375 件 ・ 関連度順
概要と使いどころ
Analyzes encryption algorithms, key management, and file encryption routines used by ransomware families to assess decryption feasibility, identify implementation weaknesses, and support recovery efforts. Covers AES, RSA, ChaCha20, and hybrid encryption schemes. Activates for requests involving ransomware cryptanalysis, encryption analysis, key recovery assessment, or ransomware decryption feasibility.
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Use Sysinternals Autoruns to systematically identify and analyze malware persistence mechanisms across registry keys, scheduled tasks, services, drivers, and startup locations on Windows systems.
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Analyzes malicious VBA macros embedded in Microsoft Office documents (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) to identify download cradles, payload execution, persistence mechanisms, and anti-analysis techniques. Uses olevba, oledump, and VBA deobfuscation to extract the attack chain. Activates for requests involving Office macro analysis, VBA malware investigation, maldoc analysis, or document-based threat examination.
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Start AEM Workflows on AEM as a Cloud Service using all available triggering mechanisms. Use when starting workflows manually via the Timeline UI, programmatically via WorkflowSession.startWorkflow(), via the HTTP Workflow API, through Manage Publication, or passing initial metadata and payload to a workflow instance.
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Comprehensive persistence tradecraft for authorized red team engagements covering Windows and Linux mechanisms. Windows techniques include registry Run/RunOnce keys, scheduled tasks, WMI event subscriptions, DLL search order hijacking, COM object hijacking, Startup folder drops, service creation, Security Support Provider (SSP) DLL injection, and Active Directory persistence (AdminSDHolder abuse, DCShadow, Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket, Skeleton Key, SID History injection). Linux techniques include cron and at jobs, systemd timers and services, SSH authorized_keys injection, shell profile backdoors (.bashrc/.bash_profile), PAM module backdoors, LD_PRELOAD hijacking, kernel module rootkits, web shells, and Git hook abuse. Provides operator-ready command sequences for SharPersist, Impacket ticketer, schtasks, sc.exe, crontab, and systemctl with OPSEC considerations for each method. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1547 (Boot or Logon Autostart), T1053 (Scheduled Task/Job), T1546 (Event Triggered Execution), T1556 (Modi...
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Low-level keylogger architecture design: kernel driver hooks (WH_KEYBOARD_LL, SetWindowsHookEx), ETW-based input capture, user-mode vs kernel-mode approaches, stealth techniques, and data exfiltration. Use for understanding input capture mechanisms, EDR evasion research, or malware architecture analysis.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Deep bug analysis to break the fix-forget-repeat cycle. Analyzes root cause category, why fixes failed, prevention mechanisms, and captures knowledge into specs. Use after fixing a bug to prevent the same class of bugs.
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Architects the encryption, codec/transport, and premium-feature layer of a group video-calling product, on top of an already-chosen SFU topology. Covers E2EE patterns (Zoom leader-fan-out, Signal pairwise-fan-out, MLS/TreeKEM as in Discord's DAVE, Telegram's ledger consensus), the SFrame (RFC 9605) + WebRTC Insertable Streams mechanism letting an SFU relay encrypted frames it can't read, codec/transport choice (AV1/VP9 SVC vs. simulcast, Opus, congestion control, Media-over-QUIC, WHIP/WHEP), and which "premium" features (virtual backgrounds, live captions, recording, breakout rooms, spatial audio) survive E2EE vs. structurally can't. Use when adding E2EE to an SFU-based call, choosing a 2026 codec/SVC strategy, or deciding which features to disable under E2EE mode. NOT for call topology/platform choice (see webrtc-adhoc-video-chat, which this composes with). NOT for one-way broadcast (see managed-video-streaming-pipeline). NOT for the DM/group-chat text backend (see realtime-messaging-backend-architecture).
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Adversarial reviewer for The Federated Harbor whitepaper — the third paper in the Curiositech sequence after Anchor and Bonded Commons. Probes federation-specific threats: trust transitivity, cross-harbor token forgery, federated revocation under partition, cross-harbor Sybil, cross-domain settlement, equivocation, bond-pool draining, cold-start joining, federation-operator Sybil. Use during a versioned red-vs-white round; pairs with federated-harbor-whitehat. NOT for incident response, NOT for the Anchor or Bonded papers (use redteam-review).
