「certificate」の検索結果

Build an automated adversary infrastructure tracking system in Python (dnspython, python-whois, shodan, networkx) that pivots across passive DNS, certificate transparency logs, WHOIS records, and IP enrichment to map threat-actor C2 networks and flag newly registered domains matching known patterns. Use when pivoting from known indicators to discover related C2 infrastructure or maintaining a continuously updated map of a threat actor's network.

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Mint a tamper-evident, post-quantum-signed receipt for a consequential agent action (deploy, delete, pay, grant-access, model decision) so it can be verified later from the certificate alone. Use when an autonomous agent takes a side-effecting action that may need to be proven later, or when satisfying EU AI Act Article 12 record-keeping. Three decisions: whether an action needs a receipt, minting it, verifying it. Signing is delegated to the open-source OpenAgentOntology package. Not after-the-fact log analysis; not a hosted notary; not a legal opinion.

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test on Windows, enterprise CA, corporate certificate, GPO cert, TLS fetch failed, Windows sandbox, daytona windows, self-hosted cert. Use when validating OpenWork Windows enterprise TLS/OS-trust fixes in a Daytona Windows sandbox.

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Configures GKE edge networking, traffic routing, load balancing, and private service endpoints. Use when configuring Gateway API manifests, standard Ingress, Cloud Armor WAF security policies, Container-Native Load Balancing (NEGs), Private Service Connect (PSC), or Google-managed SSL certificates on GKE, and to troubleshoot Ingress and load-balancer 502/5xx errors, backend health-check failures, connection draining, and TLS/SSL policy enforcement. Don't use for core cluster IP planning, Dataplane V2 network policies, or node NAT egress (use gke-networking instead).

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Command and Control framework deployment, configuration, and operational tradecraft for red team engagements. Covers Cobalt Strike (malleable C2 profiles, Beacon types HTTP/HTTPS/DNS/SMB, Beacon Object Files for in-memory execution, sleep and jitter tuning, named pipe pivoting), Sliver (implant generation across mTLS/WireGuard/DNS transport, operator multiplayer mode, armory extensions), Mythic (agent ecosystem with Apollo/Poseidon/Medusa, C2 profile configuration, translation containers), Havoc (Demon agent with sleep obfuscation via Ekko/Zilean, indirect syscalls, dotnet inline execution), Metasploit (msfvenom payload generation, multi/handler staging, Meterpreter post-exploitation modules), redirector architecture using Apache mod_rewrite and Nginx, domain fronting through CDN providers, DNS-based C2 for restrictive network egress, and TLS certificate management for infrastructure OPSEC. Tools: Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Havoc, Metasploit Framework. Aligns to MITRE ATT&CK T1071 (Application Layer Protocol), T1573 (Encrypted Channel), T1090 (Proxy/Connection Proxy).

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WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X / EAP) attack methodology — EAP method identification (PEAP-MSCHAPv2, EAP-TTLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-GTC, EAP-PWD, EAP-FAST), evil-twin RADIUS attacks with eaphammer for credential capture, MSCHAPv2 challenge-response cracking, EAP-TLS client certificate theft paths (DPAPI, NDES, AD CS auto-enrollment), supplicant validation bypass (missing server cert validation, missing CN pinning, BYOD misconfigurations), and post-capture pivots into AD via cracked domain credentials. Use for corporate Wi-Fi engagements where the network is 802.1X authenticated.

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Comprehensive offensive methodology for software supply chain attacks covering the full kill chain from reconnaissance through exploitation. Addresses dependency confusion across npm, PyPI, and NuGet ecosystems where internal registry override allows an attacker to inject malicious packages that shadow private dependencies. Covers typosquatting techniques for popular packages, compromised package injection via maintainer account takeover or social engineering, and build system attacks through Makefile injection, setup.py install hooks, and npm postinstall scripts. Extends into CI/CD artifact tampering where build outputs are replaced or modified in transit, code signing abuse through stolen or self-signed certificates, upstream repository compromise via commit injection or force-push to trusted repos, and container image supply chain attacks including base image trojaning and registry confusion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) and T1195.002 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain). Integrates tooling such as confused for dependency confusion scanning and dependency-check for known vulnerable component detection. Each technique section provides reproducible proof-of-concept patterns, detection guidance for defenders, and engagement-safe execution notes for authorized red team operations.

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Create any visual design using Adobe Express templates — flyers, posters, social media posts (Instagram, Facebook, LinkedIn), business cards, invitations, greeting cards, resumes, cover letters, brochures, newsletters, certificates, presentations, YouTube thumbnails, email headers, logos, menus, and labels. Use this skill whenever the user wants to make, design, or build any visual — even if they just say "make me a flyer", "design a poster", "I need something for Instagram", "create an event invite", or "make a business card". Also handles browsing templates, editing text, replacing images, changing backgrounds, animating, and exporting designs. Access: 🔐 Signed-In required | Gen AI: ❌ by default — image replacement only where the surface permits generative AI (e.g. Codex); none on Claude

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test on Windows, enterprise CA, corporate certificate, GPO cert, TLS fetch failed, Windows sandbox, daytona windows, self-hosted cert. Use when validating iPolloWork Windows enterprise TLS/OS-trust fixes in a Daytona Windows sandbox.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Troubleshoot npm registry, proxy, and certificate failures on the Microsoft corporate network or VPN using the 1ES public npm feed.

