Single entry point for all AEM as a Cloud Service Workflow skills. Covers workflow model design, custom process step and participant chooser development, launcher configuration, workflow triggering, and production support including debugging stuck/failed workflows, triaging incidents with Cloud Manager logs, thread pool analysis, and Sling Job diagnostics for the Granite Workflow Engine.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
aemgdc/aemdev☆ 22026年10月13日 更新
Use when a source must be reached through DergiPark, ULAKBIM TR Dizin, HEAL-Link, YOK Thesis Center, or an institutional library route, when off-campus access fails, or when a lawful retrieval plan is needed for Turkish, Greek, or European materials.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
OnourImpram/claude-code-for-social-scientists☆ 22026年9月6日 更新
Offensive methodology for attacking GraphQL APIs during penetration tests and bug bounty engagements. Covers the full attack lifecycle: endpoint discovery, introspection abuse and blind schema reconstruction when introspection is disabled, authentication and authorization bypass through Relay node IDs and nested object traversal, injection via variables and directives, query batching for brute force and OTP bypass, denial of service through depth bombs and alias amplification, WebSocket subscription hijacking, information disclosure through verbose errors and field suggestion oracles, and file upload abuse via the multipart GraphQL specification. Includes tool-specific guidance for InQL, graphql-cop, CrackQL, BatchQL, Altair, GraphQL Voyager, and clairvoyance. Trigger on: GraphQL, graphql, introspection query, batching attack, query depth, GraphQL injection, GraphQL IDOR, field suggestion, GraphQL auth bypass, GraphQL DoS, GraphQL security, graphql-cop, InQL, CrackQL, BatchQL, Relay node, alias amplificat...
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
ajtazer/heckit☆ 22026年10月7日 更新
Audit or design server-side indexes, directories, reputations, or aggregates that are DERIVED from traffic a platform witnesses (chain heads, run verdicts, heartbeats, publish activity) so that consent gates the derivation, not merely the read: no shadow index over non-consenting principals, post-consent-only evidence windows, retention bounds and delete-propagation into derived rows, activity-oracle threat modeling, and audit-logged ranking discretion. Use when building a capability directory / whois from witnessed activity, a reputation ledger from settled outcomes, vitals aggregation across tenants, or any "the yellow pages can't lie because they index signatures" feature. Keywords: shadow index, derived index, consent gates derivation, activity oracle, phone book not a log, delist propagation, ranking weight audit, k-anonymous aggregate, subpoena surface. NOT for the consent-screen UX and scope-ladder mechanics themselves (use local-first-tenancy-boundary), reputation scoring math and Sybil economics (use agent-identity-continuity-reputation), or discovery-layer architecture L1/L2/L3 (use agent-discovery-directories-guilds).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月12日 更新
Build, debug, optimize, and deploy ComfyUI workflows for diffusion image, video, and audio generation. Activate on: ComfyUI workflow, ComfyUI custom node, ComfyUI API, ComfyUI Manager, KSampler, FLUX in ComfyUI, Wan 2.2 ComfyUI, Hunyuan video ComfyUI, LTX video ComfyUI, IPAdapter, ControlNet ComfyUI, Kijai wrapper, ComfyDeploy, RunComfy, ComfyUI security, GGUF quantization, TeaCache, Nunchaku, ACE-Step ComfyUI, F5-TTS ComfyUI, subgraphs ComfyUI. NOT for: A1111/Forge/Invoke (different UIs), training pipelines from scratch, non-diffusion ML models, or general image-API integrations (use generative-video-2026 / generative-music-audio / media-gen-deployment).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月12日 更新
Cryptographic security for agentic systems — zero-trust agent networking, signed message envelopes (JWS/JWE), capability-based security (ocaps), Merkle tree audit trails, WASM sandboxing, and formal verification. Covers CLI dev tool security, mTLS between agents, permission boundaries (least privilege for AI agents), and supply chain security for skills/plugins. Activate on: "agent security", "zero trust agents", "secure agent communication", "capability-based security", "ocap", "signed messages between agents", "agent audit trail", "sandbox agent execution", "agent permissions", "mTLS agents", "cryptographic verification", "agent supply chain", "OWASP agentic", "prove agent did X", "tamper-proof agent logs". NOT for: application-level SAST scanning (use security-auditor), network firewall rules (use infrastructure), SOC2/HIPAA compliance (organizational), or prompt injection defense (use prompt-engineer).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月12日 更新
Design or review a declared control-command profile and its verb/backend lifecycle matrix. Distinguish policy denial, unsupported capability, delivery acknowledgement, independently observed effect, and unknown outcome; bind authorization to principal, target, scope, current policy, expiry, and fencing epoch. NOT for claiming runtime correctness, proving an adapter from declarations, or approving a control-panel button without independent runtime evidence.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月12日 更新
Design discovery, directories, and guilds for agent swarms at scale. Use when agents need to find each other on a shared surface: capability indices, yellow-pages directories, whois/phonebook routing, reputation-aware discovery, and guild structures that scope trust. Covers the canonical prior art (FIPA Directory Facilitator, Contract Net, Chord/DHT, DNS-SD/Consul, EigenTrust, Greif's merchant guilds) and the failure modes (read-poverty, Sybil reset, Goodhart on rank, directory staleness, cold-start). Triggers: "agents can't find each other", "who owns this file/skill", "route a question to the right agent", "capability registry", "agent reputation", "guild / federation of fleets". NOT for issuing identities, granting authority, or automatically assigning work from a directory entry.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月12日 更新
Safety-case design for always-on agents with episodic memory. Covers data hygiene, privacy and security risk surfaces, cost controls, scope, user dependency concerns, retention, incident containment, and responsible deployment evidence. It identifies hazards and asks for named controls, tests, owners, and residual uncertainty; it does not provide legal, clinical, youth-safety, or jurisdictional determinations. Activate on: "agent safety", "always-on agent privacy", "agent cost control", "persistent agent risks", "AI companion safety", "agent data hygiene", "runaway agent costs", "parasocial AI risk", "/always-on-agent-safety". NOT for: architecture design (use always-on-agent-architecture), input design (use always-on-agent-inputs), application brainstorming (use always-on-agent-applications), healthcare compliance specifically (use hipaa-compliance).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
curiositech/port-daddy☆ 22026年10月12日 更新