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Use when a Spark branch or pull request needs final diff hygiene, validation selection, commit scope, remote topology, and readiness checked before publication.

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Use when selecting a statistical test with AI consultation, when assumptions need checking against the actual data, when an analysis plan or decision log must be written before running anything, or when results need APA-style reporting with effect sizes.

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This skill should be used when the user asks for "browser tests", "playwright tests", "end-to-end testing", "test user flows", "E2E coverage", "integration tests for UI", "page object pattern", "/e2e command", or discusses automated browser testing. Covers the E2E test loop workflow, Playwright patterns, page objects, and selector strategies.

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Evil Twin / KARMA / Mana access point methodology — rogue AP construction with hostapd-mana / wifiphisher / airgeddon, KARMA universal probe response, Mana selective probe response, captive portal phishing, deauth-driven client coercion to attacker AP, MAC randomization defeat via PNL leak analysis, post-association MITM (DNS, ARP, transparent proxy), credential capture for portal/web/SMB, and detection-evasion tactics. Use to coerce client devices onto an attacker-controlled AP, intercept their traffic, harvest credentials, or deliver payloads via captive portal.

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Wi-Fi reconnaissance methodology — adapter selection, monitor mode and packet injection setup, regulatory domain handling, multi-band airspace mapping, hidden SSID discovery, BSSID/ESSID/channel/PMF/encryption fingerprinting, client probe analysis, vendor OUI lookup, war-driving with Kismet/airodump-ng/Wigle, and structured airspace data capture for downstream attacks. Use at the start of any wireless engagement to build the target map before active attacks; covers 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, and 6 GHz (Wi-Fi 6E) bands and adapter compatibility for each.

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Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash/merge/assign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process/eval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS/Pug/Handlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable exfil via /proc/self/environ. Use when target runs Node.js/Express/Fastify/NestJS/Koa.

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Hunt shadow / zombie / undocumented API surface (OWASP API9 Improper Inventory Management) — enumerate the full API version history (v1/v2/beta/legacy paths, header- and subdomain-based versioning), pull and diff every reachable OpenAPI/Swagger spec (including ones only findable via the Wayback Machine), and behaviorally diff old vs. current versions for auth/rate-limit/validation regressions rather than just response-shape differences. Distinct from hunt-api-misconfig, which owns exploitation once you have a spec or endpoint (mass assignment, JWT, OData, Swagger-chain attacks); distinct from hunt-subdomain, which owns host-level discovery. This skill owns the version-inventory and behavioral-diff workflow itself. Use when the target has versioned API paths, multiple specs, a changelog referencing deprecated endpoints, or a mobile app whose hardcoded backend calls look older than the current web app's.

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Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi — report templates, human tone guidelines, impact-first writing, CVSS 3.1 scoring, title formula, impact statement formula, severity decision guide, downgrade counters, pre-submit checklist. Validation gates and the submittability/always-rejected decision are owned by triage-validation; this skill owns the written report itself (templates, tone, formulas). Use after validating a finding and before submitting. Never use 'could potentially' — prove it or don't report.

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Comprehensive offensive methodology for software supply chain attacks covering the full kill chain from reconnaissance through exploitation. Addresses dependency confusion across npm, PyPI, and NuGet ecosystems where internal registry override allows an attacker to inject malicious packages that shadow private dependencies. Covers typosquatting techniques for popular packages, compromised package injection via maintainer account takeover or social engineering, and build system attacks through Makefile injection, setup.py install hooks, and npm postinstall scripts. Extends into CI/CD artifact tampering where build outputs are replaced or modified in transit, code signing abuse through stolen or self-signed certificates, upstream repository compromise via commit injection or force-push to trusted repos, and container image supply chain attacks including base image trojaning and registry confusion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools...

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Comprehensive lateral movement tradecraft for authorized red team engagements covering credential-based movement (pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, overpass-the-hash), NTLM relay attacks (ntlmrelayx with PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, PrinterBug coercion), remote execution protocols (WMI, WinRM, DCOM, PsExec and alternatives), RDP session hijacking, and network pivoting through tunneling tools (chisel, ligolo-ng, SSH tunnels, SOCKS proxies). Provides operator-ready command sequences for mimikatz, crackmapexec/netexec, impacket suite, and evil-winrm with emphasis on OPSEC considerations, SMB signing bypass, and detection evasion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1021 (Remote Services), T1550 (Use Alternate Authentication Material), and sub-techniques. Includes defender-perspective detection guidance for blue team awareness and a rapid engagement cheatsheet for common lateral movement scenarios encountered during internal penetration tests and assumed-breach exercises.

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Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.

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Structured OSINT methodology framework: target definition, source selection, collection workflows, data correlation, timeline reconstruction, and reporting. Use to guide systematic OSINT campaigns or teach OSINT methodology.

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Companion to the generic report-writing skill. Use when working specifically on Bugcrowd submissions where VRT mapping, OOS-clause rebuttals, or per-program target selection matter.

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Dense methodology covering DNS exfiltration (dnscat2, iodine, dns2tcp), HTTPS tunneling (domain fronting, CDN abuse, legitimate service channels), ICMP tunneling (icmpsh, ptunnel-ng), cloud storage dead drops (S3 presigned URLs, Azure Blob SAS tokens, GCS signed URLs), email-based exfil (SMTP, EWS, draft method), steganography (image, audio, document metadata), encoding/encryption (base64 chunking, XOR, AES), covert channels (custom protocol tunneling, HTTP header encoding, timing channels), and data staging (compression, splitting, encryption). Tools: dnscat2, iodine, dns2tcp, PacketWhisper, chisel, stunnel, icmpsh, ptunnel-ng, steghide, zsteg, OpenStego. MITRE ATT&CK: T1048 (Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol), T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel), T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service), T1029 (Scheduled Transfer), T1030 (Data Transfer Size Limits), T1132 (Data Encoding), T1001 (Data Obfuscation). Use when planning or executing data exfiltration during authorized red team engagements or post-exploita...

