「trust」の検索結果

Comprehensive secrets extraction methodology targeting CI/CD environments across all major platforms. Covers environment variable extraction from build contexts, exploitation of vault and secrets-manager misconfigurations (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP Secret Manager), runner and agent token abuse for lateral movement, OIDC federation attacks exploiting trust relationships between CI/CD providers and cloud platforms, build log leakage analysis for inadvertently exposed credentials, cache poisoning techniques for credential exfiltration, platform-specific credential store exploitation (GitHub Actions secrets, GitLab CI variables, Jenkins credential providers), service connection and service account abuse in Azure DevOps and GCP, and Docker registry credential theft from build environments. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1552 (Unsecured Credentials) and its sub-techniques. Each section provides enumeration procedures, extraction techniques, and post-exploitation pivoting guidance for using recovered secrets to expand access.

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Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) attack methodology — GATT enumeration, characteristic read/write without auth, pairing downgrade (Just Works forced), LE Secure Connections bypass, MITM via active relay, sniffing with Sniffle (TI CC1352) / Ubertooth / Frontline, encryption key extraction (LE Legacy Pairing crackable, LE Secure Connections strong), proximity authentication abuse (cars, locks), and companion-app trust analysis. Use for IoT BLE devices, smart locks, fitness trackers, medical devices, BLE beacons, or any device pairing over BLE.

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Comprehensive offensive methodology for software supply chain attacks covering the full kill chain from reconnaissance through exploitation. Addresses dependency confusion across npm, PyPI, and NuGet ecosystems where internal registry override allows an attacker to inject malicious packages that shadow private dependencies. Covers typosquatting techniques for popular packages, compromised package injection via maintainer account takeover or social engineering, and build system attacks through Makefile injection, setup.py install hooks, and npm postinstall scripts. Extends into CI/CD artifact tampering where build outputs are replaced or modified in transit, code signing abuse through stolen or self-signed certificates, upstream repository compromise via commit injection or force-push to trusted repos, and container image supply chain attacks including base image trojaning and registry confusion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) and T1195.002 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain). Integrates tooling such as confused for dependency confusion scanning and dependency-check for known vulnerable component detection. Each technique section provides reproducible proof-of-concept patterns, detection guidance for defenders, and engagement-safe execution notes for authorized red team operations.

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Prompt- and template-complete Google Docs creation and editing with explicit-instruction-authoritative structural preservation, including semantic roles, relationships, comparison dimensions, and instructed extensions; full-topology native-copy routing; source-grounded per-tab adaptation for past/example references; style-preserving hyperlink and table edits; canonical smart-chip-first authoring for dates and relevant supported people or Google resources; a file-backed advisory trusted read before existing-document writes; automatic protected-control awareness; direct connector APIs by default; DOCX-first import only when no supplied Google Doc template/reference constrains the output; and checked-in code mode only for exact native dropdown mutation. Use when Codex must create, edit, fill, adapt, redesign, or verify Google Docs without overriding explicit user/template instructions, adding unrequested document scope, or carrying stale reference facts into a new deliverable.

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Assess whether structured data, query results, dashboards, or analytical evidence are trustworthy enough to use. Use when the task is to check data quality, reconcile conflicting sources or metric definitions, or decide whether evidence is safe to cite.

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Build sandboxed applications for secure code execution. Load when building AI code execution, code interpreters, CI/CD systems, interactive dev environments, or executing untrusted code. Covers Sandbox SDK lifecycle, commands, files, code interpreter, and preview URLs. Biases towards retrieval from Cloudflare docs over pre-trained knowledge.

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Choose, lay out, critique, and explain data visualizations. Use when the user asks what visualization fits a dataset or goal, how a chart, dashboard, operational workspace, UML-like diagram, or software architecture diagram should be composed or interacted with, asks for visual page design, a layout mockup, generated large-screen and mobile concept images, or to be shown what a visualization could look like, when domain-native contextual surfaces or graphical backgrounds may help, when scrollytelling or parallax might be appropriate, wants a critique of an existing visualization, or needs guidance grounded in trusted visualization theory and practice. For advanced visual design or page-layout prompts where composition affects understanding, Codex must generate and show both large-screen and mobile portrait image concepts before implementation or text-only design handoff, plus mobile landscape when needed.

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Inspect macOS signing, entitlements, and Gatekeeper issues. Use when diagnosing code signing, sandbox, hardened runtime, or trust failures.

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Use when reasoning about the rig lifecycle operations family (create / start / stop / resume / restore / snapshot / release / unclaim / destroy), reading or trusting `rig ps` / lifecycle projections after recovery, or designing proof for a lifecycle scenario. Covers the 4 failure modes (auto-restore creates partial rig; projections report healthier than reality; provider auth treated as impl work; resume succeeds for one runtime fails another) plus the restore-honesty rule (failed resume is FAILED loudly — no auto fresh fallback).

