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offensive-fuzzing

Plan and run fuzz testing, which feeds varied inputs to software to uncover bugs. The skill guides tool selection, test harness creation, input collection, coverage measurement, and crash triage for parsers, protocols, kernels, and other targets.

한국어 요약은 준비 중입니다. 영어 요약을 표시하고 있습니다.

원문원문 설명 보기

Practical offensive fuzzing methodology covering target identification, fuzzer selection (AFL++, libFuzzer, Honggfuzz, Boofuzz, syzkaller), harness writing, corpus curation, mutation strategies, coverage measurement, and crash triage. Use when setting up or running fuzz campaigns against any target: file parsers, network protocols, kernel drivers, EDR engines, embedded firmware, or language runtimes.

설치 방법 보기

이럴 때 유용합니다

  • Planning fuzz tests for a file parser
  • Preparing test harnesses and seed inputs
  • Investigating stalled test coverage
  • Reproducing and grouping crashes

포함된 파일(1)

  • SKILL.md11.6 KB

SKILL.md(원문)

설치하기 전에 에이전트에게 전달되는 지시 내용을 확인할 수 있습니다.

Offensive Fuzzing

Fuzzer Types

TypeCoverageSpeedTools
BlackBoxPoorFastPeach, Boofuzz
GreyBoxGoodFastAFL++, Honggfuzz, libFuzzer, WinAFL
SnapshotGoodFastestNyx, wtf, Snapchange
WhiteBoxBestSlowKLEE, QSYM, SymSan
EnsembleBestFastAFL++ + Honggfuzz + libFuzzer

GreyBox sub-variants: Directed (AFLGo, UAFuzz), Grammar (AFLSmart, Tlspuffin), Concolic (QSYM, Driller), Kernel (syzkaller, kAFL, wtf).

Core Workflow

Research target → Choose analyses → Build harness → Seed corpus → Instrument → Fuzz → Triage crashes → Report

1. Research Target

  • Map all input surfaces (files, network, IPC, syscalls, IOCTL)
  • Identify high-value areas: previously patched code, complex parsers, newly added code, input ingestion points
  • For kernel modules: look beyond copy_from_user — DMA-BUF ops, page fault handlers, VM operation structs, allocation callbacks

2. Instrument and Build

# AFL++ (preferred for GreyBox)
CC=afl-clang-fast CXX=afl-clang-fast++ cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release .. && make -j

# libFuzzer + ASan/UBSan (C/C++)
cmake -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-fsanitize=fuzzer,address,undefined -O1 -g" ..

# CmpLog build for hard compares
AFL_LLVM_CMPLOG=1 CC=afl-clang-fast CXX=afl-clang-fast++ make clean all

Windows (MSVC): Project Properties → C/C++ → Address Sanitizer: Yes (/fsanitize=address)

3. Write Harness

libFuzzer (C++):

#include <cstdint>
#include <cstddef>
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
    parse_or_process(data, size);
    return 0;
}

Honggfuzz HF_ITER (persistent mode — preferred for large targets):

#include "honggfuzz.h"
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
    initialize_target(); // runs once
    for (;;) {
        size_t len; uint8_t *buf;
        HF_ITER(&buf, &len);
        FILE* s = fmemopen(buf, len, "r");
        target_function(s);
        fclose(s);
        reset_target_state();
    }
}

AFL++ persistent mode (__AFL_LOOP):

while (__AFL_LOOP(10000)) {
    // re-read input and process
}

macOS IPC (Mach message fuzzing):

void *lib_handle = dlopen("libexample.dylib", RTLD_LAZY);
pFunction = dlsym(lib_handle, "DesiredFunction");

4. Build Seed Corpus

  • Pull from target's test suite, bug reports, and real-world samples
  • Web-crawl (Common Crawl) for file formats; filter by MIME type
  • Minimize: afl-cmin -i raw_corpus -o seeds -- ./target @@
  • Trim inputs: afl-tmin -i crash -o crash.min -- ./target @@

5. Launch Fuzzing

AFL++ parallel (primary + secondary with cmplog):

afl-fuzz -M f1 -i seeds -o findings -x dict.txt -- ./target @@
afl-fuzz -S s1 -i seeds -o findings -c 0 -- ./target @@

libFuzzer:

./target_libfuzzer corpus/ -max_total_time=3600 -workers=4

Binary-only (QEMU):

afl-fuzz -Q -i seeds -o findings -- target.exe @@

Snapshot (AFL++ Nyx):