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Mobile app pentest for bug bounty (Android APK + iOS IPA) — runtime-first workflow: install app, proxy through Burp/mitmproxy, drive the UI, capture packets, then test the API exactly like a web target; escalate to decompile (apktool/jadx) and Frida/objection only when traffic is SSL-pinned, encrypted, or absent. Covers APK/IPA decompile for hardcoded secrets + hidden API endpoints + base URLs the web app never exposes, exported-activity and deeplink intent injection, WebView addJavascriptInterface bridge abuse, SSL pinning bypass (objection patchapk / Frida CertificatePinner + checkServerTrusted hooks), OkHttp interceptor chain to recover request signing, JNI native-lib triage, and the quick apktool/grep secret + endpoint sweep. Use when the program scope includes a mobile app, when web recon dries up and you need a fresh attack surface, or when traffic is pinned and you must MitM it.

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Operational arsenal for authorized external red-team and bug-bounty recon. Concrete probes, wordlists, regexes, dorks, curl one-liners for: subdomain enum, GraphQL/Swagger/REST discovery, identity fabric (Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML/M365 deep — Teams/SharePoint/OneDrive), cloud bucket enum (S3/GCS/Azure), CDN/WAF bypass, origin discovery, vendor fingerprinting (Citrix/F5/Pulse/Fortinet/PaloAlto/Cisco/VMware), CI/CD exposure, 48-pattern secret-scan catalog (AWS/GCP/GitHub/Stripe/Slack/Anthropic/OpenAI/Atlassian/DataDog/npm/PyPI), Postman workspaces, breach correlation (HudsonRock/HIBP/DeHashed/IntelX), TLS/JA3 audit, certificate transparency, JS endpoint extraction, package registry leaks, mobile/APK recon, sat imagery, sector-specific recon (healthcare DICOM, finance SWIFT, ICS/SCADA Modbus/BACnet). Detail content in 15 modular reference files, loaded on demand. Use for any authorized recon: scoping, asset discovery, attack-path mapping, secret triage, severity scoring.

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End-to-end iOS red-team pipeline — IPA acquisition (App Store extraction, TestFlight, enterprise/ad-hoc sideload), class-dump/Hopper/Ghidra static analysis, Info.plist + entitlements + Keychain secret extraction, App Transport Security (ATS) misconfig + certificate-pinning bypass (frida-ios-dump, objection, SSL Kill Switch 2), URL-scheme / Universal Link hijack, exported-service enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation. Companion to apk-redteam-pipeline for the iOS side of a mobile app catalogue. Use when target has an iOS app (App Store listing, TestFlight link, enterprise MDM distribution), when an IPA URL is found hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "iOS app" / "mobile app" in scope alongside an Apple developer account.

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Hunt TLS/SSL and DNS misconfigurations — missing HSTS (downgrade attack), weak cipher suites, expired/invalid certificates, mTLS bypass, missing SPF/DKIM/DMARC (email spoofing), DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR), dangling CNAME subdomain takeover, CAA records. Most of these are Info/Low on their own — this skill is opinionated about which findings actually pay (spoofable DMARC with delivered-to-inbox proof, AXFR returning internal hosts, dangling-CNAME takeover) versus which get rejected as best-practice noise (missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM position). Use during recon to find infrastructure weaknesses, and to TRIAGE them honestly before reporting.

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Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read / write / RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3/GCS/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services).

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Domain routing and boundary guidance for authorized mobile application security testing, including insecure storage, certificate pinning bypass, exposed components, and binary reverse engineering. Use when a task belongs to the mobile testing domain and needs scope, evidence, pivot, or exit criteria.

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Run Azure compliance and security audits with azqr plus Key Vault expiration checks. Covers best-practice assessment, resource review, policy/compliance validation, and security posture checks. WHEN: compliance scan, security audit, BEFORE running azqr (compliance cli tool), Azure best practices, Key Vault expiration check, expired certificates, expiring secrets, orphaned resources, compliance assessment.

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Deploys a Regional REST API with a custom domain name, a Lambda backend function, and a request-based Lambda authorizer using AWS CLI. Covers ACM certificate provisioning, API Gateway REST API creation, Lambda function deployment, request authorizer setup, custom domain configuration, base path mapping, and Route 53 DNS record creation. Trigger keywords: custom domain, REST API, Lambda, Route 53, API Gateway, regional endpoint, request authorizer, base path mapping.