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Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) specialist — the technical, on-page publishing work that makes a given page or site discoverable, understandable, trustworthy, quotable, and fresh for AI answer engines (Google AI Overviews, ChatGPT Search, Bing Copilot, Perplexity). Use when asked to 'optimize this page/site for GEO', 'optimize for AI search / answer engines', 'get my page cited by ChatGPT/Perplexity', 'improve AI visibility/citability', 'write an llms.txt', 'add citation-ready structure or schema for AI answers', 'otimizar para busca com IA', or to audit/create/improve a codebase for generative search. Do NOT use for AI-driven SEO content strategy or programmatic pages at scale (use ai-seo), classic keyword/SERP ranking (use seo), accessibility (use web-accessibility), or multi-area site audits (use web-quality-audit).

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Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Use when the user asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats or abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do NOT use for general architecture summaries, code review, security best practices (use security-best-practices), or non-security design work.

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test on Windows, enterprise CA, corporate certificate, GPO cert, TLS fetch failed, Windows sandbox, daytona windows, self-hosted cert. Use when validating iPolloWork Windows enterprise TLS/OS-trust fixes in a Daytona Windows sandbox.

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Detect data exfiltration via URL path encoding and chained web_fetch navigation. Covers fake trusted UI injection, letter-level URL path exfiltration, and multi-hop navigation hijacking. Use when the agent has web/URL fetch capability and stores user memory or personal context.

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Detect agentic supply-chain risks: compromised dependencies, malicious plugins/tools/models, and untrusted update sources.

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Detect social engineering, deceptive responses, false assurances, or prompts that induce unsafe user actions.

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Create or redesign appointment-based service websites for salons, barbers, spas, wellness studios, clinics, and hospitality brands. Use for warm editorial layouts, serif-led identity, documentary portrait crops, calm treatment selectors, location-aware booking, and operational states that remain elegant and trustworthy.

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Capture or repair reliable full-page screenshots for lazy-loaded, scroll-animated, Framer, WebGL/canvas, or reveal-heavy web pages. Use when full-page screenshots are blank, gray, white, sparse, show a tiny content strip, disagree with a working scroll video, or when article evidence/section crops must be derived from a trustworthy full-page image.

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Yellow Network Protocol app sessions for AI agents - a shared room where several agents pool funds, reallocate off-chain at machine speed, and settle one final split. Use for multiparty settlement among agents. Covers connecting, the funded-account prerequisite, creating a session with participants + weights + quorum, deposit, operate, withdraw, close, and the trust boundary. Grounded in the official @yellow-org/sdk lifecycle example.

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Complete deBridge Protocol SDK for building cross-chain bridges, message passing, and token transfers on Solana. Use when building cross-chain applications, bridging assets between Solana and EVM chains, or implementing trustless external calls.

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Use when determining sender identity in any room, managing trusted contacts, configuring the admin's primary notification channel, handling first-contact from a new channel, or escalating to admin across channels.

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Mobile app pentest for bug bounty (Android APK + iOS IPA) — runtime-first workflow: install app, proxy through Burp/mitmproxy, drive the UI, capture packets, then test the API exactly like a web target; escalate to decompile (apktool/jadx) and Frida/objection only when traffic is SSL-pinned, encrypted, or absent. Covers APK/IPA decompile for hardcoded secrets + hidden API endpoints + base URLs the web app never exposes, exported-activity and deeplink intent injection, WebView addJavascriptInterface bridge abuse, SSL pinning bypass (objection patchapk / Frida CertificatePinner + checkServerTrusted hooks), OkHttp interceptor chain to recover request signing, JNI native-lib triage, and the quick apktool/grep secret + endpoint sweep. Use when the program scope includes a mobile app, when web recon dries up and you need a fresh attack surface, or when traffic is pinned and you must MitM it.

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Scan AI agent skills, plugins, MCP servers, and agent tooling for prompt injection, unsafe commands, secret exposure, and supply-chain risks before installing or trusting them.

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Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID (admin@target.com<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see admin@target.com), signature stripping (remove Signature element entirely, server should reject but doesn't), key confusion (signed by attacker's IdP, accepted by SP), audience-restriction not validated, replay attack (same Assertion accepted twice within validity window). Tools: SAML Raider Burp extension, samlmagic, manual XML manipulation. Detection: any /saml endpoint, /Shibboleth.sso, /sso/saml/, Microsoft ADFS endpoints. Validate: account takeover via altered NameID, admin role injection via altered AttributeStatement. Use when hunting SSO flows, when SAML AssertionConsumerService is reachable, when chaining IdP-trust to SP-impersonation.

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Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。