「poi」の検索結果

Builds and queries multi-language source and binary code graphs for security analysis. Includes pre-analysis passes for blast radius, taint propagation, privilege boundaries, entry point enumeration, proxy/unresolved-call tracking, type/reference queries, structural traversal, graph diffs, audit augmentation, declared cross-language/FFI/external links via `.trailmark/links.toml`, and SQL schema graphs. Use when analyzing call paths, mapping attack surface, finding complexity hotspots, enumerating entry points, tracing taint propagation, measuring blast radius, importing SARIF/weAudit/binary findings, linking source graphs across language or RPC boundaries, or building a code graph for audit prioritization. Feature-gate version-specific Trailmark APIs before using them; prefer `trailmark.parse.detect_languages()` or `--language auto` when the target language is unknown or polyglot.

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Guides C++ code toward modern idioms (C++20/23/26). Use when writing new C++ code, modernizing legacy patterns, or working on security-critical C++. Replaces raw pointers with smart pointers, SFINAE with concepts, printf with std::print, error codes with std::expected.

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Dense description covering ARP spoofing, LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS poisoning, DNS poisoning, MITM attacks, VLAN hopping, DHCP attacks, 802.1X/NAC bypass, IPv6 attacks. Tools: Bettercap, Responder, mitm6, Ettercap, Wireshark. MITRE T1557, T1040. Use when conducting internal network assessments or testing Layer 2/3 attack surface.

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Use when creating, refreshing, packaging, inspecting, promoting, or deprecating a named per-seat starting point — Agent Starter manifest authoring, the 6-state lifecycle (captured → named → inspectable → used → promoted → deprecated), provenance honesty, and refusal rules. NOT a VM image; a managed starting point composed from agent role + startup context + optional native session source + provenance.

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Use when configuring `rig watchdog` policies, authoring wake/refocus/alignment-checkpoint messages, or choosing the right intervention level for a stale-owner situation. The 3-level continuity-check stack (wake / refocus / alignment-checkpoint), the discipline that prevents cadence pollution and bureaucracy theater, and the artifact-pool loop-edge pattern for evidence-aware waking.

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Detect persistent instruction injection or long-term memory poisoning. Focus on writing/retaining hostile instructions for future tasks, not data leakage.

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Build a cursor trail whose spacing stays constant at any hand speed, by emitting motes per unit of distance travelled rather than on a timer, so a flick draws the same continuous ribbon as a crawl instead of breaking into scattered dots. Covers sub-segment placement, the ring-buffer ordering trap, the idle breath a distance emitter needs, anchoring the trail to the screen in a 3-D scene, scaling scatter against the plane it hangs on, coasting instead of stopping dead, touch and reduced-motion fallbacks, and why moving the emitter to a DOM overlay to raise its z-index costs more than it buys. Use for cursor wisps, pointer sparks, embers, magic trails, comet tails, plankton, dust, or any mote trail that must stay legible however fast the hand moves.

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Add restrained mouse-driven orbit and parallax depth to a Three.js hero by damping one pointer target and splitting it across camera translation, look-at, and small object rotations. Use for passive cinematic 3D heroes, pointer-responsive scenes, organic model parallax, and interactive depth where OrbitControls would feel like a product viewer.

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Build a cursor or touch particle interaction that emits by distance along the traveled segment into a recycled GPU point pool, with optional keyboard-triggered bursts. Use for interactive particle trails, pollen lifted from a surface, dust disturbed by a pointer, hover particle bursts, and discrete motes whose spacing must stay consistent at different gesture speeds.

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Use git as a safety net - create a checkpoint commit before risky or large changes and roll back cleanly if a change makes things worse. Use before multi-file refactors.

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Adapt designs to work across different screen sizes, devices, contexts, or platforms. Implements breakpoints, fluid layouts, and touch targets. Use when the user mentions responsive design, mobile layouts, breakpoints, viewport adaptation, or cross-device compatibility.

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Draft, audit, or revise point-by-point reviewer response letters for Nature-family manuscript revisions. Use when the user provides reviewer comments, editor decision letters, revision notes, response drafts, or asks how to respond to major/minor revision requests, rebuttal letters, response to reviewers, peer-review reports, 审稿意见回复, 逐点回复, 修回信, 大修回复, 小修回复, or 如何回复 reviewer.