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Provides connectivity, authentication, and troubleshooting guidance for Amazon RDS for SQL Server. Applicable when users ask about SSMS times out connecting from EC2, Cannot generate SSPI context with Windows auth, connect RDS SQL Server from Lambda with pymssql, auth_scheme shows NTLM instead of KERBEROS on ECS Fargate, SSM tunnel to RDS SQL Server from laptop, port 1433 security group, TrustServerCertificate=True for localhost tunnels, SPN MSSQLSvc, AWS Managed Microsoft AD, CNAME not RDS endpoint for Kerberos, tds_version='7.4', encryption='require', port-as-string for pymssql, Secrets Manager credential caching in Lambda, error 18456 login failed. Covers Python (pymssql, pyodbc), .NET (Microsoft.Data.SqlClient), Java (JDBC mssql-jdbc), Node.js (tedious), IAM auth via RDS Proxy, and VPC/ECS/EKS/Lambda deployment.

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Configures Amazon CloudFront content delivery across six workflows: when to use CloudFront and how it fits with AWS WAF, Shield, CloudFront Functions, Lambda@Edge, Route 53, and origins (creating a distribution, caching, and Flat Rate Pricing (FRP) versus pay-as-you-go pricing); managing custom-domain TLS certificates (ACM in us-east-1); configuring multi-tenant distributions; protecting origins with origin access control (OAC), VPC origins, and origin mutual TLS (mTLS); securing content with signed URLs and cookies, geographic restrictions, viewer mutual TLS, and edge token validation; and observing traffic with standard and real-time logs. Applicable when the customer wants to put CloudFront in front of content, choose pricing, lock an origin, restrict who can view content, or analyze logs. Not applicable for the Route 53 DNS side of a CloudFront custom domain or failover between distributions (see the route53-cloudfront skill), or for pure-Route 53 DNS work (see the route53 skill).

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Configures Amazon Route 53 to route traffic to a CloudFront distribution using a custom domain. Use when setting up DNS alias records, alternate domain names (CNAMEs), ACM certificates for HTTPS, and IPv6 support for CloudFront.

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AWS security service suitability, coverage and cost recommendations: WAF/origin overlap, AWS Network Firewall inspection coverage and policy review, VPC endpoint, Transit Gateway/Cloud WAN segmentation and DNS Firewall security-control suitability, certificate renewal ownership and monitoring, incident response triage ownership, centralized security log store (CloudWatch or Security Lake). Also factual configuration, findings, data sources and severity scoring for GuardDuty, Inspector, Security Hub V2/OCSF (Exposure, connectors, automation), Security Hub CSPM/ASFF (standards, controls), Macie, Detective, Security Lake, AWS Security Incident Response membership and case coverage, and Organizations security policies. Applies to advisory security-service choices even when one service is named. Implementation, rule or code authoring, deployment, scans and troubleshooting outside these factual procedures belong to specialist skills. Supports local AWS CLI and AWS MCP.

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Analyze a target's TLS configuration — negotiated protocol version, cipher suite, certificate chain, expiry, and downgrade vectors. Use when: SOC2 auditor flagged your endpoint for "weak TLS" but you don't know which control failed (TSC CC6.7 transmission integrity vs CC6.6 encryption) or which cipher is the problem. Threshold: any negotiated TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1, OR a cipher with RC4 / 3DES / null / EXPORT, OR a cert with under 30 days to expiry, OR a chain that fails hostname verification. Trigger with: "audit tls", "check ssl config", "weak tls", "analyze tls".

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Turns one-shot external recon into a continuous monitoring program. Covers the scheduled re-scan-and-diff loop (baseline snapshot -> interval sleep -> re-scan -> asset/finding delta -> threshold-gated webhook alert), the scan-to-scan diff engine (new/removed/changed assets by a tracked-attribute table, new/resolved findings by a stable cross-scan fingerprint), adversary CTI / chatter monitoring across six public feeds (ransomwatch, ransomware.live, HackerNews Algolia search, Reddit security-subreddit RSS, GitHub Gist code-search, public Telegram channel scraping) with a source-kind-aware severity engine (leak-site/forum/telegram/paste tiers, CRITICAL through INFO), literal/glob/regex watchlist pattern matching, full-corpus capture with retroactive rescan on new watchlist entries, infrastructure-tracking-over-time discipline (certificate-transparency, passive-DNS, port/service, and typosquat re-enumeration cadence, and what a genuine 'perimeter drift' event looks like in the diff output), a five-state finding-lifecycle state machine (open/triaged/risk_accepted/resolved/false_positive) with per-severity SLA and fingerprint-based cross-scan dedup and auto-resolve/reopen rules, the alert-fatigue trap where a lifecycle-unaware rule re-fires on an already-accepted finding, a durable retry/backoff alert-outbox pattern ('queued is not delivered'), and copy-paste bash-cron plus PowerShell-Scheduled-Task recipes for a re-scan+diff loop with the Slack-compatible webhook payload shape. Passive OSINT and analysis only -- no new active-intrusion technique. Use when setting up ongoing monitoring for a retainer or MSSP engagement, tuning alert thresholds to avoid fatigue, triaging a finding's lifecycle status, investigating adversary chatter about a brand, building a 'what changed on the perimeter since last week' report, or deciding whether a persisting finding should re-alert.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。