「prompt-injection」の検索結果

Security launch audit for a public web app BEFORE you ship or hand it to a client — "vibe coders are getting sued", systematized. An executable pipeline: classify (static / full-stack / AI) → run sections (secrets+supply-chain, DB, auth, infra+headers, legal, LLM/injection) orchestrating deterministic tools + manual checks → GO/NO-GO report. Adapted from Prajwal Tomar's playbook, extended with prompt-injection / supply-chain / secret-history / dependency-CVE layers. NOT the same as pre-push (that = clean push; this = is the product itself safe to launch). Triggers — "security checklist for the site", "audit before launch", "is the site safe", "check before handing to client".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Black-box evaluation of a shipped LLM feature — adversarial probes for hallucination, prompt-injection, and cost-runaway vs stated expectations. Not RAG/embedding. Triggers 'review my chatbot'.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploy Llama Guard, NeMo Guardrails, and LLM Guard input/output scanners as runtime defenses.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Reviews the instructions text and skills of a declarative agent, with its stated capabilities, knowledge sources and audience, for prompt-injection exposure, data-leakage paths, over-broad permissions and missing refusals, and returns an attack-surface map, a findings table with severity, quoted evidence and attack path, one pasteable fix per finding, a probe pack the owner can run and a refusal-coverage table. Use when the user asks to "red-team this agent", "check these instructions for prompt injection", "could this agent leak data", "review the permissions on my agent" or "what should this agent refuse". Do not use for checking a SKILL.md against the format rules, use skill-file-reviewer instead; do not use for designing the launch test set, use agent-evaluation-plan instead. Drafts for human review; never approves, authorises or signs off.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Expert en sécurité des agents IA (prompt injection, jailbreak prevention, tool misuse, output filtering)

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Comprehensive LLM security testing: bias detection, data leakage, prompt injection, jailbreak, alignment testing, adversarial prompts

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

End-to-end Coval adversarial / red-team testing workflow. Builds one adversarial test set (12 core attack vectors plus legitimate controls, each with an expected-behavior checklist), creates a persistent "Adversarial User" persona and a Composite Evaluation metric that scores each scenario against its own expected behaviors, launches a multi-iteration run against the agent (voice or chat), polls for completion, builds a per-scenario pass/fail scorecard, and creates a saved report grouped by Test Case. Use when a user wants to follow the Adversarial & Red-Team Testing cookbook (https://docs.coval.dev/guides/adversarial-red-team-testing) without doing each step by hand. Triggers: "adversarial test set", "red team my agent", "jailbreak / prompt-injection testing", "test my agent against bad actors".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Fail-closed security auditing for OpenClaw/ClawHub skills & repos: trufflehog secrets scanning, semgrep SAST, prompt-injection/persistence signals, and supply-chain hygiene checks before enabling or installing.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Secure the path from an inbound event (webhook, email, SMS, GitHub comment, file, cron) to an agent spawn in the Port Daddy fleet. Use when wiring trigger sources to agents, reviewing the io-wiring registry, adding a trust/permission gate, hardening output sinks (SSRF/path traversal), scoping tools by provenance, or proving the spawn path is safe against prompt-injection → tool-abuse. Encodes ADR-0093 and the red-team threat model. NOT for generic Coast Guard sandboxing (ADR-0050), the macaroon push-grant gate alone (ADR-0053), or non-fleet code.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。