NYX_MODE=1 AFL_MAP_SIZE=1048576 afl-fuzz -i seeds -o findings -- ./target_nyx @@

Ensemble (AFL++ + Honggfuzz sharing corpus):

# Terminal 1
afl-fuzz -M fuzzer1 -i seeds -o sync_dir -- ./target @@
# Terminal 2
../honggfuzz/honggfuzz -i sync_dir/fuzzer1/queue -W sync_dir/hfuzz \
  --linux_perf_ipt_block -t 10 -- ./target ___FILE___

6. Monitor and Unstick

If progress stalls:

  • Enable CmpLog: -c 0 on AFL++ secondaries
  • Add dictionary: -x dict.txt or AFL_TOKEN_FILE
  • Switch to directed fuzzing (AFLGo) targeting specific BBs/functions
  • Use concolic assistance (QSYM, Driller) on hard branches
  • Snapshot the target to increase exec/s
  • AFL_MAP_SIZE=1048576, -L 0 for MOpt scheduler

7. Triage Crashes

# 1. Minimize
afl-tmin -i crash -o crash.min -- ./target @@
# 2. Symbolize
ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:symbolize=1 ./target crash.min 2>asan.log
# 3. Hash + bucket
./cov-tool --bbids ./target crash.min > cov.hash
./bucket.py --key "$(cat cov.hash)" --log asan.log --out triage/

Sanitizer env quick reference:

ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:symbolize=1:detect_stack_use_after_return=1
UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
TSAN_OPTIONS=halt_on_error=1:history_size=7
MSAN_OPTIONS=poison_in_dtor=1:track_origins=2

Oracle Selection

Bug ClassOracle
Memory safetyASan, HWASan (AArch64, lower overhead)
Uninitialized readsMSan
ConcurrencyTSan
Undefined behaviorUBSan
Type safetyTypeSan
Heap hardeningScudo Hardened Allocator
Logic bugsDifferential / idempotency oracles
Kernel memoryKASAN, KMSAN, KCSAN
Kernel UBKUBSan (CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y)
CFIKCFI (-fsanitize=kcfi, Clang 18)
Binary-onlyQASAN (QEMU+ASan), DynamoRIO

Property oracle patterns:

  • Idempotency: f(x) == f(f(x))
  • Differential: compare two impls, bucket on output mismatch
  • Invariants: monotonic lengths, checksum equality, schema validation post-parse

Specialized Targets

Kernel (Linux) — syzkaller

{
  "target": "linux/arm64",
  "http": ":56700",
  "workdir": "/path/to/workdir",
  "kernel_obj": "/path/to/kernel",
  "image": "/path/to/rootfs.ext3",
  "sshkey": "/path/to/id_rsa",
  "procs": 8,
  "enable_syscalls": ["openat$module_name", "ioctl$IOCTL_CMD", "mmap"],
  "type": "qemu",
  "vm": { "count": 4, "cpu": 2, "mem": 2048 }
}
  • Limit enable_syscalls to deepen coverage on specific subsystems
  • Use syz-extract to pull constants for custom modules
  • Enable CONFIG_KASAN=y, CONFIG_KCFI=y, CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y
  • Use kcov filters and syz_cover_filter to direct coverage
  • Network fuzzing: inject via TUN/TAP + pseudo-syscalls (syz_emit_ethernet)
  • Crash decode: ./scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh vmlinux ... < dmesg.log

syzkaller repro:

syz-execprog -repeat=0 -procs=1 -cover=0 -debug target.repro

EDR / Windows Scanning Engines

WTF snapshot harness skeleton (mpengine.dll / mini-filter):

g_Backend->SetBreakpoint("nt!KeBugCheck2", [](Backend_t *Backend) {
    const uint64_t BCode = Backend->GetArg(0);
    Backend->Stop(Crash_t(fmt::format("crash-{:#x}", BCode)));
});

FilterConnectionPort fuzzing:

HANDLE hPort;
FilterConnectCommunicationPort(L"\\PortName", 0, NULL, 0, NULL, &hPort);
FilterSendMessage(hPort, fuzzData, sizeof(fuzzData), NULL, 0, &bytesReturned);

IOCTL fuzzing pattern:

