintainer statements. Record a stable URL, version/commit/section, and concise claim.
  • A citation establishes what the source requires; source code establishes what the implementation does. Do not let either substitute for the other.
  • Keep findings generic and evidence-backed. A mismatch is a Code Review Candidate until independent validation establishes impact.
  • Do not copy target-specific advisories, vulnerability paths, payloads, or hidden benchmark facts into reusable prompts, skills, or candidate-visible eval material.

Workflow

  1. Define the contract boundary. Name the Subject, implementation version, relevant modules, caller/callee boundary, and any fast or fallback paths.
  2. Extract requirements. For each source claim, record the exact invariant or precondition, source URL/version/section, and why the implementation relies on it.
    • Track unspecified behavior separately as an open research question. Inspect SDK defaulting, serialization, retries, fallbacks and error handling to identify a discriminating comparison with raw API behavior. Strange errors can reveal an unexpected implementation path; check configuration, version and a control before attributing security impact.
    • For composed security integrations, name the effective principal and policy input at each hop. Compare what each layer guarantees with what its caller assumes. Key policies, grants, identity policies, delegated services, workload identities and admission controls should be examined only where that target actually uses them.
  3. Trace to code. Link each requirement to source files, symbols, guards, tests, and call paths. Inspect both optimized/delegated and slow/fallback behavior.
  4. Classify each invariant. Use exactly one status:
    • enforced: a reachable guard or construction establishes the requirement on every relevant path.
    • partially_enforced: enforcement exists but a relevant caller, fast path, fallback, error path, or input shape is not covered.
    • not-located: the review found no implementation evidence establishing the requirement; this is not proof that it is absent.
    • not-applicable: the cited requirement does not apply to this version, boundary, or use case; explain why.
  5. Create candidates conservatively. Create a passive candidate only for partially_enforced or not-located when a cited requirement conflicts with concrete implementation evidence. Include the counterexample shape in abstract terms, not an exploit recipe.
  6. Queue independent validation. Require a source-to-guard trace, a control case, and a clean-environment oracle before promotion. Active reproduction remains approval-gated.
  7. Persist the review. Record notable invariant statuses and candidates as Research Observations via security-observation-intake, and persist cited source excerpts and the invariant matrix as Artifacts through the Evidence Interface (src/server/evidence/artifact-service.ts). Chat output alone evaporates with the turn; cited claims must survive it.

Output

Return:

  • Scope: Subject, version/commit, sources, and allowed actions.
  • Invariant Matrix: invariant, primary citation, implementation evidence, status, and confidence.
  • Module Contract Cards: inputs, assumptions, guarantees, delegated responsibilities, optimized/fallback paths, and evidence artifacts.
  • Composition Tasks: cross-module assumptions that need source-to-guard tracing.
  • Candidates: only evidence-backed mismatches, marked draft with validation requirements.
  • No-Finding Coverage: requirements traced and enforced, plus limitations.

Reviews

No reviews yet. Tell others what you thought.

Comments

No login needed. Share how it worked for you, ask a question, or note where it did not run.

No comments yet. Be the first to write one.

Comments are published right away. Do not include personal information such as email addresses or phone numbers. Up to 2 URLs.

0 / 1,000 characters

This form is protected by reCAPTCHA, and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

More skills from this repository

Plan and use user-consented local camera and microphone observations for an explicitly authorized physical target. Use when a capture can establish a bounded physical-state observation such as whether a test fixture changed state, an instrument reading changed, or equipment noise changed relatively.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

justsml/ExploitHunter.app14Updated Oct 17, 2026

Plan vulnerability research using conventional bug-hunting and pentest stage names, specialty playbooks, and a research-hypothesis-experiment loop. Use when designing a bug bounty workflow, selecting tools and strategies, building a decision tree, or turning a target/scope into a staged hunting plan.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

justsml/ExploitHunter.app14Updated Oct 17, 2026

Passive code-review lane for authorized repositories, local checkouts, uploaded source archives, and diffs. Use when the security research agent needs deterministic candidate discovery before expensive AI investigation, scoped PR-style review, append-only evidence records, or independent revalidation of code findings.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

justsml/ExploitHunter.app14Updated Oct 17, 2026

Run independent, task-matched expert attempts, select a base, and synthesize the strongest result.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

justsml/ExploitHunter.app14Updated Oct 17, 2026

Select established CTF and security-research tools for authorized artifact triage, web inspection, reversing, crypto, forensics, networking, and exploit validation. Use when a user provides a CTF-style tool catalog, asks which tools to use, or needs safe usage instructions for common offensive/security tools.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

justsml/ExploitHunter.app14Updated Oct 17, 2026

Disciplined diagnosis loop for hard bugs and performance regressions. Reproduce → minimise → hypothesise → instrument → fix → regression-test. Use when user says "diagnose this" / "debug this", reports a bug, says something is broken/throwing/failing, or describes a performance regression.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

justsml/ExploitHunter.app14Updated Oct 17, 2026

See all skills by justsml

Report a problem with this skill