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cloud-recon

Cloud control-plane reconnaissance for AWS, Azure/Entra, GCP, and Alibaba Cloud: identity, IAM/RAM, trust, resources, metadata, and managed-Kubernetes cloud-side boundary. Recon only — no policy changes, no privilege escalation. Operator may select /cloud-attack or /k8s.

The English summary is being prepared. Showing the original description.

See how to install

Files included (8)

  • SKILL.md4.1 KB
  • references/alibaba-enum-commands.md4.4 KB
  • references/aws-enum-commands.md3.9 KB
  • references/aws-iam-graph.md1.9 KB
  • references/azure-enum-commands.md1.9 KB
  • references/cloud-k8s-identity.md1.7 KB
  • references/gcp-enum-commands.md1.9 KB
  • references/vulnerability-intelligence.md534 B

SKILL.md (original)

Review the instructions the agent will receive before you install.

/cloud-recon — 云控制面信息收集

scope: 已有云凭据或云环境线索后,只读枚举身份、权限、信任、资源。不改策略、不建用户、不更新函数。▸ 高价值路径交给操作者选 /cloud-attack 或 /k8s。

命令全书在 reference,不要在 SKILL 复制四朵云 CLI。

  • AWS:references/aws-enum-commands.md + references/aws-iam-graph.md
  • Azure:references/azure-enum-commands.md
  • GCP:references/gcp-enum-commands.md
  • 阿里云:references/alibaba-enum-commands.md
  • 云↔K8s:references/cloud-k8s-identity.md
  • versioned 软件 CVE:../shared/cve-enrichment.md

开局与收尾

开局第一件事:Read ./notes.md。没有则 python ~/.claude/skills/bin/notes.py init。只按已拿下/凭据继续。 走到哪条链,才 Read 一份 references/<file>.md。禁止开局全读、禁止凭记忆写 payload。 监听 / sudo / 输密码 / Permission denied:立刻停,说明等操作者做什么,等回报。不要假装已成功。 收尾:

  1. 追加 ./notes.md
  2. python ~/.claude/skills/bin/modules.py tail <本模块名> Read 备用:~/.claude/skills/shared/modules.yaml 禁止 ./modules.yaml 和 python ../bin/...
  3. 优先 default_next;never_default 不得当作默认(操作者点名除外)
  4. 名册外的名字不许建议
  5. 停。等操作者选 /模块 或 /clear /edr-bypass 半条链未完:打通后回本模块,不要 /clear。

0. 成功条件

平台 / Account / Tenant / Project
当前 principal 与凭据类型(长期 / STS / MI / SA / OIDC)
有效权限与高价值 trust(AssumeRole / actAs / Owner)
资源面摘要(计算 / 存储 / serverless / 密钥)
托管 K8s 是否可拿 kubeconfig(只报告,不进集群)

禁止: 建 AccessKey、改 Trust、更新 Lambda、写 Bucket Policy。

IAM 误配 不是 CVE。只有自管 appliance/DB 引擎/镜像才走 enrichment。


1. 决策树(按手上材料,不按厂商课表)

还不知道哪朵云     → DNS/ASN/泄露变量识别平台
AWS 密钥/STS       → references/aws-enum-commands.md + pmapper
Azure token/SP/MI  → references/azure-enum-commands.md + ROADtools
GCP SA JSON/ADC    → references/gcp-enum-commands.md
阿里 AK/STS/RRSA   → references/alibaba-enum-commands.md
只有 VM 内         → 元数据(§4)再当新身份重新枚举
能 get 集群凭证    → 停,候选 /k8s

一次做完当前身份的图,不要 AWS 命令抄完再无脑把 Azure 全书跑一遍。


2. 平台识别

amazonaws.com / azurewebsites.net / run.app / aliyuncs.com
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET / GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS
ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID

3. 每朵云(指针)

AWS: sts get-caller-identity → IAM/trust/resource policy → pmapper/cloudsplaining → EC2/S3/Lambda/Secrets。EKS 只 list/describe-cluster,能拿 API 就候选 /k8s。

Azure: az account show / roadrecon / AzureHound。MFA 用户不要默认 az login -u -p。AKS 能出 kubeconfig → /k8s。

GCP: gcloud auth list + IAM policy + SA impersonation 探测(能 print-token 只记可达身份,不在 recon 里提权利用)。GKE 同上。

阿里云: RAM/STS/ECS/OSS/FC/ActionTrail/ACK。元数据 100.100.100.200(含 token 模式)。ACK RRSA → 记 RAM 身份,候选 /k8s 或继续本模块枚举该 Role。


4. 元数据

AWS 169.254.169.254     Azure 169.254.169.254
GCE metadata.google.internal
阿里 100.100.100.200
EKS IRSA / AKS WI / GKE WI / ACK RRSA

token ≠ admin。记下 principal 再枚举。


5. 完成后

写入 ./notes.md。候选只按「开局与收尾」跑 python ~/.claude/skills/bin/modules.py tail。只建议,不自动跳。

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