「red-team」の検索結果

Adversarial verification for AI-generated legal content. Use when fact-checking legal documents, validating citations, detecting hallucinations, scoring document quality, or assessing distribution readiness.

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This skill should be used when the user asks to "plan a red team engagement", "scope a penetration test", "design a security assessment methodology", "create rules of engagement", or "plan an adversary simulation".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Adversarial verification of AI-generated legal content with systematic fact-checking, source validation, and quality control. Use when a user asks to verify, fact-check, red-team, validate sources, or quality-control a legal document, briefing, compliance summary, or regulatory analysis before it is distributed to clients, stakeholders, or published. Trigger phrases include "verify", "fact-check", "red team", "red-flag", "check accuracy", "validate sources", "quality control", "is this correct", and "review for errors". Produces a structured verification report with severity-categorized errors, verified sources, unsupported claim list, missing disclaimers, and an explicit distribution-readiness assessment.

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Use when running a full red-team engagement end-to-end — initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, C2 infrastructure, EDR bypass, living-off-the-land

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Plan, execute, document, and retest authorized security assessments of AI agents and multi-agent workflows using safe adversarial cases, synthetic identities, canaries, and evidence-based findings. Use when defining red-team rules of engagement, assessing prompt injection or excessive agency, testing tool and identity boundaries, evaluating memory or cross-agent attacks, scoring a campaign, or verifying remediation in an approved environment.

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Test AI/LLM features that ship in your product. Covers prompt regression testing, response quality evaluation, tool-call validation, hallucination and RAG grounding checks, nondeterministic-output strategies, red-team/safety scans, eval frameworks, and agent-as-target injection (indirect injection via tool output / RAG / scan reports, self-propagating payloads, data exfiltration via an agent) plus a bundled detector for untrusted content. Use when: "test our LLM feature," "prompt regression test," "eval framework," "hallucination test," "RAG grounding," "nondeterministic output," "AI feature testing," "red-team our chatbot," "indirect prompt injection," "agent reading untrusted tool output," "production AI quality." Not for: using AI to generate your own test code — use ai-test-generation. Not for: classifying CI failures with AI — use ai-bug-triage. Not for: EU AI Act / GDPR conformity of an AI feature — use compliance-testing. Not for: canary/flag rollout of an AI feature — use testing-in-production. Related: ai-test-generation, ai-qa-review, api-testing, compliance-testing, security-testing, risk-based-testing, test-data-management.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Red team engagement planning is the foundational phase that defines scope, objectives, rules of engagement (ROE), threat model selection, and operational timelines before any offensive testing begins.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Executes comprehensive red team exercises that simulate real-world adversary operations against an organization's people, processes, and technology. The red team operates with stealth as a primary objective, employing the full attack lifecycle from initial reconnaissance through objective completion while testing the organization's detection and response capabilities. This differs from penetration testing by focusing on adversary emulation rather than vulnerability identification. Activates for requests involving red team exercise, adversary simulation, adversary emulation, or full-scope offensive security assessment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

AI/LLM red-team assessment using the OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) + OWASP AI Testing Guide (AITG v1, Nov 2025) frameworks, plus OWASP MCP Top 10 runtime testing for agentic/MCP targets. Tests prompt injection, jailbreaks, system prompt leakage, sensitive data extraction, excessive agency, improper output handling, model extraction, content bias, evasion, membership inference, MCP token exposure, MCP command injection, and more. Uses four tools in combination: FuzzyAI (single-turn jailbreak fuzzing), PyRIT (multi-turn orchestrated attacks), Garak (probe-based vulnerability scanning), and promptfoo (plugin-based red-team evaluation). Each tool covers different OWASP categories; running them together gives systematic coverage. Includes a conditional MCP reconnaissance phase and a post-access AI infrastructure phase (chained from /post-exploit). Produces: OWASP LLM Top 10 + AITG + MCP coverage matrix, findings per category, architecture diagram of the AI system, PoCs for confirmed exploits. Chains into /gh-export for issue filing.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

AI and LLM red-teaming skill for evaluating prompt injection, jailbreak, data exfiltration, tool abuse, agent hijack, RAG poisoning, model denial of service, and unsafe tool-use chains in Gemini, Claude, GPT, and open-weight models. Use to build evaluation harnesses, attack corpora, defensive guardrails, and red-team reports for AI systems you own or are authorized to test.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