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An innate exploratory drive that guarantees no graph node remains permanently invisible to an agent population. After a warm-up period (step > 3), each agent fires a coverage scan with probability |unseen_nodes| / |all_nodes|. When triggered, the agent teleports directly to the globally unseen node with the highest belief uncertainty, works it, and returns control to the normal action-selection loop. Probability is self-annealing: it starts near 1.0 when almost everything is unseen and decays toward 0.0 as coverage saturates, requiring no manual schedule. The mechanism is "innate" (hard-coded into the agent step loop) as distinct from the "adaptive" EFE path, which requires local neighbors and learned precision weights. Together they form a two-layer exploration architecture: adaptive for locally-guided foraging, innate for topological completeness.
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Threat-models protocols where authority, scarce resources, bonds, bounties, escrow, reputation, ordering, adjudication, or settlement create strategic incentives. Use to test attack utility, conservation, collusion, Sybil resistance, oracle capture, griefing, custody, liquidity, and residual risk. NOT for choosing payment or bond amounts without evidence, smart-contract code audit, legal or employment classification, DeFi trading, admitting workers, or settling claims.
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Audit whether an enforced-coordination MCP has actually shrunk its ~19 legacy etiquette verbs into the 5 enforced tools — work/act/ask/recall/status — each carrying one denial shape and one transcript event, migrated through a real retirement path (intake-metadata, alias, or doc-history — never a parallel runtime), with zero legacy-verb calls once a body reaches compliance mode C4+. Use when reviewing a broker-collapse migration plan, gating a body's move from advisory (C0-C3) to enforced (C4+) coordination, or verifying IT-018 Broker Collapse compliance. NOT for the inbound trigger→spawn boundary that decides whether an event may spawn an agent at all (use fleet-event-spawn-trust), the capability-token cryptographic mechanism behind a denial (use agentic-zero-trust-security), designing how a swarm of agents invokes and shards work (use swarm-invocation-designer), or auditing an individual PR's mergeability (use agent-pr-authoring).
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Treat tokens as a coding swarm's cost-of-goods-sold and legibility engine while accounting for finite subscription allowance when per-call price is unknown. Covers provider windows, remaining-usage evidence, burn forecasts, preemptive checkpoint/model switching, per-agent budgets, compaction, shared digests, context degradation, and spend metering. Activate on: "token budget", "context budget", "compaction strategy", "briefing as compression", "context rot", "summarization collapse", "COGS for agents", "subscription usage remaining", "five-hour or weekly limit", "burn forecast", "model switch before limit", or "/context-economics-for-agent-swarms". NOT for: memory architecture (use always-on-agent-architecture), single-prompt wording (use prompt-engineer), mechanism-design proofs (use nisan-et-al-2007-algorithmic-game-theory), physical containment (use sandboxed-adversarial-test-harness), or production rebodiment and fencing (use agent-resurrection-and-body-continuity).
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Audits an Articles of Agreement contract — the daemon-witnessed agreement every official Port Daddy agent signs covering registration, transcript reporting, tool-use gating, file claims, parley conduct, budget limits, and operator control — against the enforcement-beats-hope bar: a clause counts as safe only when it resolves to a concrete, daemon-observable mechanism with a defined denial shape, never a promise the agent might honor. Use when drafting a new agent's Articles, reviewing a compliance-level (C0-C6) claim, deciding whether a clause is genuinely enforced or merely documented, or auditing whether an agent's claimed identity can be trusted. NOT for securing the inbound event-to-spawn path (fleet-event-spawn-trust), designing the relay's transport PKI and signing keys (pd-relay-zero-trust), or tracking an agent's identity and reputation across its whole lifetime after it signs (agent-identity-continuity-reputation).
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Produces a narrow-interval quality signal for a WinDAGs skill that a third party can verify without inspecting model weights or method internals. The mechanism is attribution-kNN over a tamper-evident outcome log (task→skills→accept/reject store), combined with a conformal-prediction calibration certificate that provides a formal coverage guarantee. Thompson/Beta sampling is explicitly rejected as a category error: it produces a selection signal for stationary i.i.d. rewards, not an attestation signal for context-dependent LLM output quality. The resulting bundle — outcome-log Merkle root + conformal threshold + optional TEE guardrail signature — constitutes a "narrow-interval trust" credential: verifiable, bounded, and internals-opaque.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。