930 件 ・ 関連度順
概要と使いどころ
Hunt Open Redirect — all types including low-impact, chained to OAuth token theft → ATO, phishing chains. URL parameter manipulation, JavaScript redirect, meta refresh, header injection. Use when hunting redirect bugs or building ATO chains.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt Next.js specific vulnerabilities — Server Actions arbitrary function execution, Middleware auth bypass via static asset paths, ISR cache poisoning, Image Optimization SSRF (/_next/image), RSC payload leakage, getServerSideProps injection, source map exposure, debug endpoint leakage. Use when target runs Next.js 13/14/15 or any React SSR framework.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, and HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DoS (CVE-2023-44487). Use when target exposes port 50051 / 443 / 8443 / 9090 with HTTP/2, when grpcurl/grpcui detects reflection, when an Envoy or grpc-gateway proxy is fronting a microservice, or when recon reveals a microservice architecture.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: __proto__ injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer poisoning, and absolute-URL link poisoning in emails. High to Critical when it reaches ATO or mass cache poisoning. Built on public Host-header research (PortSwigger 'Practical web cache poisoning' + James Kettle, and the classic password-reset-poisoning class). Use on any forgot-password flow, CDN/reverse-proxy-fronted app, OAuth/OIDC endpoint, or absolute-URL-in-email feature.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt vector-store / embedding-layer weaknesses in RAG pipelines (OWASP LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses) — persistent corpus poisoning that survives across sessions and users (distinct from one-shot indirect prompt injection, which is owned by hunt-llm-ai), cross-tenant vector-database IDOR (unauthenticated or unscoped queries against Pinecone/Weaviate/Chroma/Milvus/Qdrant/pgvector), source-text/metadata leakage in similarity-search results, and retrieval-hijack via adversarial embedding proximity ('SEO poisoning' for RAG). Targets: any app with a shared knowledge base, document upload feeding a chatbot, or a directly reachable vector-DB port. Validate: a second, clean session/account must inherit a poisoned result, or a cross-tenant artifact must be independently verifiable — confabulation is not a finding, same bar as hunt-llm-ai. Use when target is RAG-backed, exposes a vector-DB port, or lets users upload documents that other users' queries later retrieve.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA (CAPTCHA token replay / single-use / concurrency-window bypass specifics → hunt-captcha-bypass), IP-based rate-limit bypass via X-Forwarded-For and friends, ReDoS. Distinguishes hard lockout vs soft IP-throttle vs CAPTCHA-injection vs silent shadow-throttling (avoids false-negative 'no rate limit' conclusions). Medium to Critical depending on what the brute reaches (OTP→ATO = Critical).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable/numeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry/reuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session fixation, (6) JWT manipulation (forge token to another identity; crypto details → hunt-jwt-crypto), (7) password change without step-up (chain with login timing/length oracle), (8) social-recovery / security-question brute-force, (9) SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri. Chains: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = persistent ATO; lax redirect_uri = auth-code theft; dangling-CNAME takeover at redirect_uri = ATO. Validate: demonstrate real takeover of test account B from attacker A's session; OOB/Collaborator confirm blind token-leak steps. Use when hunting ATO chains, testing password reset / email change / MFA / OAuth / session / JWT, or chaining primitives toward Critical.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt JWT cryptographic failures — alg:none signature-stripping and RS256→HS256 key-confusion that let an attacker forge a token for any identity (e.g. an admin) without knowing a secret. Use when the app authenticates with a JSON Web Token (an `eyJ...` Bearer token in the Authorization header, a cookie, or a login response). This skill OWNS JWT signature/crypto forgery (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku header injection); hunt-ato covers JWT as one ATO path, hunt-auth-bypass covers SSO/SAML token trust, hunt-api-misconfig covers non-crypto JWT handling. Critical when a forged token grants access to another user's data or an admin-only endpoint.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
This skill should be used when the user asks to "identify web application vulnerabilities", "explain common security flaws", "understand vulnerability categories", "learn about injection attacks", "review access control weaknesses", "analyze API security issues", "assess security misconfigurations", "understand client-side vulnerabilities", "examine mobile and IoT security flaws", or "reference the OWASP-aligned vulnerability taxonomy". Use this skill to provide comprehensive vulnerability definitions, root causes, impacts, and mitigation strategies across all major web security categories.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Core module implementation for claude-flow v3. Implements DDD domains, clean architecture patterns, dependency injection, and modular TypeScript codebase with comprehensive testing.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Refactor and review SwiftUI view files with strong defaults for small dedicated subviews, MV-over-MVVM data flow, stable view trees, explicit dependency injection, and correct Observation usage. Use when cleaning up a SwiftUI view, splitting long bodies, removing inline actions or side effects, reducing computed `some View` helpers, or standardizing `@Observable` and view model initialization patterns.
