「soul id」の検索結果

Comprehensive OSINT methodology for external red-team operations and authorized attack-surface assessments. Covers the 6-stage recon pipeline (seed → asset expansion → enrichment → exposure analysis → convergence → operator-armed active validation) with connector-resilience and stage-vs-gating discipline, asset-graph discipline, severity rubric, confidence upgrade workflows, time budgeting, identity-fabric mapping, breach×identity correlation with per-person identity dossiers, detectability tagging, detection-aware probing, WAF/CDN bypass, vulnerability prioritization, phishing infrastructure planning, bug bounty submission, and client deliverable templates. Use when planning or executing reconnaissance against authorized targets, mapping an organization's external attack surface, investigating a person/entity, or producing client deliverables.

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AIエージェントのキャラクター定義ファイルを生成するスキル。ユーザーがキャラクター設定（名前、二つ名、年齢、属性、性格、支配の流儀、口癖、外見、絵文字など）を入力すると、それに基づいてIDENTITY.md、SOUL.md、USER.md、AGENTS.md、TOOLS.md、BOOTSTRAP.md、HEARTBEAT.mdの7つのファイルとavatar.pngを配置したキャラクターディレクトリを作成する。また、agent-identity/README.md にキャラクター情報とアバター画像を追加する。ユーザーが「キャラクターを作って」「新しいキャラクターを追加して」「○○っていうキャラクターのファイル作って」と言った時や、キャラクター設定を詳細に提供した時に使用する。

Generate a personalized SOUL.md through a warm, adaptive onboarding conversation. Trigger when the user wants to create, set up, or initialize their AI partner's identity — e.g., "create my SOUL.md", "bootstrap my agent", "set up my AI partner", "define who you are", "let's do onboarding", "personalize this AI", "make you mine", or when a SOUL.md is missing. Also trigger for updates: "update my SOUL.md", "change my AI's personality", "tweak the soul".

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Finding validation before writing any report — 7-Question Gate (all 7 questions), 4 pre-submission gates, always-rejected list, conditionally valid with chain table, CVSS 3.1 quick reference, severity decision guide, report title formula, 60-second pre-submit checklist. Use BEFORE writing any report. One wrong answer = kill the finding and move on. Saves N/A ratio.

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Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities — session fixation (no regeneration on login), insufficient invalidation on logout / password-change / email-change, predictable or low-entropy session IDs, JWT-as-session with no exp/revocation, refresh-token rotation/reuse-detection gaps, OAuth/SSO session linkage, device-bound-session (DBSC) downgrade, and cookie attribute issues (Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite/__Host-). Validate with TWO real sessions (attacker A + victim B), body-diff every 200, and OOB confirmation for theft chains. Medium to Critical (fixation→admin hijack, no-invalidation→persistent ATO).

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Hunting skill for graphql vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across IDOR via node() / GID, mutation IDOR including AI/LLM features, cross-tenant IDOR, SSRF via argument, batching-DoS, query-cost-bypass, SQLi via argument, broken-object-level-authz, auth-bypass via unscoped mutations, and PII exposure from missing field-level authz. Use when hunting graphql on any target.

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Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6-digit OTP without rate limit (10^6 attempts at server speed), (5) race condition on OTP validation, (6) recovery-code dump via /api/me, (7) backup factor downgrade (SMS factor with no rate limit). Plus the chain: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = ATO without MFA challenge. Detection: trace auth flow in Burp, find every state transition, check if MFA is middleware-gated vs per-endpoint, check OTP entropy and rate limit on OTP-validate. Validate: attacker session reaching post-MFA state. Use when hunting auth bypass, MFA flows, chaining primitives toward ATO.

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Hunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across SAML XSW / parser-differential (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2025-25291/25292), SAML signature stripping (Uber, Rocket.Chat, samlify CVE-2025-47949), SAML domain enforcement bypass via control characters (HackerOne 2024), partner-portal cross-IdP assertion reuse (Slack), WordPress XMLRPC bypassing SSO (Uber), JWT alg-confusion HS256/RS256 (Jitsi), JWT signature-validation skip (Linktree, Newspack), and token-audience confusion (Argo CD CVE-2023-22482). For standalone JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) see hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers JWT only inside SSO/SAML/token-trust bypass chains. SAML assertion-layer attacks (XSW, comment injection, signature stripping, XXE-in-assertion) are owned by hunt-saml; this skill owns the broader cross-protocol auth-bypass taxonomy. Use when hunting auth bypass — see the Legacy-Protocol Matrix for branded-UI vs legacy-endpoint patterns.

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Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization gaps, and admin-override mutations reachable via mass assignment. Distinct from hunt-graphql, which owns generic GraphQL discovery and IDOR/mutation methodology — this skill owns the delta introduced when a GraphQL layer sits in front of a ledger, wallet, payments, banking, brokerage, or lending backend, where a resolver bug moves real money instead of just leaking data. Use when hunting a fintech, banking, payments, wallet, neobank, brokerage, or lending target that exposes a GraphQL API, or when a schema/response includes balance, transfer, ledger, redeem, quote, KYC, or account-linking fields.

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Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.

