'trust' 검색 결과

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

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Deploy Cisco Duo multi-factor authentication across enterprise applications, VPN, RDP, and SSH access points. This skill covers Duo integration methods, adaptive authentication policies, device trust

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Business Email Compromise (BEC) is a sophisticated fraud scheme where attackers impersonate executives, vendors, or trusted partners to trick employees into transferring funds, sharing sensitive data,

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Configuring Google Cloud Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) to enforce per-request identity verification for Compute Engine, App Engine, Cloud Run, and GKE services using access levels, context-aware policies, and programmatic access with service accounts.

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A Certificate Authority (CA) is the trust anchor in a PKI hierarchy, responsible for issuing, signing, and revoking digital certificates. This skill covers building a two-tier CA hierarchy (Root CA +

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Reference for the Adobe AEM CLI (@adobe/aem-cli, formerly the helix-cli npm package; commands `aem up`, `aem import`, `aem content`) — installation, the local Edge Delivery dev server, .env / AEM_* configuration, HTTPS/TLS, proxy & certificate trust, content sync with da.live, and troubleshooting. Use when installing, running, or configuring the aem/hlx CLI, when `aem up` fails (port conflicts, cert errors, proxy 404s, pipeline vs. local-file confusion), or when migrating from the old helix-cli package. Do NOT use for da.live content-format rules or the DA Source API contract (use da-content); do NOT use for writing EDS block code (use content-driven-development).

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Perform a bounded security design/hardening pass for explicit security or threat-model intent, or a concrete auth/authorization/secret/untrusted-input/file-upload/sensitive-data risk; do not trigger for every input, data store, third-party call, implementation, review, or release.

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Use when choosing or configuring MCP servers for research work, when a literature, reference manager, or scholarly search server needs a trust check before installation, or when an existing research tool stack needs a data flow and permission audit.

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Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) attack methodology — GATT enumeration, characteristic read/write without auth, pairing downgrade (Just Works forced), LE Secure Connections bypass, MITM via active relay, sniffing with Sniffle (TI CC1352) / Ubertooth / Frontline, encryption key extraction (LE Legacy Pairing crackable, LE Secure Connections strong), proximity authentication abuse (cars, locks), and companion-app trust analysis. Use for IoT BLE devices, smart locks, fitness trackers, medical devices, BLE beacons, or any device pairing over BLE.

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Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash/merge/assign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process/eval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS/Pug/Handlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable exfil via /proc/self/environ. Use when target runs Node.js/Express/Fastify/NestJS/Koa.

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Hunt JWT cryptographic failures — alg:none signature-stripping and RS256→HS256 key-confusion that let an attacker forge a token for any identity (e.g. an admin) without knowing a secret. Use when the app authenticates with a JSON Web Token (an `eyJ...` Bearer token in the Authorization header, a cookie, or a login response). This skill OWNS JWT signature/crypto forgery (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku header injection); hunt-ato covers JWT as one ATO path, hunt-auth-bypass covers SSO/SAML token trust, hunt-api-misconfig covers non-crypto JWT handling. Critical when a forged token grants access to another user's data or an admin-only endpoint.

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Comprehensive secrets extraction methodology targeting CI/CD environments across all major platforms. Covers environment variable extraction from build contexts, exploitation of vault and secrets-manager misconfigurations (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP Secret Manager), runner and agent token abuse for lateral movement, OIDC federation attacks exploiting trust relationships between CI/CD providers and cloud platforms, build log leakage analysis for inadvertently exposed credentials, cache poisoning techniques for credential exfiltration, platform-specific credential store exploitation (GitHub Actions secrets, GitLab CI variables, Jenkins credential providers), service connection and service account abuse in Azure DevOps and GCP, and Docker registry credential theft from build environments. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1552 (Unsecured Credentials) and its sub-techniques. Each section provides enumeration procedures, extraction techniques, and post-exploitation pivoting guidance for usi...

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Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers.

