Daytona cloud server, Den sandbox, desktop plus cloud e2e, marketplace server, worker proxy, cloud auth, org policies, connect Electron to Den. Use for server-side setup in validated flows.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
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概要と使いどころ
Daytona cloud server, Den sandbox, desktop plus cloud e2e, marketplace server, worker proxy, cloud auth, org policies, connect Electron to Den. Use for server-side setup in validated flows.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Electron and Den, desktop plus cloud, two-sandbox e2e, cloud auth, marketplace, org policy, worker proxy, provider sync, desktop handoff. Validate Electron against a Daytona Den server with unified proof.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Connect coding agents, AI SDKs, and LLM tools to the AntSeed buyer proxy. Use when configuring Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Pi, OpenClaw, Hermes, GenLayer Studio, Vercel AI SDK, LangChain, or raw HTTP to route inference through AntSeed at localhost:8377.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Troubleshoot npm registry, proxy, and certificate failures on the Microsoft corporate network or VPN using the 1ES public npm feed.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Client-side request-signing and anti-bot token reversal for bug bounty — when a request carries a sign/sig/hmac/token/nonce/timestamp/X-Sensor header that Burp Repeater cannot replay, recover the signer just enough to reproduce the request outside the client. Packet-first staging (capture real request → prove replay works → only reverse if replay fails) across the locate→recover→runtime→validation→replay spine. Covers tracing backward from the signature field (writer→builder→entry→source), isolating user-mutable sign inputs (timestamp/nonce/deviceId/body) vs constants (secret key), hooking fetch/XHR in DevTools, JS deobfuscation basics (webpack/wasm/JSVMP), and the bounty payoff: reach the protected API to then hunt IDOR/auth/business-logic. Use when Burp/mitmproxy replay of a signed or anti-bot-gated request fails and you suspect a client-computed field is blocking you.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for any Solidity/Rust contract audit or when deciding whether a DeFi target is worth hunting.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for any Solidity/Rust contract audit or when deciding whether a DeFi target is worth hunting.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunting skill for sqli vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports including modern NoSQL injection (Rocket.Chat CVE-2021-22911 MongoDB $regex, Mongoose ORM CVE-2024-53900 $where bypass), modern ORM raw-fragment SQLi (Django CVE-2024-42005, Sequelize GHSA-wrh9-cjv3-2hpw), second-order SOQL injection (HackerOne Salesforce), time-based blind SQLi in GraphQL resolvers, and SQLi on OIDC-proxy backends. Use when hunting SQLi on any target. Dedicated NoSQL operator injection (MongoDB/CouchDB $where/$regex/$ne) is owned by hunt-nosqli — NoSQL appears here only as adjacent ORM/WAF context.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, and HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DoS (CVE-2023-44487). Use when target exposes port 50051 / 443 / 8443 / 9090 with HTTP/2, when grpcurl/grpcui detects reflection, when an Envoy or grpc-gateway proxy is fronting a microservice, or when recon reveals a microservice architecture.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt Kubernetes & Docker — API anonymous access, kubelet 10250 exec (SPDY/WebSocket, NOT plain POST) and the simpler /run primitive, etcd 2379 unauth, dashboard skip-login, RBAC misconfig, secret/SA-token abuse, docker.sock host escape, runc/container-escape (Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626), API-server-mediated nodes/proxy RCE, EphemeralContainers node-shell, bound/projected SA-token audience+expiry abuse, admission-controller bypass, Helm/Tiller remnants. Use when target runs containerized infra, exposes K8s ports (6443/10250/10255/2379/8443), or cloud metadata reveals K8s service accounts.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash/merge/assign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process/eval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS/Pug/Handlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable exfil via /proc/self/environ. Use when target runs Node.js/Express/Fastify/NestJS/Koa.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer poisoning, and absolute-URL link poisoning in emails. High to Critical when it reaches ATO or mass cache poisoning. Built on public Host-header research (PortSwigger 'Practical web cache poisoning' + James Kettle, and the classic password-reset-poisoning class). Use on any forgot-password flow, CDN/reverse-proxy-fronted app, OAuth/OIDC endpoint, or absolute-URL-in-email feature.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
This skill should be used when the user asks to "intercept HTTP traffic", "modify web requests", "use Burp Suite for testing", "perform web vulnerability scanning", "test with Burp Repeater", "analyze HTTP history", or "configure proxy for web testing". It provides comprehensive guidance for using Burp Suite's core features for web application security testing.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Agentica server + Claude proxy setup - architecture, startup sequence, debugging