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Analyze an existing web application, identify safe user-visible capabilities across routes, forms, server actions, handlers, and schemas, then implement first-party WebMCP tools and validate discovery and invocation with Stagehand. Use when the user asks to make a codebase agent-ready, expose website features as WebMCP tools, or add WebMCP directly to an app rather than generating a standalone injection script from a URL.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Dedicated security-audit route for OWASP-style risks, secret leaks, auth flaws, injection, unsafe input handling, SSRF/XSS, and sensitive-data exposure. Use instead of code-reviewer when the prompt explicitly asks for security, vulnerability, threat, auth, or OWASP review.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Domain routing and boundary guidance for authorized cloud security testing, including IAM misconfiguration, exposed storage, metadata services, and serverless injection. Use when a task belongs to the cloud testing domain and needs scope, evidence, pivot, or exit criteria.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Domain routing and boundary guidance for authorized server-side template injection testing, including Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, Velocity, and Thymeleaf engines. Use when a task belongs to the SSTI domain and needs scope, evidence, pivot, or exit criteria.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Implements dependency injection in Golang using uber-go/dig — reflection-based container, Provide/Invoke, dig.In/dig.Out parameter and result objects, named values, value groups, optional dependencies, scopes, and Decorate. Apply when using or adopting uber-go/dig, when the codebase imports `go.uber.org/dig`, or when wiring an application graph at startup. For higher-level lifecycle and modules, see `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-uber-fx` skill.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Idiomatic Golang design patterns — functional options, constructor APIs, `init()` and global-state avoidance, enums, panic vs error decisions, resource management and lifecycle, graceful shutdown, timeouts and retries, streaming and iterators, and architecture styles (clean, hexagonal, DDD, flat). Apply when choosing between architectural patterns, implementing functional options, designing constructor APIs, setting up graceful shutdown, applying resilience patterns, or asking which idiomatic Go pattern fits a specific problem. Not for wiring a DI container or comparing DI libraries (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-injection` skill), nor for error wrapping, `errors.Is`/`As`, or logging mechanics (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-error-handling` skill).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Compile-time dependency injection in Golang using google/wire — wire.NewSet, wire.Build, wire.Bind (interface→concrete), wire.Struct, wire.Value, wire.InterfaceValue, wire.FieldsOf, cleanup functions, //go:build wireinject injector files, and generated wire_gen.go. Apply when using or adopting google/wire, when the codebase imports `github.com/google/wire`, or when wiring an application graph at compile time via `wire.Build`. For runtime DI with reflection, see `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-uber-dig` skill.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Defensive Golang coding against accidental bugs — nil panics, typed-nil interfaces, `append` backing-array aliasing, silent int64-to-int32 truncation, float `==` comparison, `defer` inside loops, defensive copies of slices and maps, and usable zero values. Use when a Go program panics on a nil map write or nil pointer dereference, when reviewing code for nil-safety, numeric conversion overflow, or resource lifecycle, or when designing a type whose zero value must be safe. Not for designing concurrent access with goroutines, channels, or sync primitives (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-concurrency` skill), not for exploitable vulnerabilities such as injection, weak crypto, or leaked secrets (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-security` skill), and not for debugging an already-failing program (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-troubleshooting` skill).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang — injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and HTTP security headers, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, PII in logs, STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling, plus `gosec` SAST, race detection, and fuzz testing. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when touching crypto, file or network I/O, secrets, user input, or authentication. Not for non-exploitable defensive bugs such as nil panics or slice aliasing (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety` skill), dependency vulnerability scanning with govulncheck (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-management` skill), or wiring security scanners into CI pipelines (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration` skill).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Golang struct and interface design patterns — composition, embedding, type assertions, type switches, interface segregation, dependency injection via interfaces, struct field tags, and pointer vs value receivers. Use this skill when designing Go types, defining or implementing interfaces, embedding structs or interfaces, writing type assertions or type switches, adding struct field tags for JSON/YAML/DB serialization, or choosing between pointer and value receivers. Also use when the user asks about "accept interfaces, return structs", compile-time interface checks, or composing small interfaces into larger ones.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Provides AI and machine learning techniques for CTF challenges. Use when attacking ML models, crafting adversarial examples, performing model extraction, prompt injection, membership inference, training data poisoning, fine-tuning manipulation, neural network analysis, LoRA adapter exploitation, LLM jailbreaking, or solving AI-related puzzles.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。