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Methodology for detecting client SOC patches, attacker activity, and security-state changes that occur DURING a red-team engagement — and converting those observations into deliverable findings. Built from authorized red-team work where the client patched a confirmed SQLi within 30 minutes of detection AND an external attacker locked multiple new accounts during a single test session. Use when (a) running ANY active engagement against a monitored target, (b) a previously-confirmed finding stops reproducing, (c) baseline timing shifts unexpectedly, or (d) you notice response patterns changing during testing.

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External SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, F5 Big-IP. Covers version fingerprinting, CVE matrix (2018-2026), AAA backend identification, default credentials, configuration-disclosure paths, pre-auth RCE/SSRF/path-traversal exploits where applicable. Built from authorized-engagement Cisco ASA testing plus 2024-2026 enterprise VPN CVE landscape. Use whenever the target's perimeter exposes any SSL VPN appliance or remote-access gateway — these are the most common initial-access points in 2024-2026 actor TTPs.

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This skill should be used when the user asks to "test for XSS vulnerabilities", "perform cross-site scripting attacks", "identify HTML injection flaws", "exploit client-side injection vulnerabilities", "steal cookies via XSS", or "bypass content security policies". It provides comprehensive techniques for detecting, exploiting, and understanding XSS and HTML injection attack vectors in web applications.

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This skill should be used when the user asks to "test for SQL injection vulnerabilities", "perform SQLi attacks", "bypass authentication using SQL injection", "extract database information through injection", "detect SQL injection flaws", or "exploit database query vulnerabilities". It provides comprehensive techniques for identifying, exploiting, and understanding SQL injection attack vectors across different database systems.

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This skill should be used when the user asks to "test for HTML injection", "inject HTML into web pages", "perform HTML injection attacks", "deface web applications", or "test content injection vulnerabilities". It provides comprehensive HTML injection attack techniques and testing methodologies.

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This skill should be used when the user asks to "attack Active Directory", "exploit AD", "Kerberoasting", "DCSync", "pass-the-hash", "BloodHound enumeration", "Golden Ticket", "Silver Ticket", "AS-REP roasting", "NTLM relay", or needs guidance on Windows domain penetration testing.

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Provides cryptography attack techniques for CTF challenges. Use when attacking encryption, hashing, signatures, ZKP, PRNG, or mathematical crypto problems involving RSA, AES, ECC, lattices, LWE, CVP, number theory, Coppersmith, Pollard, Wiener, padding oracle, GCM, key derivation, or stream/block cipher weaknesses.

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[omh] Attack paths into an operated system: turn a system's components and data flows into assets, trust boundaries, attack scenarios, controls, and the security test that proves each control holds. Use when the user says: application-threat-model, application threat model, threat model, threat modeling, threat modelling, threat modeling session, threat modeling workshop, security threat model.

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Configures AWS Shield Advanced for enhanced Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection: subscribing accounts and adding resource protections, enabling automatic application layer (layer 7) mitigation through AWS WAF, configuring health-based detection with Route 53 health checks, setting up Shield Response Team (SRT) access and proactive engagement, reviewing DDoS events and requesting cost protection credits, and aggregating resources into protection groups. Applicable when the user wants stronger DDoS protection for internet-facing resources (CloudFront, Application or Network Load Balancers, Elastic IP addresses, Global Accelerator, or Route 53 hosted zones), wants expert help during an attack, or wants to recover attack-driven scaling charges. Routes to the right per-task procedure in references. Not applicable for authoring AWS WAF rules (waf skill), creating Route 53 health checks (route53 skill), or org-wide Shield Advanced rollout with Firewall Manager (firewallmanager skill).