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Use when a PinMe project (Worker TypeScript) needs to integrate user authentication — creating email/password users, verifying id_tokens, querying user info, or listing users via Identity Platform auth proxy APIs.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Python library for accessing, analyzing, and extracting data from SEC EDGAR filings. Use when working with SEC filings, financial statements (income statement, balance sheet, cash flow), XBRL financial data, insider trading (Form 4), institutional holdings (13F), company financials, annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q), proxy statements (DEF 14A), 8-K current events, company screening by ticker/CIK/industry, multi-period financial analysis, or any SEC regulatory filings.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
PLAINTEXT-ONLY: the shipped `doca_flow_grpc` server uses `grpc::InsecureServerCredentials()` with NO TLS / mTLS / token-auth knob on the binary — transport security must come from external infrastructure (e.g. an mTLS proxy / sidecar) on a trusted segment. Use this skill when bringing up, configuring, hardening, or debugging `doca_flow_grpc` — the DOCA-shipped gRPC remote-control surface in front of `doca-flow` that lets non-C++ clients (Python, Go, Rust, Java) program Flow pipes and entries over RPC instead of linking `libdoca_flow.so` directly. Trigger even when the user doesn't say 'doca-flow-grpc-server' or 'gRPC' — e.g. 'program Flow rules from Python on another host', 'remotely configure pipes on the BlueField', 'client times out connecting to the Flow server', 'where is the .proto for Flow', 'UNAUTHENTICATED / FAILED_PRECONDITION on a Flow RPC'. Route elsewhere for the underlying doca-flow API, generic gRPC tooling (protoc, language bindings), or DOCA install / BFB bring-up.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Use when the user asks to "monitor brand mentions", "set up social listening", "did anything spike about us this week", or "watch these accounts for buying triggers"; runs always-on keyless listening — a versioned listening-query architecture (brand variants incl. misspellings and 中文 names, exclusion terms, per-source syntax for HN Algolia / Bluesky / GDELT / Tavily), a mention sweep with six-class triage (crisis / bug / lead / praise / question / spam) each routed with an SLA, a 7-day rolling baseline with spike flags (the crisis trigger input), a B2B trigger watchlist (funding / hiring / launch signals), and an explicit coverage disclosure where X/IG/TikTok/LinkedIn/小红书 numbers are proxy-labeled, never Measured. Not for launch-window telemetry (T-0→T+30 rank and review polling) — use launch-monitor. 舆情监听/品牌提及监测/基线突刺/触发信号
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Use when the user asks to "set up conversion values so tROAS optimizes profit not orders", "map margin onto my purchase value", "build value rules for lead / phone / signup conversions", or "stop bidding to revenue when I care about profit"; defines and QAs the conversion VALUE model — per-conversion values, margin/net-value adjustment, static-vs-dynamic value rules, proxy values for non-revenue actions, and a value-vs-count sanity check — as a value-model spec plus a pre-launch value QA sheet. Not for whether the tag fires or UTMs are clean — use conversion-signal-qa; not for cross-platform double-count de-dup — use attribution-reconciler; not for scoring R1/R2 — that is a scored veto in ad-account-auditor. 付费广告转化价值建模/利润出价/价值规则QA
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Provides connectivity, authentication, and troubleshooting guidance for Amazon RDS for SQL Server. Applicable when users ask about SSMS times out connecting from EC2, Cannot generate SSPI context with Windows auth, connect RDS SQL Server from Lambda with pymssql, auth_scheme shows NTLM instead of KERBEROS on ECS Fargate, SSM tunnel to RDS SQL Server from laptop, port 1433 security group, TrustServerCertificate=True for localhost tunnels, SPN MSSQLSvc, AWS Managed Microsoft AD, CNAME not RDS endpoint for Kerberos, tds_version='7.4', encryption='require', port-as-string for pymssql, Secrets Manager credential caching in Lambda, error 18456 login failed. Covers Python (pymssql, pyodbc), .NET (Microsoft.Data.SqlClient), Java (JDBC mssql-jdbc), Node.js (tedious), IAM auth via RDS Proxy, and VPC/ECS/EKS/Lambda deployment.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Connects an existing AWS Lambda function to Amazon API Gateway by creating a REST or HTTP API with resource/method setup, Lambda proxy integration, permissions, and deployment. Always use this skill when connecting Lambda to API Gateway — it handles CORS, throttling, access logging, and production security hardening that are easy to miss.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Optimize Apify Actor performance: crawl speed, memory usage, concurrency, and proxy rotation. Use when Actors are slow, consuming too much memory, or being blocked by target sites, or when a crawl is too expensive per run. Trigger with "apify performance", "optimize apify actor", "apify slow", "crawlee concurrency", "apify memory tuning", "scraper performance".
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Diagnose and fix common Apify Actor and API errors. Use when an Apify run fails, an API call returns 401/403/404/413/429, a proxy connection drops, an Actor build breaks, or a scrape hits an anti-bot block, and you need the cause plus a copy-paste fix. Trigger with "apify error", "fix apify", "actor failed", "apify not working", "debug apify", "apify 429".
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。