「replay」の検索結果

Safely simulates and applies Identity and Access Management (IAM) v1 (Allow) policy changes on Google Cloud. Uses the Policy Simulator to replay historical access logs against proposed policies to prevent breaking active workloads before applying the changes. Use when simulating or applying IAM v1 allow policies across Projects, Folders, or Organizations. Don't use for analyzing IAM v2 deny policies, VPC Service Controls, or performing general policy troubleshooting.

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Agentic end-to-end tests with e2e, the e2e runner. Covers scaffolding e2e.config.ts, picking the Playwright browser engine or the agent-device mobile engine, starting the app under test from the config, driving flows with agent.act, judging with agent.assert, agent.waitFor, and agent.extract, pinning values with screen, app, browser, and expect, shaping the agent (context, system prompt, tools, personas), the replay cache, the e2e CLI, reading .e2e/report.json, and bug bashes (parallel explore runs proven with repro tests). Use when a project depends on e2e, when asked for end-to-end, browser, mobile, or agentic UI tests, to bug bash or hunt for bugs, or when an e2e run fails.

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Use when the user wants the dsh agent to self-improve from past usage, asks about a nightly/offline 'sleep' or 'dream' cycle, skill/memory consolidation, or says things like 'make my agent better the more I use it', 'review my past sessions', 'learn my preferences', 'consolidate what you learned', 'run the sleep cycle', or wants to schedule background self-optimization. Drives the skillopt_sleep engine through the skillopt_* tools: harvest past sessions -> mine recurring tasks -> replay via a selected backend -> consolidate validated skills behind a held-out gate.

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Use when the user wants Codex to self-improve from past usage, asks about a nightly/offline 'sleep' or 'dream' cycle, wants Codex to review past sessions, learn preferences, consolidate memory/skills, run dry-run/run/adopt/status for SkillOpt-Sleep, or schedule background self-optimization. Drives the skillopt_sleep engine: harvest past sessions -> mine recurring tasks -> replay through a selected backend -> consolidate validated memory + skills behind a held-out gate.

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Use when the user wants their Claude agent to self-improve from past usage, asks about a nightly/offline 'sleep' or 'dream' cycle, memory/skill consolidation, or says things like 'make my agent better the more I use it', 'review my past sessions', 'learn my preferences', 'consolidate what you learned', 'run the sleep cycle', or wants to schedule background self-optimization. Drives the skillopt_sleep engine: harvest past sessions -> mine recurring tasks -> replay through a selected backend -> consolidate validated CLAUDE.md/SKILL.md behind a held-out gate.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Complete reference for all 10 DeFi smart contract bug classes. Use this when hunting for specific vulnerability types, need attack patterns for accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle manipulation, ERC4626 vaults, reentrancy, flash loans, signature replay, or proxy/upgrade bugs.

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MNN Metal 后端 op/kernel 开发与优化入口。索引各份 sub-doc：性能问题诊断流程（op 单测 + 对手基准定位真瓶颈，优化任务第一站）、kernel 开发规范与优化知识库（命名/写法/GEMV/GEMM/attention + 手段方法论）、算子融合全链路（导出图→converter→Metal 单 dispatch + 融合方法论）、运行时调度（fence/content-cache/H2D/replay + 调度方法论）、构建测试基线、env 开关注册表。根据当前任务选择性阅读对应 sub-doc。

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Inspects a recorded CARLA .log without replaying it — show_recorder_file_info for the header/actors/frames, collision queries between actor categories, and blocked-actor queries for vehicles that got stuck. Use when the user asks to "what's in this recording", "show recorder info", "which vehicles collided", "find collisions in the log", or "which actors were blocked/stuck".

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Use this skill when creating a Java SDK surface-area E2E integration test backed by a replay proxy YAML snapshot

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Authoring guide for Native SDK TypeScript services under src/services: ordinary scriptc static-tier TypeScript reached through generated typed Cmd clients, shared record shapes, hermetic vendored npm, streaming, deadlines, cancellation, devhost simulation, authority, replay, and the two carriers (in-process thread pool, child subprocess). Use when adding or modifying src/services modules, moving Node/JSON/regex/Map/Date/class work out of a core, or fixing NS1065-NS1067.

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Translates Mermaid sequenceDiagrams describing cryptographic protocols into ProVerif formal verification models (.pv files). Use when generating a ProVerif model, formally verifying a protocol, converting a Mermaid diagram to ProVerif, verifying protocol security properties (secrecy, authentication, forward secrecy), checking for replay attacks, or producing a .pv file from a sequence diagram.

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Scans Cairo/StarkNet smart contracts for 6 critical vulnerabilities including felt252 arithmetic overflow, L1-L2 messaging issues, address conversion problems, and signature replay. Use when auditing StarkNet projects.

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Zigbee, Thread, and Matter mesh-protocol attack methodology — IEEE 802.15.4 sniffing with TI CC2531 / CC2540 / Sonoff Zigbee Dongle E, KillerBee toolkit, Touchlink commissioning abuse with the well-known transport key, replay/injection attacks, Zigbee Cluster Library command abuse for door locks and bulbs, Thread network credential theft, Matter commissioning chain analysis, and 6LoWPAN/IPv6 routing exploitation. Use when targeting smart-home or commercial mesh deployments, Zigbee-based door locks, lighting, or sensor networks.

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Deauthentication and disassociation attacks against 802.11 networks — targeted single-client deauth for handshake capture, broadcast deauth for DoS (with authorization), action-frame attacks bypassing 802.11w (PMF), beacon flooding, mdk4 / aireplay-ng tooling, and rate-limit / PMF-aware operation. Use to coerce client reconnection (handshake capture, evil-twin roaming), as targeted DoS, or to test PMF posture.

