2,094 件 ・ 関連度順
概要と使いどころ
Act on a Caveman learn report - review the ranked token sinks, apply cost-lowering fixes with per-edit consent, and report what those fixes returned. Use when asked to lower an agent's token cost, what caveman has saved, to trim a heavy CLAUDE.md, or to offload re-pasted context into cavemem.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
TDD workflow for RTK filter development. Red-Green-Refactor with Rust idioms. Real fixtures, token savings assertions, snapshot tests with insta. Auto-triggers on new filter implementation.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Manage API key authentication and session tokens. Start here to authenticate requests via Bearer token, obtain session cookies, and configure login requirements for the OmniRoute API.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Wrap getTokenOptimizer().getCompactContext() to retrieve compacted ReasoningBank context for cost-analysis queries; report bridge-reported tokensSaved
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Cost per million tokens on hardware you own (Ollama, llama.cpp, vLLM, LM Studio) from watts, electricity price, hardware price and measured tokens/second, and the utilisation at which local beats a hosted model. Use for local-vs-API break-even questions.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Reference for the Claude API / Anthropic SDK — model ids, pricing, params, streaming, tool use, MCP, agents, caching, token counting, model migration. TRIGGER — read BEFORE opening the target file; don't skip because it "looks like a one-liner" — whenever: the prompt names Claude/Anthropic in any form (Claude, Anthropic, Fable, Opus, Sonnet, Haiku, `anthropic`, `@anthropic-ai`, `claude-*`, `us.anthropic.*`, `[1m]`); the user asks about an LLM (pricing/model choice/limits/caching) — never answer from memory; OR the task is LLM-shaped with provider unstated (agent/MCP/tool-definition/multi-agent/RAG/LLM-judge/computer-use; generate/summarize/extract/classify/rewrite/converse over NL; debugging refusals/cutoffs/streaming/tool-calls/tokens). SKIP only when another provider is being worked on (overrides all triggers): OpenAI/GPT/Gemini/Llama/Mistral/Cohere/Ollama named in the query; OR `grep -rE 'openai|langchain_openai|google.generativeai|genai|mistralai|cohere|ollama'` over the project hits (run this grep FIRST if no provider named — don't Read the file).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Azure Communication Services common utilities for Java. Use when working with CommunicationTokenCredential, user identifiers, token refresh, or shared authentication across ACS services.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Linux credential artifacts, service tokens, SSH material, cloud and container secrets, socket-level trust, and host-to-host pivot chains. Use when the user asks to trace Linux auth artifacts, accepted token or key replay, socket or service-account trust edges, sudo or capability abuse, or explain lateral movement across Linux challenge nodes. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for SSRF reachability, internal route probing, metadata-service access, credential pivoting, and token-to-accepted-privilege chains. Use when the user asks to trace SSRF sources, internal hosts, metadata endpoints, link-local tokens, service-account credentials, or explain how a server-side fetch edge turns into accepted access. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for JWT, JWS, and JWE validation paths, header parsing, key selection, claim acceptance, audience and issuer checks, role derivation, and token-to-identity confusion bugs. Use when the user asks to inspect JWT headers or claims, key lookup, `kid` handling, `alg` confusion, audience or issuer validation, role claims, or explain how a token becomes accepted identity or privilege. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for OAuth, OIDC, redirect flows, state or nonce handling, PKCE, token exchange, refresh logic, claim mapping, and accepted login paths. Use when the user asks to trace redirects, callback parameters, scopes, state, nonce, PKCE, refresh tokens, consent, or explain how an OAuth or OIDC chain turns into accepted identity or privilege. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Build scalable design systems with design tokens, theming infrastructure, and component architecture patterns. Use when creating design tokens, implementing theme switching, building component libraries, or establishing design system foundations.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Security hardening reviewer for GitHub Actions workflow files (.github/workflows/*.yml). Reasons about the Actions threat model that pattern matchers and general code linters miss — untrusted-input script injection, privileged triggers running fork code, mutable action references, and over-scoped tokens. Use this skill when asked to review, audit, harden, or secure a GitHub Actions workflow, when writing a new workflow, or for any request like "is this workflow safe?", "review my CI for security issues", "why is pull_request_target dangerous here?", "pin my actions", or "lock down GITHUB_TOKEN permissions". Covers script injection via ${{ }} interpolation, pull_request_target / workflow_run privilege escalation, SHA-pinning of third-party actions, least-privilege permissions, GITHUB_ENV/GITHUB_OUTPUT injection, secret exposure, OIDC over long-lived credentials, and self-hosted runner exposure on public repositories.