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Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved on (no binding to action/session), (4) static or predictable CAPTCHA values accepted (e.g. '0', 'null', empty string), (5) audio/accessibility CAPTCHA trivially solvable programmatically, (6) CAPTCHA only enforced after N failures (first N requests bypass it). Detection: intercept a successful form submission, remove the CAPTCHA field entirely, replay — if it still succeeds, server-side validation is absent. Medium severity standalone; High when it removes the only rate-limit gate protecting a login, registration, or payment endpoint.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char via OOB), client-side template injection, dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Grounded in named public research: Gareth Heyes / PortSwigger DOM-clobbering + DOM-Invader, Michał Bentkowski DOMPurify clobbering bypasses, jQuery htmlPrefilter XSS (CVE-2020-11022 / CVE-2020-11023), d0nut CSS-exfil research. Use when hunting DOM-XSS, client-side auth bypass, or token exfiltration without server-side interaction.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Organization-grade cloud and supply-chain attack-surface discovery: S3/GCS/Azure Blob bucket discovery via observed-name mining (CNAME/cert-SAN/Wayback) and bounded two-class permutation (6 prefixes x 15 suffixes on trusted tokens, bounded target-bound expansion on subdomain stems), existence (HEAD/GET) vs public-listing confirmation, object-key triage into 9 value tiers (database dumps, credentials, IaC state, kubeconfig, VCS dirs, config, archives, PII, logs), dangling-CNAME bucket-takeover detection, and the ownership-gated severity model that stops an unattributable public bucket from becoming a false CRITICAL; the fully offline AWS-account-ID recovery from a leaked AKIA/ASIA/AROA access key (base32 decode, runnable stdlib Python, canonical test vector, AWS-documentation-example-ID screening); dependency-confusion confirmation for npm/PyPI (internal-signal classifier -- private-registry binding vs org-namespace match -- paired with a read-only public-registry 404 check and the npm scope-claimability nuance the public search API misses); and passive cloud-native/container/Kubernetes/CI control-plane fingerprinting (Lambda URLs, API Gateway, Cloud Run, App Service, kubelet/etcd/K8s API/dashboard, Jenkins/GitLab/Argo CD) as an org-attribution and exposure surface. Passive/discovery only -- no exploitation, no credential submission, no active control-plane confirmation (a stage-6 validate_cloud active tier is described but out of scope). Use when enumerating a target's cloud storage footprint, recovering an AWS account ID from a leaked key, confirming a supply-chain dependency-confusion vector, or fingerprinting cloud-native/K8s/CI infrastructure for an authorized external recon engagement.

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Build a SOUL from an X handle - read a wide sample of a public X account, then draft SOUL.md (identity, worldview, opinions), STYLE.md (voice), and examples so every skill speaks in that voice.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

根据用户的视频需求(场景、时长、音频、语言、平台限制、预算、是否需要本地部署/角色一致性等),从 16 个主流 AI 视频模型(12 商业 + 4 开源)中推荐最匹配的 1-3 个,并解释为什么。覆盖商业:Seedance 2.0、HappyHorse 1.0、Kling 3.0、Sora 2、Veo 3.1、**Gemini Omni**(2026-05 新)、Runway Gen-4.5/Aleph、Pika 2.5、Hailuo 02、Hunyuan Video 1.5、Wan 2.7、即梦 AI;开源:LTX-Video 0.9.7、Mochi 1、CogVideoX 5B、Higgsfield Soul。用于"用哪个 AI 视频模型好"、"Sora 还是 Kling"、"国内有什么模型"、"哪个免费"、"哪个支持中文"、"哪个能编辑已有视频"、"哪个能本地部署"、"哪个角色一致性最强"等触发场景。

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Generate a personalized SOUL.md through a warm, adaptive onboarding conversation. Trigger when the user wants to create, set up, or initialize their AI partner's identity, or when a SOUL.md is missing. Also trigger for updates such as "update my SOUL.md", "change my AI's personality", or "tweak the soul".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Re-run or deepen the agent's identity interview. Drives the SHARED bootstrap answer bank (state/interview.json) via `gbrain bootstrap interview --set/--show/--confirm`, then re-renders the identity files with `gbrain bootstrap render --only <FILE> --force`. One answer store, two surfaces: first-boot bootstrap and this re-run skill write the same bank, so an updated answer flows into SOUL.md, USER.md, ACCESS_POLICY.md, and HEARTBEAT.md without hand-editing rendered files. Every answer is the user's own words — never invented.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Token-hygiene audit of the always-loaded context stack — CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, auto-memory MEMORY.md, and the bootstrap-rendered identity files (SOUL.md, USER.md, ACCESS_POLICY.md, HEARTBEAT.md) or their harness equivalents. Finds redundancy, contradictions, stale content, compression candidates, and skill-extraction candidates; produces a ranked action list sorted by token savings with a risk class per finding. REPORT-ONLY: this skill never edits any audited file. Recommendations for bootstrap-rendered files target the interview answer bank / templates, never the rendered output. Judging routes through `gbrain eval cross-modal` (single cheap model by default; full multi-model panel is explicit opt-in).

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Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for any Solidity/Rust contract audit or when deciding whether a DeFi target is worth hunting.

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Security payloads, bypass tables, wordlists, gf pattern names, always-rejected bug list, and conditionally-valid-with-chain table. Use when you need specific payloads for XSS/SSRF/SQLi/XXE/NoSQLi/command injection/SSTI/IDOR/path-traversal/HTTP smuggling/WebSocket/MFA bypass, or bypass techniques. Submittability and the always-rejected / what-NOT-to-submit decision are owned by triage-validation.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunting skill for idor vulnerabilities. Built from 26 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting idor on any target.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.

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Use when the user wants to generate a cinematic still image on Higgsfield, asks about shot framing, camera angle, or composition for image prompts, needs a specific shot type (close-up, wide shot, cowboy shot, etc.), or is working with [img] reference-based image generation. Covers distance & size shots, camera angles, and camera movement keywords optimized for AI image models (Soul 2.0, Nano Banana, Seedream, GPT Image, Flux, etc.).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。