HANDLE hDev = CreateFile(L"\\\\.\\DeviceName", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, ...);
DeviceIoControl(hDev, ioctlCode, inputBuf, inputLen, outBuf, outLen, &ret, NULL);
  • Take snapshots after initialization, right before parse/dispatch loop
  • Use IDA Lighthouse for coverage visualization
  • Monitor: DRIVER_VERIFIER_DETECTED_VIOLATION (0xc4), IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (0xa)
  • WinDbg: .symfix; !analyze -v; k; !heap -p -a @rax

Cross-platform mpengine.dll on Linux (loadlibrary + HF_ITER + Intel PT):

// Bypass Lua VM to avoid stability issues
insert_function_redirect((void*)luaV_execute_address, my_lua_exec, HOOK_REPLACE_FUNCTION);
for (;;) {
    HF_ITER(&buf, &len);
    ScanDescriptor.UserPtr = fmemopen(buf, len, "r");
    __rsignal(&KernelHandle, RSIG_SCAN_STREAMBUFFER, &ScanParams, sizeof ScanParams);
}

Rust

# Full Rust fuzzing pipeline
cargo test                                         # 1. property tests
cargo +nightly miri test                           # 2. UB via interpreter
cargo +nightly careful test                        # 3. runtime bounds checks
cargo fuzz run fuzz_target_1 -- -max_total_time=3600  # 4. libFuzzer crashes
RUSTFLAGS="--cfg loom" cargo test --release        # 5. concurrency (if needed)
cargo fuzz coverage fuzz_target_1                  # 6. coverage report

Focus unsafe blocks on: Vec::from_raw_parts, unchecked indexing, transmute size mismatches, pointer arithmetic, FFI integer truncation.

Embedded / Binary-Only

  • LibAFL: Modular Rust framework; Unicorn engine, snapshot module, LBRFeedback (zero-instrumentation on Intel), SAND decoupled sanitization
  • Retrowrite / QASAN: Binary rewriting for coverage + ASan without source
  • Nautilus: Grammar-based fuzzing for structured formats

Language Ecosystems

  • Go 1.18+: go test -fuzz=Fuzz -run=^$ ./...
  • Python: Atheris (CPython native extension fuzzing)
  • Rust: cargo-fuzz or honggfuzz-rs
  • JS engines: Fuzzilli with extended instrumentation (__builtin_return_address(0) for PC tracking)
  • Wasm runtimes: wasmtime-fuzz, wafl for differential fuzzing across V8/Wasmer/Wasmtime
  • Smart contracts: Echidna, Foundry-fuzz (Solidity); Move-Fuzz (Aptos/Sui)

CI/CD Integration

- name: Build with afl-clang-fast
  run: CC=afl-clang-fast make -j
- name: Fuzz (smoke, 15 min)
  run: timeout 15m afl-fuzz -i seeds -o findings -- ./target @@ || true
- name: Upload crashes
  if: always()
  uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  with:
    path: findings/**/crashes/*

Use ClusterFuzzLite for persistent continuous fuzzing; cache corpora between runs.

Crash Analysis Quick Reference

Linux:

ulimit -c unlimited && sysctl -w kernel.core_pattern=core.%e.%p
gdb -q ./target core.* -ex 'bt' -ex 'info reg' -ex q
addr2line -e ./target 0xDEADBEEF

Windows:

# Enable local dumps
New-Item 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\LocalDumps' -Force
# PageHeap
gflags /p /enable target.exe /full

Kernel KASAN/KMSAN:

dmesg -T | egrep -i 'kasan|kmsan' -A 60
./scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh vmlinux /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build < dmesg.log

Reproducibility: pin CPU governor, disable ASLR only where safe, fix RNG seeds, save input sequences in persistent mode, record binary hashes and sanitizer options with every crash.

Tool Index

ToolUse Case
AFL++General GreyBox, CmpLog, MOpt, Nyx
HonggfuzzIntel PT, crash detection, HF_ITER
libFuzzerIn-process, source available
syzkallerLinux/Windows kernel syscall fuzzing
wtfSnapshot fuzzing, Windows targets
NyxAFL++ snapshot mode (Intel PT)
SnapchangeAWS snapshot fuzzing
LibAFLCustom Rust fuzzing framework
AFLGoDirected fuzzing to target BB/function
kAFLKernel + OS fuzzing
JackalopeBinary coverage-guided (Windows/macOS)
cargo-fuzzRust libFuzzer integration
AtherisPython fuzzing
NautilusGrammar-based fuzzing
AFLTriageAutomated crash triage
afl-covCoverage analysis for AFL++
ClusterFuzzDistributed fuzzing infrastructure

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