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Comprehensive offensive methodology for software supply chain attacks covering the full kill chain from reconnaissance through exploitation. Addresses dependency confusion across npm, PyPI, and NuGet ecosystems where internal registry override allows an attacker to inject malicious packages that shadow private dependencies. Covers typosquatting techniques for popular packages, compromised package injection via maintainer account takeover or social engineering, and build system attacks through Makefile injection, setup.py install hooks, and npm postinstall scripts. Extends into CI/CD artifact tampering where build outputs are replaced or modified in transit, code signing abuse through stolen or self-signed certificates, upstream repository compromise via commit injection or force-push to trusted repos, and container image supply chain attacks including base image trojaning and registry confusion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools...

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Comprehensive CI/CD pipeline exploitation methodology covering GitHub Actions injection vectors (expression injection via PR titles and issue bodies, workflow_run event abuse, GITHUB_TOKEN over-scoping, composite action supply chain compromise), Jenkins attack paths (Groovy sandbox escapes, script console remote code execution, Java remoting deserialization, credential store dumping, shared library injection), GitLab CI exploitation (YAML anchor injection, runner registration token abuse, CI variable extraction, protected branch bypass via merge request pipelines), and Azure DevOps pipeline agent compromise with service connection theft. Includes artifact poisoning techniques across all platforms, tooling guidance for gato and jenkins-attack-framework, and maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.002 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain). Covers enumeration of pipeline configurations, privilege escalation from contributor to code execution, lateral movement through pipeline trust boundaries, and p...

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Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports. Covers coupon-race-stacking (Instacart, Stripe, Reverb), negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering (Upserve, Eternal/Zomato), decimal/fraction price-field overflow (Shipt), client-side checkout amount trust on PayPal redirect (WordPress.org), price-per-unit mass-assignment (Krisp), and archived-price swap / cart-TOCTOU (Stripe). Use when hunting business logic — heavy emphasis on financial-impact-demonstrated cases.

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filename=shell.php, Content-Type: image/jpeg → server trusts Content-Type

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Hunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across SAML XSW / parser-differential (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2025-25291/25292), SAML signature stripping (Uber, Rocket.Chat, samlify CVE-2025-47949), SAML domain enforcement bypass via control characters (HackerOne 2024), partner-portal cross-IdP assertion reuse (Slack), WordPress XMLRPC bypassing SSO (Uber), JWT alg-confusion HS256/RS256 (Jitsi), JWT signature-validation skip (Linktree, Newspack), and token-audience confusion (Argo CD CVE-2023-22482). For standalone JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) see hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers JWT only inside SSO/SAML/token-trust bypass chains. SAML assertion-layer attacks (XSW, comment injection, signature stripping, XXE-in-assertion) are owned by hunt-saml; this skill owns the broader cross-protocol auth-bypass taxonomy. Use when hunting auth bypass — see the Legacy-Protocol Matrix for branded-UI vs legacy-endpoint patterns.

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Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.

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You are attacking Layer 2/3 infrastructure during an authorized internal engagement. ARP, DHCP, broadcast name resolution, VLAN trunking, and IPv6 autoconfiguration are all unauthenticated -- you exploit that trust to intercept credentials, redirect traffic, and cross network boundaries.

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You are helping a penetration tester enumerate and exploit Active Directory

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Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.

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LLM bugs are only worth reporting when they cross a trust boundary you can prove — an OOB callback, a verbatim-reproducible secret, a cross-tenant record, or code execution. A model 'saying something bad once' is confabulation, not a vulnerability. Read the False-Positive Gate before claiming anything.

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Active Directory attack methodology for internal network red team engagements. Covers reconnaissance (BloodHound, PowerView, ADExplorer), credential abuse (Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning), privilege escalation (ACL abuse, GPO abuse, unconstrained/constrained delegation), lateral movement (Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Overpass-the-Hash, WMI/WinRM/PsExec), persistence (Golden/Silver/Diamond Tickets, DCSync, DCShadow, AdminSDHolder, Skeleton Key), forest trust attacks, ADCS abuse (ESC1-ESC15), and modern MDI/Defender for Identity evasion. Use when assessing on-prem AD, hybrid AD/Entra ID environments, or ADCS deployments.

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