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Phishing campaign execution methodology for authorized red team engagements. Covers end-to-end campaign lifecycle: infrastructure provisioning (GoPhish, SMTP relay configuration, domain acquisition and aging, SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment), payload delivery vectors (Office macro weaponization, HTA droppers, ISO/IMG container abuse, LNK shortcut hijacking, OneNote embedded payloads, HTML smuggling), email authentication bypass techniques (SPF softfail exploitation, DKIM replay attacks, display name spoofing, homoglyph and cousin domain registration), credential harvesting with MFA bypass (EvilGinx2 transparent proxy, Modlishka session relay, pixel-perfect HTML cloning), spear phishing pretext development informed by OSINT, email security gateway evasion, QR code phishing (quishing), and callback phishing for initial access. Integrates with GoPhish for campaign management, EvilGinx2 for adversary-in-the-middle credential interception, King Phisher for template design, and the Social Engineering Toolkit for payload generation. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1566 (Phishing) and sub-techniques T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment), T1566.002 (Spearphishing Link), T1566.003 (Spearphishing via Service). Assumes you have written authorization and a defined scope before any campaign execution.

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Comprehensive methodology for auditing and exploiting TLS/SSL implementations and misconfigurations across network services and mobile applications. Covers protocol downgrade attacks including POODLE (CVE-2014-3566) against SSLv3 CBC padding, DROWN (CVE-2016-0800) cross-protocol attack leveraging SSLv2 export ciphers to decrypt TLS sessions, and FREAK (CVE-2015-0204) forcing RSA export-grade key exchange. Addresses BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) exploiting CBC IV predictability in TLS 1.0, CRIME (CVE-2012-4929) and BREACH targeting TLS-level and HTTP-level compression oracles respectively, and Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) for OpenSSL memory disclosure. Covers certificate validation bypass techniques for applications with improper hostname verification or chain validation, certificate pinning bypass using Frida and Objection for mobile application interception, HSTS bypass via NTP manipulation and subdomain exploitation, TLS 1.3 0-RTT replay attacks against non-idempotent endpoints, mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication attacks including client certificate theft and relay, and Certificate Transparency log monitoring for reconnaissance. Primary tooling includes testssl.sh for comprehensive TLS auditing, sslyze for Python-integrated scanning, sslscan for quick cipher enumeration, and tlsx for high-speed TLS probing at scale. Maps to CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation), CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information), and CWE-757 (Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation).

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Z-Wave attack methodology — sniffing with Z-Force / EZ-Wave / RTL-SDR + ZniffMobile, S0 (legacy) network-key derivation flaw and key reuse, S2 (modern) ECDH commissioning analysis, replay/injection on unauthenticated nodes, default-key brute-force on test deployments, and home-automation hub pivots. Use when targeting Z-Wave smart home devices (door locks, sensors, garage controllers) — common in mid-2010s smart home deployments still in production.

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Analyze product data and manage product tooling in PostHog. Use when the user wants product analytics or insights, HogQL/SQL queries, feature flags, experiments and A/B tests, error tracking, session replay, surveys, LLM analytics, dashboards, data warehouse, or PostHog documentation.

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Use only for MSBuild failure investigation, build-performance analysis, or review of existing build XML/extension contracts. A plan to convert a working legacy/non-SDK project to SDK style or migrate packages.config is a project-system migration, NOT a build-file review: do not activate, even to check scope. Framework/API upgrades are also excluded. Activate for advisory Import/Exists hook and NuGet packed-import questions even without a checkout or failed build; .csproj/.fsproj/.vbproj/.props/.targets conditions; custom-target inputs/outputs; .binlog capture/replay; failing dotnet build/restore/pack/publish or MSBuild-based test builds; slow evaluation, compilation, copying, or no-change builds; and controlled timing comparisons. Exclude SDK installation alone, C# refactoring, runtime profiling, assertions after successful builds, and non-MSBuild builds.

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Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for any Solidity/Rust contract audit or when deciding whether a DeFi target is worth hunting.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for any Solidity/Rust contract audit or when deciding whether a DeFi target is worth hunting.

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Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID (admin@target.com<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see admin@target.com), signature stripping (remove Signature element entirely, server should reject but doesn't), key confusion (signed by attacker's IdP, accepted by SP), audience-restriction not validated, replay attack (same Assertion accepted twice within validity window). Tools: SAML Raider Burp extension, samlmagic, manual XML manipulation. Detection: any /saml endpoint, /Shibboleth.sso, /sso/saml/, Microsoft ADFS endpoints. Validate: account takeover via altered NameID, admin role injection via altered AttributeStatement. Use when hunting SSO flows, when SAML AssertionConsumerService is reachable, when chaining IdP-trust to SP-impersonation.

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Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA (CAPTCHA token replay / single-use / concurrency-window bypass specifics → hunt-captcha-bypass), IP-based rate-limit bypass via X-Forwarded-For and friends, ReDoS. Distinguishes hard lockout vs soft IP-throttle vs CAPTCHA-injection vs silent shadow-throttling (avoids false-negative 'no rate limit' conclusions). Medium to Critical depending on what the brute reaches (OTP→ATO = Critical).

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Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6-digit OTP without rate limit (10^6 attempts at server speed), (5) race condition on OTP validation, (6) recovery-code dump via /api/me, (7) backup factor downgrade (SMS factor with no rate limit). Plus the chain: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = ATO without MFA challenge. Detection: trace auth flow in Burp, find every state transition, check if MFA is middleware-gated vs per-endpoint, check OTP entropy and rate limit on OTP-validate. Validate: attacker session reaching post-MFA state. Use when hunting auth bypass, MFA flows, chaining primitives toward ATO.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。