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Set up the Telegram channel — save the bot token and review access policy. Use when the user pastes a Telegram bot token, asks to configure Telegram, asks "how do I set this up" or "who can reach me," or wants to check channel status.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Set up the Discord channel — save the bot token and review access policy. Use when the user pastes a Discord bot token, asks to configure Discord, asks "how do I set this up" or "who can reach me," or wants to check channel status.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Add or verify a model's chat prompt rendering and tokenization in rust/sglang-processor so it matches SGLang's Python serving path exactly (same prompt text, same token ids). Use when adding a model to sglang-processor, porting a model's rendering from sgl-router, bumping Dynamo's renderer, or debugging a processor-vs-Python prompt mismatch.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Re-encode verbose prose into a dense telegraphic register — punctuation as connectives, label frames, verbless assertions — without losing normativity or precision. Use when compressing system prompts, tool/function descriptions, skill bodies, or agent instructions; reducing token count or context bloat; making documentation token-efficient for LLM input; or rewriting text in compressed notation.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detect privilege escalation attempts across Windows and Linux, including access token manipulation, UAC bypass, unquoted service path abuse, kernel exploits, and sudo/doas abuse. Use when threat hunting for T1068-style privilege escalation, triaging EDR/SIEM alerts on suspicious privilege changes, scoping compromise during incident response, or validating detection coverage in a purple team exercise.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Audit Azure Storage accounts for public blob containers, missing encryption, overly permissive SAS tokens, disabled logging, and network access violations using Azure CLI, PowerShell, and Microsoft Defender for Storage. Use for storage security audits across subscriptions, responding to Defender for Storage anonymous-access alerts, verifying compliance controls, or setting security baselines when onboarding a subscription.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Audit Azure Blob and ADLS storage accounts for public access exposure, weak or long-lived SAS tokens, missing encryption at rest, disabled HTTPS-only traffic, and outdated TLS versions, using the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK to generate a risk-scored report. Use when assessing an Azure subscription's storage accounts for misconfiguration, building cloud security posture checks, or investigating a suspected data exposure via public blob access.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Plan, run, and measure an adversary engagement operation using the MITRE Engage framework so that deployed deception is driven by strategy instead of deployed ad hoc. Covers the Engage Matrix (Prepare, Expose, Affect, Elicit, Understand), the 10-Step Operational Process, mapping engagement Activities to the ATT&CK techniques they expose, and defining measurable Goals and Operational Objectives. Use when a team has honeypots, honeytokens, or canary tokens but no coordinating strategy, when leadership asks "should we engage attackers and how", when building a deception/denial program, when writing an adversary engagement operation plan, or when deciding which deception Activities to deploy against a specific threat actor. Keywords: MITRE Engage, adversary engagement, cyber deception strategy, denial and deception, Engage Matrix, EAC, EGO, Expose Affect Elicit, deception program, honeypot strategy, engagement operation.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware encryption activity in real time. Uses strategically placed decoy documents monitored via file integrity monitoring or OS-level watchdogs to trigger alerts when ransomware modifies or encrypts them. Activates for requests involving ransomware canary deployment, honeyfile setup, deception-based ransomware detection, or file integrity monitoring for encryption.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Finds over-permissive RBAC roles and service-account token abuse paths in a Kubernetes cluster using kubectl auth can-i, rbac-police, kubectl-who-can, and rakkess, tracing which subjects can escalate toward cluster-admin. Use when reviewing who can escalate privileges in a cluster, hunting exploitable RoleBindings during an authorized review, or validating least privilege after an RBAC change. Keywords: RBAC, ClusterRoleBinding, service account token, auth can-i, rbac-police, escalate, bind, impersonate. Do not use for designing and applying hardened RBAC - use implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Install rtk token-compression proxy into agent containers. Routes Bash tool calls through rtk for 60–90% token savings on dev commands (git, cargo, pytest, docker, kubectl, etc.).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。