Auth System Setup
Overview
Designs and implements complete authentication and authorization systems for web applications. Covers OAuth 2.0 provider integration (Google, GitHub, Microsoft), session and token management, role-based access control (RBAC), and permission architectures. Generates production-ready code, database migrations, and tests.
Instructions
1. Gather Requirements
Before generating any code, determine:
- Tech stack: Backend framework, database, frontend framework
- Auth method: OAuth providers, email/password, magic links, or combination
- Roles needed: What roles exist? What can each role do?
- Token strategy: Stateless JWT, server-side sessions, or hybrid
- Compliance: GDPR, SOC 2, HIPAA — affects data storage and logging
2. Design the Auth Architecture
Create the auth flow diagram and data model:
- User table: id, email, name, avatar, provider, provider_id, created_at
- Role table: id, name, description
- Permission table: id, resource, action (read/write/delete)
- Role-Permission mapping: role_id, permission_id
- User-Role mapping: user_id, role_id
- Refresh token table: id, user_id, token_hash, family_id, expires_at, revoked_at
3. Implement OAuth Flow
For each OAuth provider:
- Create provider configuration (client ID, secret, scopes, callback URL)
- Implement the authorization redirect with state parameter and PKCE
- Handle the callback: exchange code for tokens, extract user profile
- Provision or update the user record
- Issue application tokens (access + refresh)
Always use PKCE for public clients. Always validate the state parameter.
RFC 9700 (the OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice) requires PKCE for public clients and recommends it for confidential ones. Send code_challenge_method=S256. GitHub's OAuth documentation lists code_challenge as strongly recommended. Keep the code_verifier and state server-side, or in an httpOnly cookie with SameSite=Lax. The provider redirects back to your callback cross-site, and browsers do not send SameSite=Strict cookies on that navigation, so a Strict cookie breaks the callback.
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
// Generate per-login values before redirecting to the provider
export function createPkcePair() {
const codeVerifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'); // 43 characters (RFC 7636 allows 43-128)
const codeChallenge = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(codeVerifier).digest('base64url');
const state = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
return { codeVerifier, codeChallenge, state };
}
// Authorization URL for Google (accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth)
const { codeVerifier, codeChallenge, state } = createPkcePair();
// Store codeVerifier and state server-side (or in the SameSite=Lax cookie) for the callback
const url = new URL('https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth');
url.search = new URLSearchParams({
client_id: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID,
redirect_uri: 'https://app.terminalskills.io/auth/callback', // must match the registered callback
response_type: 'code',
scope: 'openid email profile',
state,
code_challenge: codeChallenge,
code_challenge_method: 'S256',
}).toString();
4. Implement RBAC
Generate the permission-checking middleware:
authorize(resource, action) → middleware function
1. Extract user from request (via JWT or session)
2. Load user roles and permissions (cache with TTL)
3. Check if any role grants the required permission
4. Return 403 with clear error if denied
For row-level security, add ownership filters:
filterByOwnership(resource) → middleware function
1. If user role has wildcard access, skip filter
2. Otherwise, add WHERE clause: resource.owner_id = user.id
3. Apply to SELECT, UPDATE, DELETE queries
5. Generate Tests
Create tests for:
- OAuth flow: successful login, invalid state, expired code
- Token lifecycle: issue, refresh, rotate, revoke
- RBAC: each role accessing allowed and denied resources
- Edge cases: expired tokens, revoked refresh tokens, role changes mid-session
Examples
Example 1: Express + PostgreSQL + Google OAuth
Prompt: "Set up Google OAuth with JWT tokens for my Express app. I need admin and user roles."
Output:
auth/providers/google.ts — OAuth 2.0 + PKCE flow
auth/middleware/authenticate.ts — JWT verification
auth/middleware/authorize.ts — Role checker
migrations/001_auth_tables.sql — Users, roles, permissions, refresh_tokens
auth/services/token.service.ts — JWT issuance with refresh rotation
auth/routes.ts — /auth/google, /auth/callback, /auth/refresh, /auth/logout
tests/auth.test.ts — 18 integration tests
Example 2: Django + GitHub OAuth + Multi-tenant RBAC
Prompt: "Add GitHub login to my Django app. Each organization has its own roles: owner, editor, viewer."
Output:
accounts/providers/github.py — OAuth integration via django-allauth
accounts/models.py — Organization, Membership, Role models
accounts/permissions.py — Per-organization permission backend
accounts/middleware.py — Org context middleware (from subdomain or header)
accounts/decorators.py — @require_org_role('editor') decorator
migrations/0001_multi_tenant_auth.py — Schema migration
tests/test_permissions.py — 22 test cases across org boundaries
Guidelines
- Never store plain-text passwords — use bcrypt with cost factor 12+ or argon2id
- Always use PKCE for OAuth flows, even with confidential clients
- Rotate refresh tokens on every use — detect reuse to identify token theft (RFC 9700 §4.14 describes the same rotation)
- Set short access token TTL — 15 minutes is a common default, not a standard; pick the value that fits your session length
- Cache permissions — reload on role change, not on every request
- Log auth events — login, logout, failed attempts, role changes (for audit trail)
- Rate limit auth endpoints — prevent brute force on login and token refresh
- Use httpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict cookies for refresh tokens in browsers
- Never put sensitive data in JWT payload — it's base64, not encrypted