White-box security audit. Blue-teamer and lead red-teamer run in parallel isolation for an independent first pass — neither sees the other's output during reconnaissance. A synthesis step categorizes findings into four prescriptive buckets (anchoring-suppressed, convergent, blue-flagged-unverified, divergent), producing a unified target list. Focused red-teamers then deep-dive each target. Iterates when exploit chains are discovered. Heavy and thorough by design. Advisory only — produces findings and proposes tickets; does not implement remediation.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Plan and execute a comprehensive red team engagement covering reconnaissance through post-exploitation using MITRE ATT&CK-aligned TTPs to evaluate an organization's detection and response capabilities.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploy and configure the Havoc C2 framework with teamserver, HTTPS listeners, redirectors, and Demon agents for authorized red team operations.

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Reviews the instructions text and skills of a declarative agent, with its stated capabilities, knowledge sources and audience, for prompt-injection exposure, data-leakage paths, over-broad permissions and missing refusals, and returns an attack-surface map, a findings table with severity, quoted evidence and attack path, one pasteable fix per finding, a probe pack the owner can run and a refusal-coverage table. Use when the user asks to "red-team this agent", "check these instructions for prompt injection", "could this agent leak data", "review the permissions on my agent" or "what should this agent refuse". Do not use for checking a SKILL.md against the format rules, use skill-file-reviewer instead; do not use for designing the launch test set, use agent-evaluation-plan instead. Drafts for human review; never approves, authorises or signs off.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Plan and execute a comprehensive red team engagement covering reconnaissance through post-exploitation using MITRE ATT&CK-aligned TTPs to evaluate an organization's detection and response capabilities.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploy and configure the Havoc C2 framework with teamserver, HTTPS listeners, redirectors, and Demon agents for authorized red team operations.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Executes comprehensive red team exercises that simulate real-world adversary operations against an organization's people, processes, and technology. The red team operates with stealth as a primary objective, employing the full attack lifecycle from initial reconnaissance through objective completion while testing the organization's detection and response capabilities. This differs from penetration testing by focusing on adversary emulation rather than vulnerability identification. Activates for requests involving red team exercise, adversary simulation, adversary emulation, or full-scope offensive security assessment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Red team engagement planning is the foundational phase that defines scope, objectives, rules of engagement (ROE), threat model selection, and operational timelines before any offensive testing begins.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Plan and execute a comprehensive red team engagement covering reconnaissance through post-exploitation using MITRE ATT&CK-aligned TTPs to evaluate an organization's detection and response capabilities.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploy and configure the Havoc C2 framework with teamserver, HTTPS listeners, redirectors, and Demon agents for authorized red team operations.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Client-facing red-team deliverable format — codifies the Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC structure used for external red-team engagements (not bug-bounty platform reports). Different audience, different tone, different cadence. Built from an authorized engagement deliverable where 14 findings were packaged into a 52KB MD + 2.2MB DOCX with 16 embedded screenshots. Use when the engagement is 'external red team for an enterprise client' (not H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti), when generating the final report, when the client has specified a custom report format, or when packaging findings into DOCX/PDF.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Methodology for detecting client SOC patches, attacker activity, and security-state changes that occur DURING a red-team engagement — and converting those observations into deliverable findings. Built from authorized red-team work where the client patched a confirmed SQLi within 30 minutes of detection AND an external attacker locked multiple new accounts during a single test session. Use when (a) running ANY active engagement against a monitored target, (b) a previously-confirmed finding stops reproducing, (c) baseline timing shifts unexpectedly, or (d) you notice response patterns changing during testing.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions 'mobile app' in scope.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Microsoft 365 / Entra ID red-team attack chain — current 2026 reality. AADSTS code reference, user enumeration vectors (with hardening status), Smart Lockout math, Conditional Access bypass options, ROPC + SAML SSO browser flow, Burp/Playwright templates. Built from authorized red-team work where ROPC spray surfaced pre-existing lockouts and CA-blocked credentials, plus real-time external attacker activity correlation. Use for any M365/Entra credential attack, password spray, user enumeration, CA-bypass exploration, or active-attacker-detection scenario.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。