124 件 ・ 関連度順
概要と使いどころ
Sandbox escape playbook. Use when breaking out of Python sandbox, Lua sandbox, seccomp filter, chroot jail, container/Docker, browser sandbox, or namespace isolation to achieve unrestricted code execution or file access.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Analyzes single-cell pooled CRISPR screens (Perturb-seq, CROP-seq, Perturb-CITE-seq, ECCITE-seq, multiome) where each cell carries an sgRNA and a scRNA-seq / surface-protein / chromatin readout. Covers experimental design (direct-capture Perturb-seq Dixit 2016 vs CROP-seq 3'UTR-barcoded Datlinger 2017 vs ECCITE-seq vs Multiome), MOI for sgRNA assignment, escaper-cell filtering (Mixscape, Papalexi 2021), SCEPTRE NB GLM + permutation for low-MOI (Barry 2024 Genome Biol 25:124), the Pertpy framework, factor decomposition, genome-scale Perturb-seq (Replogle 2022 Cell, 2.5M cells), and per-perturbation single-cell DE. Use when running a single-cell CRISPR screen, choosing direct-capture vs CROP-seq architecture, filtering escaper cells, performing single-cell DE, integrating Perturb-seq with pathway analysis, scaling to GW CRISPRi via Replogle protocol, or analyzing multi-omics screens.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Use when building a client-side browser exploit — V8/JSC JIT type confusion to renderer R/W, V8 heap-sandbox escape, renderer-to-browser sandbox escape (Mojo IPC, GPU/Dawn/ANGLE), Electron/webview IPC abuse, 1-click RCE chains
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Define, track, and act on QA metrics: test coverage percentage, flakiness rate, defect escape rate, MTTR, test execution time trends, automation ROI, quality gates, and SLAs for test suites. Includes metric formulas, realistic targets by company stage, and the action to take when each metric goes red. Use when: "QA metrics," "test metrics," "quality KPIs," "test health," "flakiness rate," "defect escape rate." Not for: building the dashboard UI (Allure/Grafana) — use qa-dashboard; measuring coverage gaps and mutation score — use coverage-analysis. Related: qa-dashboard, coverage-analysis, ci-cd-integration, release-readiness, quality-postmortem.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Analyze escaped defects and test suite health through blameless postmortems. Covers bug pattern analysis, test suite health reviews, 5 Whys root cause analysis, process improvement cycles, and postmortem/retro meeting templates with action item tracking. Use when: "QA retro," "escaped bugs," "postmortem," "quality incident," "defect analysis," "improvement cycle." Not for: live release go/no-go decisions — use release-readiness. Not for ongoing metric dashboards — use qa-metrics. Not for reviewing existing test code quality — use ai-qa-review. Related: qa-metrics, test-reliability, test-strategy.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
红队渗透 / 攻防 — 受授权的红队作业者 + 渗透测试工程师 + 攻击型安全顾问的认知操作系统 (侦察 OSINT / 外网渗透 / 内网 AD 渗透 BloodHound + Kerberoasting + ADCS 利用 + 横向移动 / Web 应用渗透 OWASP WSTG / 移动 OWASP MASTG / 云渗透 AWS Azure GCP IAM 路径 + 容器逃逸 + K8s / C2 操作 Cobalt Strike Sliver Mythic Havoc + OPSEC / 初始访问 + AV EDR 绕过 (仅授权场景) / 无线 RF / 物理社工 / 报告与整改 / 框架 MITRE ATT&CK + D3FEND + PTES + OSSTMM + NIST 800-115 + Kill Chain / 法律伦理 CFAA + 网络安全法 + 刑法 285 286 + 数据安全法 + GDPR + 授权书 + 范围 + 交战规则 — 不含 黑产 / 未授权攻击 / 大规模 exploitation / 供应链投毒 / 未授权 DoS — 这是 重罪 + 行业封杀 + 律师吊销, 本 skill 严守 authorized-only 边界 — 也不含 蓝队 SOC + 恶意软件 即服务 / 僵尸网络 / 勒索软件作者 — 这是 cybercrime 不是 红队) (Cybersecurity Red Team / Offensive Security Operations — the cognitive operating system of authorized red team operators, penetration testers, and offensive security consultants covering (a) reconnaissance & OSINT (passive + active discovery, asset surface mapping), (b) external network pentest (perimeter, exposed services, web), (c) internal network / Active Directory pentest (AD enumeration via BloodHound, Kerberos abuse — Kerberoasting / AS-REP-roasting / Unconstrained delegation / S4U2self, NTLM relay, ADCS abuse, GPO abuse, lateral movement, privilege escalation), (d) web application pentest (OWASP WSTG, authentication, authorization, SSRF, XXE, deserialization, SSTI, prototype pollution, GraphQL, JWT, API), (e) mobile pentest (OWASP MASTG, iOS / Android, instrumentation Frida / Objection, MASVS), (f) cloud pentest (AWS / Azure / GCP — IAM enumeration, privilege escalation paths, container escape, K8s RBAC, serverless), (g) C2 operations & post-exploitation (Cobalt Strike / Sliver / Mythic / Havoc, beacon ops, malleable profiles, OPSEC), (h) initial access & evasion (phishing infrastructure, payload development, AV / EDR evasion, BYOVD, AMSI / ETW bypass — strictly for authorized engagements), (i) wireless / RF (WPA2/3, evil twin, Wi-Fi pivots), (j) physical / social engineering (badge cloning, pretexting, vishing — under engagement letter), (k) reporting & remediation (executive summary, technical findings, CVSS, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, retest), (l) frameworks & methodology (MITRE ATT&CK, MITRE D3FEND, PTES, OSSTMM, NIST SP 800-115, OWASP WSTG / MASTG, Cyber Kill Chain, Unified Kill Chain, Diamond Model), (m) law & ethics (CFAA US, Computer Misuse Act UK, 中国 刑法 285/286 + 网络安全法 + 数据安全法, GDPR for tested EU systems, engagement letter, scope, rules of engagement, safe harbor for bug bounty); NOT criminal hacking / 黑产 / unauthorized targeting / mass exploitation / supply-chain compromise / DoS against unconsented systems (这是 重罪 + 业内开除 + 律师执照吊销, 本 skill 严守 authorized-only 边界), NOT pure defensive blue team / SOC analyst tradecraft (是 平行学科, 仅做 边界标注 + ATT&CK 反推方向), NOT malware-as-a-service development / botnet ops / ransomware authoring (是 cybercrime 不是 红队), NOT 'ethical hacking' 在 'just curious 看看' 自我合理化的灰色操作 (违反 authorization 原则即不是 红队).) Master OS — automated mastery of Cybersecurity Red Team / Offensive Security Operations — the cognitive operating system of authorized red team operators, penetration testers, and offensive security consultants covering (a) reconnaissance & OSINT (passive + active discovery, asset surface mapping), (b) external network pentest (perimeter, exposed services, web), (c) internal network / Active Directory pentest (AD enumeration via BloodHound, Kerberos abuse — Kerberoasting / AS-REP-roasting / Unconstrained delegation / S4U2self, NTLM relay, ADCS abuse, GPO abuse, lateral movement, privilege escalation), (d) web application pentest (OWASP WSTG, authentication, authorization, SSRF, XXE, deserialization, SSTI, prototype pollution, GraphQL, JWT, API), (e) mobile pentest (OWASP MASTG, iOS / Android, instrumentation Frida / Objection, MASVS), (f) cloud pentest (AWS / Azure / GCP — IAM enumeration, privilege escalation paths, container escape, K8s RBAC, serverless), (g) C2 operations & post-exploitation (Cobalt Strike / Sliver / Mythic / Havoc, beacon ops, malleable profiles, OPSEC), (h) initial access & evasi
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Sandbox escape playbook. Use when breaking out of Python sandbox, Lua sandbox, seccomp filter, chroot jail, container/Docker, browser sandbox, or namespace isolation to achieve unrestricted code execution or file access.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Build QA quality dashboards, calculate defect metrics, analyze escape rates, and produce quality trend reports. Use this skill whenever a QA lead or manager needs to measure and communicate quality outcomes. Trigger on phrases like "quality metrics", "defect density", "escape rate", "bug trends", "quality dashboard", "sprint quality report", "test coverage metrics", "QA KPIs", "how is quality trending", "defect leakage", "production bugs this quarter", "mean time to detect", "quality scorecard", or any request to quantify, visualize, or report on the quality of a product or testing process. Also trigger when a manager asks "how is QA performing?" or an engineering lead asks "what does our defect data tell us?".