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Guides creation and modification of ASP.NET Core Web API endpoints with correct HTTP semantics, OpenAPI metadata, and error handling. USE FOR: adding new API endpoints (controllers or minimal APIs), wiring up OpenAPI/Swagger, creating .http test files, setting up global error handling middleware. DO NOT USE FOR: general C# coding style, EF Core data access or query optimization (use optimizing-ef-core-queries), frontend/Blazor work, gRPC services, or SignalR hubs.

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Generate or scaffold ASP.NET Core code — Razor Pages, Blazor components, MVC controllers, views, and Minimal API endpoints — without using ASP.NET Core CLI scaffolding/code-generation tools. Use when (1) adding CRUD pages, views, or API endpoints backed by Entity Framework (EF Core) and a database, (2) generating code to create, read, update, and delete data using a DbContext, (3) scaffolding UI components that match the project's existing CSS framework and coding patterns, or (4) creating data-driven forms, tables, and navigation for a model class. Do not use for non-ASP.NET projects or when CLI-based scaffolding is preferred.

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Mobile app pentest for bug bounty (Android APK + iOS IPA) — runtime-first workflow: install app, proxy through Burp/mitmproxy, drive the UI, capture packets, then test the API exactly like a web target; escalate to decompile (apktool/jadx) and Frida/objection only when traffic is SSL-pinned, encrypted, or absent. Covers APK/IPA decompile for hardcoded secrets + hidden API endpoints + base URLs the web app never exposes, exported-activity and deeplink intent injection, WebView addJavascriptInterface bridge abuse, SSL pinning bypass (objection patchapk / Frida CertificatePinner + checkServerTrusted hooks), OkHttp interceptor chain to recover request signing, JNI native-lib triage, and the quick apktool/grep secret + endpoint sweep. Use when the program scope includes a mobile app, when web recon dries up and you need a fresh attack surface, or when traffic is pinned and you must MitM it.

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Argus — the all-seeing scanner suite. Six automated scanners for high-value web + LLM bug classes — CORS misconfiguration (origin reflection / null / credentialed read), CRLF & host-header injection, NoSQL injection (operator auth-bypass / $where blind), JWT attacks (alg:none / RS256→HS256 confusion / secret crack), out-of-band confirmation of blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE/Log4Shell via interactsh, and an LLM red-team corpus (prompt-injection / jailbreak / system-prompt leak / exfil / indirect injection). Use when a target exposes a JSON API, a login endpoint, JWT auth, a parameter that might reach the server, a chatbot/agent, or any endpoint suspected of a blind/out-of-band bug.

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Post-access cloud exploitation for AWS, GCP, and Azure — what to do AFTER you obtain credentials or reach a metadata endpoint. Covers IAM enumeration and privilege escalation (iam:PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AssumeRole chains, GCP service-account impersonation, Azure managed-identity abuse), IMDSv1/v2 metadata credential theft, STS token abuse, S3/GCS/Blob bucket takeover and object exfil, Lambda/Cloud Functions env-var secrets, cross-account and cross-service pivoting, and turning leaked keys into demonstrated impact (read PII, assume admin, exfil data). Assumes authorized scope only. Use when you have AWS/GCP/Azure keys, an SSRF hitting 169.254.169.254 / metadata.google.internal, a leaked service-account JSON, or a token, and need to escalate and prove impact. For finding buckets/origins first, use cloud-recon; for the SSRF entry point, see web2-vuln-classes. 中文触发词：云渗透、AWS提权、IAM枚举、元数据凭证、云安全审计

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Okta-as-IdP red-team attack chain — tenant discovery, user enumeration (multiple vectors), authentication flow analysis (factors enumeration, push-notification fatigue, SMS bypass), password spray with lockout discipline, Okta-specific phishing primitives (kits, FastPass abuse, OIDC redirect_uri tampering), MFA enumeration, post-compromise admin API surface. Many enterprise orgs use Okta instead of (or alongside) Entra ID. Distinct endpoints, distinct rate-limiting, distinct factor flows. Use when recon shows `<tenant>.okta.com`, `<tenant>.okta-emea.com`, `<tenant>.oktapreview.com`, or autodiscover-style records pointing at Okta IdP.