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Comprehensive OSINT methodology for external red-team operations and authorized attack-surface assessments. Covers the 6-stage recon pipeline (seed → asset expansion → enrichment → exposure analysis → convergence → operator-armed active validation) with connector-resilience and stage-vs-gating discipline, asset-graph discipline, severity rubric, confidence upgrade workflows, time budgeting, identity-fabric mapping, breach×identity correlation with per-person identity dossiers, detectability tagging, detection-aware probing, WAF/CDN bypass, vulnerability prioritization, phishing infrastructure planning, bug bounty submission, and client deliverable templates. Use when planning or executing reconnaissance against authorized targets, mapping an organization's external attack surface, investigating a person/entity, or producing client deliverables.

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Rigorous, defensible email-spoofability verdict and SPF supply-chain risk analysis computed from published DNS alone. Deepens the record-level SPF/DMARC/DKIM/BIMI/MTA-STS/DNSSEC fetch recipes in the offensive-osint arsenal (§16.14) with the reasoning that section doesn't do: a priority-ordered composite verdict for whether an attacker can actually land header-From-spoofed mail in an inbox, and by which vector (exact-domain vs subdomain) — grounded in the single most-misunderstood distinction in email security: the envelope MAIL FROM that SPF authenticates vs the visible header From: that only DMARC governs. Explains precisely why SPF -all/~all alone is NOT spoof-proof without DMARC enforcement, and why SPF +all bypasses DMARC even under p=reject pct=100. Covers RFC 7208 §4.6.4's 10-DNS-lookup / 2-void-lookup PermError fail-open condition with a runnable stdlib-only lookup-counter script, plus the SPF-include-takeover supply-chain vector (an attacker re-registering a dead include inherits SPF-pass authority over the victim domain) with strict transient-vs-NXDOMAIN discrimination discipline so a temporary SERVFAIL is never mistaken for a takeover lead. Fully passive: DNS TXT reads only, no mail sent, no RCPT TO probe, no API keys. Use when auditing a domain's real spoofing resistance (not just its published records), explaining to a client why 'we have SPF -all' does not mean they're covered, investigating an SPF PermError or an unusually long include chain, evaluating a dead SPF include as a takeover lead, or writing a defensible spoofability finding for a deliverable.

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FAIR-aligned exposure quantification: turns a pile of recon findings into a defensible 0-100 + A-F org risk score (Likelihood x Impact, three ownership-aware factors: exposure/threat/impact), an ownership + proof demotion cap so unproven or weakly-owned findings can't inflate the number, a $-denominated FAIR loss-magnitude estimate (IBM/Ponemon per-record cost bands, cross-source record dedup, threat-factor annualization), attack-path amplification (curated red-team chain catalog + generic graph-walk engine, with a kill-chain vs shared-fate honesty gate), and a board-ready one-pager deliverable (hero $ + letter grade + top-3 findings + top attack path + the ask). Extends osint-methodology's severity rubric and client deliverable templates with quantification. Passive analysis only -- operates on findings already collected, no target traffic, no API keys. Use when asked to score risk, quantify exposure, estimate breach cost, build a board report, translate technical findings to dollars, or explain why a grade or dollar figure came out the way it did.