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Analyzes single-cell pooled CRISPR screens (Perturb-seq, CROP-seq, Perturb-CITE-seq, ECCITE-seq, multiome) where each cell carries an sgRNA and a scRNA-seq / surface-protein / chromatin readout. Covers experimental design (direct-capture Perturb-seq Dixit 2016 vs CROP-seq 3'UTR-barcoded Datlinger 2017 vs ECCITE-seq vs Multiome), MOI for sgRNA assignment, escaper-cell filtering (Mixscape, Papalexi 2021), SCEPTRE NB GLM + permutation for low-MOI (Barry 2024 Genome Biol 25:124), the Pertpy framework, factor decomposition, genome-scale Perturb-seq (Replogle 2022 Cell, 2.5M cells), and per-perturbation single-cell DE. Use when running a single-cell CRISPR screen, choosing direct-capture vs CROP-seq architecture, filtering escaper cells, performing single-cell DE, integrating Perturb-seq with pathway analysis, scaling to GW CRISPRi via Replogle protocol, or analyzing multi-omics screens.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detects prompt injection attacks targeting LLM-based applications using a multi-layered defense combining regex pattern matching for known attack signatures, heuristic scoring for structural anomalies, and transformer-based classification with DeBERTa models. The detector analyzes user inputs before they reach the LLM, flagging direct injections (system prompt overrides, role-play escapes, instruction hijacking) and indirect injections (encoded payloads, multi-language obfuscation, delimiter-based escapes). Based on the OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection) and Simon Willison's prompt injection taxonomy. Activates for requests involving prompt injection detection, LLM input sanitization, AI security scanning, or prompt attack classification.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Write and deploy Falco rules with the modern eBPF driver to detect container escape, namespace abuse, privileged mounts, and anomalous syscalls at runtime in Kubernetes and Docker.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Use when turning something that happened into something that makes the next run better - "write a retro", "record this paper cut", "this bug escaped verification", "make this an eval", "why do we keep hitting this", "did that change actually help", "scorecard", "what did we learn from that run", "lessons keep getting re-learned". Covers the six-step loop (capture, classify, convert, change, measure, retro), the repo artifact each step produces, and how escaped bugs become eval cases. Do NOT use to design or judge a single workflow experiment (see `workflow-experimentation`, which this loop feeds), to decide where to run work (see `dogfooding`), or to debug one failed execution in the moment.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detects prompt injection attacks targeting LLM-based applications using a multi-layered defense combining regex pattern matching for known attack signatures, heuristic scoring for structural anomalies, and transformer-based classification with DeBERTa models. The detector analyzes user inputs before they reach the LLM, flagging direct injections (system prompt overrides, role-play escapes, instruction hijacking) and indirect injections (encoded payloads, multi-language obfuscation, delimiter-based escapes). Based on the OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection) and Simon Willison's prompt injection taxonomy. Activates for requests involving prompt injection detection, LLM input sanitization, AI security scanning, or prompt attack classification.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Analyzes single-cell pooled CRISPR screens (Perturb-seq, CROP-seq, Perturb-CITE-seq, ECCITE-seq, multiome) where each cell carries an sgRNA and a scRNA-seq / surface-protein / chromatin readout. Covers experimental design (direct-capture Perturb-seq Dixit 2016 vs CROP-seq 3'UTR-barcoded Datlinger 2017 vs ECCITE-seq vs Multiome), MOI for sgRNA assignment, escaper-cell filtering (Mixscape, Papalexi 2021), SCEPTRE NB GLM + permutation for low-MOI (Barry 2024 Genome Biol 25:124), the Pertpy framework, factor decomposition, genome-scale Perturb-seq (Replogle 2022 Cell, 2.5M cells), and per-perturbation single-cell DE. Use when running a single-cell CRISPR screen, choosing direct-capture vs CROP-seq architecture, filtering escaper cells, performing single-cell DE, integrating Perturb-seq with pathway analysis, scaling to GW CRISPRi via Replogle protocol, or analyzing multi-omics screens.