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Complete reference for 26 web2 bug classes with root causes, detection patterns, bypass tables, exploit techniques, and real paid examples. Covers IDOR, auth bypass, XSS, SSRF (11 IP bypass techniques), SQLi, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC, file upload (10 bypass techniques), GraphQL, LLM/AI (ASI01-ASI10 agentic framework), API misconfig (mass assignment, JWT attacks, prototype pollution, CORS), ATO taxonomy (9 paths), SSTI (Jinja2/Twig/Freemarker/ERB/Spring), subdomain takeover, cloud/infra misconfigs, HTTP smuggling (CL.TE/TE.CL/H2.CL), cache poisoning, MFA bypass (7 patterns), SAML attacks (XSW/comment injection/signature stripping), error disclosure / debug endpoints (stack trace regex per framework, chain templates), CSS injection (attribute-selector exfiltration, opacity clickjacking, @import). LFI / file inclusion -> RCE (php://filter source disclosure, iconv filter-chain RCE with no upload, log/environ poisoning, .user.ini/.htaccess auto_prepend, data:// + expect:// wrappers, session inclusion, traversal bypass table). Insecure deserialization (PHP __wakeup bypass / phar:// POP chains, Java ysoserial CommonsCollections gadgets + magic bytes, Python pickle __reduce__ + signed-cookie forgery, Node node-serialize). Dependency confusion / supply chain (internal package-name discovery, unclaimed-name confirmation, callback-only PoC, npm/pip/Maven/RubyGems variants). Use when hunting a specific vuln class or studying what makes bugs pay.

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Methodology for detecting client SOC patches, attacker activity, and security-state changes that occur DURING a red-team engagement — and converting those observations into deliverable findings. Built from authorized red-team work where the client patched a confirmed SQLi within 30 minutes of detection AND an external attacker locked multiple new accounts during a single test session. Use when (a) running ANY active engagement against a monitored target, (b) a previously-confirmed finding stops reproducing, (c) baseline timing shifts unexpectedly, or (d) you notice response patterns changing during testing.

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NTLM info disclosure is a Medium-severity finding when chained to context — the leak itself is intentional protocol behavior (RFC-compliant NTLMSSP challenge), but on internet-exposed enterprise infrastructure it provides exact reconnaissance for the next stage of an attack. Highest-value targets:

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Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole chains, Lambda/Functions privilege flips, Azure Owner-on-self, GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator), persistence techniques (IAM user/key creation, AAD app registration, GCP svc account key creation, EventBridge/Logic Apps backdoors), data exfiltration (S3/Blob/GCS, snapshot share, RDS/CosmosDB/Cloud SQL exfil), cloud-native lateral movement (cross-account assume, Azure AD multi-tenant, GCP project hierarchy), serverless attacks (Lambda env vars, layer hijack, Step Functions), Kubernetes-on-cloud (EKS/AKS/GKE-specific paths to node and AWS metadata), and CSPM evasion (CloudTrail blind spots, GuardDuty mute, Sentinel rule shaping). Use when the engagement scope is cloud accounts, when you've stolen cloud credentials, or...

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Container escape and breakout techniques targeting Docker, containerd, and Podman runtimes. Covers privileged container breakout via host filesystem mount and nsenter, Docker socket abuse through /var/run/docker.sock, Linux capability exploitation including CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, and CAP_NET_ADMIN, cgroup v1 notify_on_release escape, runc CVEs such as CVE-2019-5736 and CVE-2024-21626 Leaky Vessels, kernel exploits from within containers, and Dockerfile misconfigurations like --privileged and host namespace sharing. Includes enumeration with capsh, amicontained, deepce, CDK, and nsenter. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1611 Escape to Host. Use this skill when the engagement scope includes container breakout, Docker escape, container privilege escalation, host access from container, or when you land inside a containerized environment and need to reach the underlying host.

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Cross-cutting methodology for the CVE-hunting pipeline (ported from find-cve-agent): when a bug is design-vs-real, false-positive avoidance, version checking before reporting, responsible disclosure norms, acceptance-rate expectations per vuln class, vulnerability chaining playbook, known false-positive patterns, maintainer-response patterns, secure-pattern reference (what NOT to flag), and a self-criticism checklist to run before claiming a finding. Use this alongside the cve-hunter/cve-exploiter/cve-validator agents and the /cve-hunt pipeline — load it whenever judging if a finding is real, worth reporting, or already fixed.

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Hunt Kubernetes & Docker — API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket, NOT plain POST) and the simpler /run primitive, etcd 2379 unauth, dashboard skip-login, RBAC misconfig, secret/SA-token abuse, docker.sock host escape, runc/container-escape (Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626), API-server-mediated nodes/proxy RCE, EphemeralContainers node-shell, bound/projected SA-token audience+expiry abuse, admission-controller bypass, Helm/Tiller remnants. Use when target runs containerized infra, exposes K8s ports (6443/10250/10255/2379/8443), or cloud metadata reveals K8s service accounts.

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Database design principles and decision-making. Schema design, indexing strategy, ORM selection, serverless databases.

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Send SMS and make voice calls via Dialpad API. Supports single/batch SMS, voice calls with TTS, and caller ID selection.

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別駭我！基本安全檢測 — Security self-check for Clawdbot/Moltbot. Run a quick audit of your clawdbot.json to catch dangerous misconfigurations — exposed gateway, missing auth, open DM policy, weak tokens, loose file permissions. Auto-fix included. Invoke: "run a security check" or "幫我做安全檢查".

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