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Org-grade attack-surface mapping: given a company's legal identity, discover its ENTIRE owned internet footprint — corporate family -> owned domains -> owned netblocks/ASN -> live assets — with attribution discipline, not just DNS breadth. The org-first attribution pyramid (legal entity -> LEI/registration -> corporate family -> owned domains -> owned netblocks/ASN -> live assets). Corporate-identity resolution via the GLEIF LEI API (legal name -> LEI, exact-LEI direct-children expansion, downward-only depth-capped BFS, NEVER a name re-resolution), SEC-EDGAR full-text search + Exhibit-21 subsidiary entity names, OpenCorporates entity corroboration, Wikidata SPARQL corporate graph (P856/P355/P749/P1830). Domain attribution via reverse-WHOIS (WhoisXML preview-then-purchase quota guard, SecurityTrails associated-domains — both paid), crt.sh O= certificate-transparency organization pivot (keyless), infrastructure correlation (shared NS/MX/SaaS-TXT, netblock membership, reverse-DNS PTR), and the independent-evidence combiner (1-prod(1-w_i), rule of three, OwnerTier NONE/WEAK/MODERATE/STRONG/CONFIRMED) — discover-only `related:` candidates are NEVER auto-scanned. Netblock/ASN attribution via org-first RIR queries (ARIN Whois-RWS org-handle search, RIPE DB organisation + inverse-org search) that recover 'dark netblocks' with no DNS link to the seed, ASN discovery (RIPEstat + BGPView union), the HYPERSCALER-SCOPE GUARD (never attribute a whole AWS/GCP/Azure/Cloudflare announced range to a tenant — keep only the seed-containing block, tag shared_hosting_cdn), and org-identity-seeded internet-scan-index queries (Shodan/Censys/ZoomEye/FOFA/BinaryEdge org: filters + an always-on keyless crt.sh fallback). Promote-to-scan triage ranks forgotten discover-only netblocks by remote-access exposure (gateway-vendor/KEV/control-plane/datastore port scoring) into an operator queue. Attribution confidence rubric + anti-patterns (namesake grafting via GLEIF name re-resolution, single-signal ownership, hyperscaler over-attribution, privacy-WHOIS pivot poisoning, RIR org-name collisions). Passive/keyless-first OSINT only — every paid-key dependency is enrichment on top of a keyless core, never a hard requirement. Use when mapping an organization's full corporate-family internet footprint, resolving a legal entity to its LEI/subsidiaries, discovering domains/netblocks/ASNs an org owns beyond its one seed domain, auditing M&A/shadow-IT sprawl, or scoping an engagement that starts from a company NAME rather than a domain.

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Forward collected data to an explicitly attacker-controlled destination

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JWT and OAuth token attack playbook. Use when validating token trust, signing algorithms, key handling, claim abuse, bearer flows, and OAuth account-binding weaknesses.

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Lattice-based cryptanalysis playbook. Use when attacking RSA via Coppersmith small roots, recovering DSA/ECDSA nonces from bias, solving knapsack problems, or applying LLL/BKZ reduction to cryptographic constructions.

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SAML SSO assertion attack playbook. Use when testing signature validation, assertion wrapping, audience restrictions, ACS handling, XML trust boundaries, and enterprise SSO flaws.

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RSA attack playbook for CTF and real-world cryptanalysis. Use when given RSA parameters (n, e, c) and need to recover plaintext by exploiting weak keys, small exponents, shared factors, or padding oracles.

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HTTP/2 protocol-specific attack playbook. Use when the target supports HTTP/2 and you need to exploit binary framing, HPACK compression, h2c upgrade smuggling, pseudo-header injection, stream multiplexing abuse, or H2→H1 downgrade translation flaws.

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AI/ML security playbook. Use when assessing model supply chain attacks (pickle RCE, poisoned weights), adversarial examples, model poisoning, model stealing, data privacy attacks (membership inference, model inversion), and autonomous agent security risks.

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Builds the capability to notice an attack in progress — deciding what to log and retain, centralizing it somewhere tamper-resistant, writing detections that fire on attacker behavior rather than on individual events, tuning out the noise that trains people to ignore alerts, and defining what happens when something fires. Use this to design or assess monitoring coverage, work out why an incident went unnoticed, cut alert volume without losing signal, or decide what a detection capability should cost.

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For authorized security review of code, auth, or APIs you control, model the attacker, map the attack surface, and report only findings with a reproducible exploit path and verified mitigation.

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Use when designing or auditing ACM CCS experiments, attack demonstrations, adaptive-attack defense evaluations, security measurements, baselines, overhead and cost reporting, ablations, and claim-to-evidence fit, with emphasis on evidence that survives an adversarial program committee rather than leaderboard wins.

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Detect, respond to, and prevent software supply chain attacks on package registries, container images, and CI/CD pipelines with lockfile auditing, provenance verification, and emergency response playbooks.

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