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Analyzes single-cell pooled CRISPR screens (Perturb-seq, CROP-seq, Perturb-CITE-seq, ECCITE-seq, multiome) where each cell carries an sgRNA and a scRNA-seq / surface-protein / chromatin readout. Covers experimental design (direct-capture Perturb-seq Dixit 2016 vs CROP-seq 3'UTR-barcoded Datlinger 2017 vs ECCITE-seq vs Multiome), MOI for sgRNA assignment, escaper-cell filtering (Mixscape, Papalexi 2021), SCEPTRE NB GLM + permutation for low-MOI (Barry 2024 Genome Biol 25:124), the Pertpy framework, factor decomposition, genome-scale Perturb-seq (Replogle 2022 Cell, 2.5M cells), and per-perturbation single-cell DE. Use when running a single-cell CRISPR screen, choosing direct-capture vs CROP-seq architecture, filtering escaper cells, performing single-cell DE, integrating Perturb-seq with pathway analysis, scaling to GW CRISPRi via Replogle protocol, or analyzing multi-omics screens.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detects prompt injection attacks targeting LLM-based applications using a multi-layered defense combining regex pattern matching for known attack signatures, heuristic scoring for structural anomalies, and transformer-based classification with DeBERTa models. The detector analyzes user inputs before they reach the LLM, flagging direct injections (system prompt overrides, role-play escapes, instruction hijacking) and indirect injections (encoded payloads, multi-language obfuscation, delimiter-based escapes). Based on the OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection) and Simon Willison's prompt injection taxonomy. Activates for requests involving prompt injection detection, LLM input sanitization, AI security scanning, or prompt attack classification.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detect VM/sandbox escape vulnerabilities in packages using node:vm, simpleeval, or custom sandboxes that can be bypassed to achieve code execution.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt Kubernetes & Docker — API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket, NOT plain POST) and the simpler /run primitive, etcd 2379 unauth, dashboard skip-login, RBAC misconfig, secret/SA-token abuse, docker.sock host escape, runc/container-escape (Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626), API-server-mediated nodes/proxy RCE, EphemeralContainers node-shell, bound/projected SA-token audience+expiry abuse, admission-controller bypass, Helm/Tiller remnants. Use when target runs containerized infra, exposes K8s ports (6443/10250/10255/2379/8443), or cloud metadata reveals K8s service accounts.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
You are helping a penetration tester escape from a containerized environment or
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
React / Next.jsのボタン、モーダル、通知、ページ遷移に動きを加え、表示・消去やスクロールに連動するアニメーションを実装するスキル。
Use for authorized cloud, container, and Kubernetes security assessment including metadata SSRF, IAM misconfig, container escape paths, and cluster RBAC review.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Wire CommunityToolkit.Mvvm ViewModels into Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection. Covers the .NET Generic Host composition root, constructor injection, service lifetimes (Singleton / Transient / Scoped), IMessenger registration, resolving ViewModels in Views, keyed services, testing seams, and the legacy Ioc.Default escape hatch. Use across WPF, WinUI 3, .NET MAUI, Uno, and Avalonia.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detects unauthorized runtime drift in containers by monitoring binary execution, filesystem changes, and configuration deviation from the original immutable image, using Falco and Microsoft Defender for Containers. Use when validating immutable-infrastructure controls, hunting for unexpected package installs or binaries written inside a running container, or determining whether a container diverged from the image it was built from. Keywords: drift, immutable infrastructure, new binary executed, package install, image mismatch, Falco. Do not use for detecting breakout from the container to the host - use detecting-container-escape-attempts.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detects prompt injection using regex signature matching, heuristic scoring for structural anomalies, and DeBERTa-based transformer classification, flagging direct injections (system-prompt overrides, role-play escapes) and indirect injections (encoded payloads, obfuscation) per OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01:2025). Use for input validation layers in chatbots/agents/RAG pipelines, or for retrospectively classifying injection attempts in logs or incident investigations.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。