Automate 21risk tasks via Rube MCP (Composio). Always search tools first for current schemas.
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Harden AI/LLM deployments against prompt injection, data exfiltration, model theft, and supply chain attacks.
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Secure LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply chain threats in production environments.
Use this skill when:
Threat Risk Control
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Prompt injection System prompt override Input sanitization, separate context
Data exfiltration PII in model outputs Output filtering, DLP scanning
Jailbreaking Policy bypass Content moderation, guardrails
Model theft Weight extraction via API Rate limiting, access controls
Training data poisoning Backdoored fine-tuned model Dataset validation, provenance
Supply chain attack Malicious model weights Signature verification, scanning
Insecure output XSS/SQLi from LLM response Output encoding, parameterized queries
Regex indicators have false positives and bypasses. They do not establish a prompt-injection security boundary. Keep untrusted content separate, enforce server-side tool/data authorization independent of model text, minimize accessible secrets and require approval for scoped side effects. The examples below are illustrative detectors, not proof an input or output is safe.
import re
from typing import Optional
INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above)\s+instructions",
r"you\s+are\s+now\s+",
r"new\s+instructions?:",
r"system\s+prompt",
r"forget\s+everything",
r"act\s+as\s+",
r"jailbreak",
r"dan\s+mode",
r"<\s*system\s*>",
r"\[INST\]",
]
def detect_prompt_injection(user_input: str) -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""Return (is_suspicious, matched_pattern)."""
normalized = user_input.lower().strip()
for pattern in INJECTION_PATTERNS:
if re.search(pattern, normalized, re.IGNORECASE):
return True, pattern
return False, None
def sanitize_user_input(user_input: str, max_length: int = 4000) -> str:
"""Sanitize input before passing to LLM."""
# Truncate
user_input = user_input[:max_length]
# Remove null bytes and control characters
user_input = re.sub(r'[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]', '', user_input)
# Check for injection
suspicious, pattern = detect_prompt_injection(user_input)
if suspicious:
raise ValueError(f"Potential prompt injection detected: {pattern}")
return user_input
# guardrails.yaml
from nemoguardrails import RailsConfig, LLMRails
config = RailsConfig.from_path("./guardrails-config")
rails = LLMRails(config)
async def safe_llm_call(user_message: str) -> str:
response = await rails.generate_async(
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": user_message}]
)
return response["content"]
# guardrails-config/config.yml
models:
- type: main
engine: openai
model: gpt-4o-mini
rails:
input:
flows:
- check jailbreak
- check sensitive data
output:
flows:
- check output for PII
- check output for harmful content
import re
from presidio_analyzer import AnalyzerEngine
from presidio_anonymizer import AnonymizerEngine
analyzer = AnalyzerEngine()
anonymizer = AnonymizerEngine()
PII_ENTITIES = ["PERSON", "EMAIL_ADDRESS", "PHONE_NUMBER", "CREDIT_CARD",
"US_SSN", "IBAN_CODE", "IP_ADDRESS", "LOCATION"]
def scrub_pii_from_output(text: str) -> str:
"""Remove PII from LLM output before returning to user."""
results = analyzer.analyze(text=text, entities=PII_ENTITIES, language="en")
if not results:
return text
anonymized = anonymizer.anonymize(text=text, analyzer_results=results)
return anonymized.text
def has_no_known_output_indicators(output: str) -> bool:
"""No known regex match; does not prove SQL, HTML or command safety."""
dangerous_patterns = [
r"<\s*script\s*>", # XSS
r"javascript:", # XSS
r";\s*(DROP|DELETE|INSERT)",# SQLi
r"\$\{.*\}", # template injection
r"`.*`", # command injection in some contexts
]
for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
if re.search(pattern, output, re.IGNORECASE):
return False
return True
Schematic example: bind SECRET_KEY, TOKEN_ISSUER and TOKEN_AUDIENCE to a verified trusted configuration. Require explicit scopes
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Automate 21risk tasks via Rube MCP (Composio). Always search tools first for current schemas.
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