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Operational arsenal for authorized external red-team and bug-bounty recon. Concrete probes, wordlists, regexes, dorks, curl one-liners for: subdomain enum, GraphQL/Swagger/REST discovery, identity fabric (Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML/M365 deep — Teams/SharePoint/OneDrive), cloud bucket enum (S3/GCS/Azure), CDN/WAF bypass, origin discovery, vendor fingerprinting (Citrix/F5/Pulse/Fortinet/PaloAlto/Cisco/VMware), CI/CD exposure, 48-pattern secret-scan catalog (AWS/GCP/GitHub/Stripe/Slack/Anthropic/OpenAI/Atlassian/DataDog/npm/PyPI), Postman workspaces, breach correlation (HudsonRock/HIBP/DeHashed/IntelX), TLS/JA3 audit, certificate transparency, JS endpoint extraction, package registry leaks, mobile/APK recon, sat imagery, sector-specific recon (healthcare DICOM, finance SWIFT, ICS/SCADA Modbus/BACnet). Detail content in 15 modular reference files, loaded on demand. Use for any authorized recon: scoping, asset discovery, attack-path mapping, secret triage, severity scoring.

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Hunt shadow / zombie / undocumented API surface (OWASP API9 Improper Inventory Management) — enumerate the full API version history (v1/v2/beta/legacy paths, header- and subdomain-based versioning), pull and diff every reachable OpenAPI/Swagger spec (including ones only findable via the Wayback Machine), and behaviorally diff old vs. current versions for auth/rate-limit/validation regressions rather than just response-shape differences. Distinct from hunt-api-misconfig, which owns exploitation once you have a spec or endpoint (mass assignment, JWT, OData, Swagger-chain attacks); distinct from hunt-subdomain, which owns host-level discovery. This skill owns the version-inventory and behavioral-diff workflow itself. Use when the target has versioned API paths, multiple specs, a changelog referencing deprecated endpoints, or a mobile app whose hardcoded backend calls look older than the current web app's.

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Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID (admin@target.com<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see admin@target.com), signature stripping (remove Signature element entirely, server should reject but doesn't), key confusion (signed by attacker's IdP, accepted by SP), audience-restriction not validated, replay attack (same Assertion accepted twice within validity window). Tools: SAML Raider Burp extension, samlmagic, manual XML manipulation. Detection: any /saml endpoint, /Shibboleth.sso, /sso/saml/, Microsoft ADFS endpoints. Validate: account takeover via altered NameID, admin role injection via altered AttributeStatement. Use when hunting SSO flows, when SAML AssertionConsumerService is reachable, when chaining IdP-trust to SP-impersonation.

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Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved on (no binding to action/session), (4) static or predictable CAPTCHA values accepted (e.g. '0', 'null', empty string), (5) audio/accessibility CAPTCHA trivially solvable programmatically, (6) CAPTCHA only enforced after N failures (first N requests bypass it). Detection: intercept a successful form submission, remove the CAPTCHA field entirely, replay — if it still succeeds, server-side validation is absent. Medium severity standalone; High when it removes the only rate-limit gate protecting a login, registration, or payment endpoint.

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Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) password reset link works from a different IP/browser (no binding), (5) no rate limit on the reset request endpoint. These are the standalone recovery-flow broken-auth primitives — distinct from reset-email host-header poisoning (hunt-host-header) and the full ATO chain (hunt-ato owns password-reset as an ATO path; prove the primitive here, chain it there). Detection: trace the full forgot-password flow from request to token to use; check response diffs between valid/invalid emails; test token replay after consumption. Medium to High (enumeration=Medium, token-reuse=High, account-takeover=Critical when chained to known-email).

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Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, library versions, or a language traceback. Use on any input-accepting endpoint (JSON APIs, forms, query params). Medium-High when the leak exposes internal structure that arms a deeper attack.

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