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You are helping a penetration tester exploit browser-based attack surfaces. This

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Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting via injected forms. Use when testing text-display surfaces (search results, profile fields, comments, error messages, feedback forms). For markup that executes JavaScript, escalate to hunt-xss.

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Business logic vulnerability testing for web/mobile/API engagements. Covers workflow bypass, state machine violations, multi-step process abuse, price/quantity/discount manipulation, currency confusion, coupon stacking, refund/chargeback abuse, race conditions on logic boundaries, parameter tampering for hidden flows, role/tenant boundary violations, time-of-check vs use, anti-automation defeat, fraud-detection evasion, and subscription/quota abuse. Use when scoping an application after surface-level OWASP Top 10 has been covered, or when the asset is a transactional/marketplace/fintech/e-commerce/SaaS app where logic flaws produce direct financial impact.

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Hunt shadow / zombie / undocumented API surface (OWASP API9 Improper Inventory Management) — enumerate the full API version history (v1/v2/beta/legacy paths, header- and subdomain-based versioning), pull and diff every reachable OpenAPI/Swagger spec (including ones only findable via the Wayback Machine), and behaviorally diff old vs. current versions for auth/rate-limit/validation regressions rather than just response-shape differences. Distinct from hunt-api-misconfig, which owns exploitation once you have a spec or endpoint (mass assignment, JWT, OData, Swagger-chain attacks); distinct from hunt-subdomain, which owns host-level discovery. This skill owns the version-inventory and behavioral-diff workflow itself. Use when the target has versioned API paths, multiple specs, a changelog referencing deprecated endpoints, or a mobile app whose hardcoded backend calls look older than the current web app's.

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Comprehensive API security testing methodology covering REST, gRPC, and WebSocket attack surfaces. Addresses the full OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 including BOLA/IDOR, broken authentication, excessive data exposure, rate limiting bypass, BFLA, mass assignment, SSRF, and security misconfiguration. Includes REST-specific attacks such as HTTP verb tampering, content-type switching, and parameter pollution. Covers gRPC exploitation through protobuf interception, reflection API enumeration, and metadata injection. Addresses WebSocket vulnerabilities including origin bypass, message injection, and cross-site WebSocket hijacking. Provides tooling guidance for Burp Suite, Postman, grpcurl, websocat, and mitmproxy. Each technique includes detection signatures and defensive indicators so you understand what artifacts your testing leaves behind. Designed for authorized penetration testing engagements against API-driven architectures.

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Comprehensive Linux privilege escalation methodology for offensive security engagements. Covers the full attack surface from a low-privilege shell to root: SUID/SGID binary abuse via GTFOBins, Linux capabilities exploitation (cap_setuid, cap_dac_override, cap_dac_read_search), sudo misconfigurations including NOPASSWD rules and Baron Samedit (CVE-2021-3156), cron job abuse through writable scripts, PATH hijacking, and wildcard injection with tar/rsync/chown. Includes writable /etc/passwd attacks, NFS no_root_squash exploitation, kernel exploits (DirtyPipe CVE-2022-0847, DirtyCow CVE-2016-5195, PwnKit CVE-2021-4034), Docker group container escapes, LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH hijacking for shared library injection, systemd service misconfigurations, and sensitive file enumeration for credential harvesting. Integrates automated enumeration with LinPEAS, linux-exploit-suggester, pspy for process monitoring, and GTFOBins for binary exploitation. Each technique includes detection signatures and defender-sid...

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Hunt source code and build artifact leakage — JavaScript source maps (.js.map) reconstructing TypeScript/ES6 source, Swagger/OpenAPI JSON endpoint discovery, .env/.git exposure, webpack chunks with hardcoded secrets, robots.txt/security.txt recon, build-info files, asset-manifest.json API route discovery, .DS_Store file listing. Use at the START of every recon session — these findings often unlock the entire attack surface.

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External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.

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Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.

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Comprehensive Windows privilege escalation methodology for offensive security engagements. Covers the full attack surface from a standard user shell to NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM: token impersonation via SeImpersonate and SeAssignPrimaryToken privileges using JuicyPotato, PrintSpoofer, GodPotato, SweetPotato, and RoguePotato; service misconfigurations including unquoted service paths, weak service DACLs, writable service binaries, and insecure service creation permissions; AlwaysInstallElevated MSI exploitation; DLL hijacking through search order abuse, phantom DLL loading, and writable PATH directory injection; UAC bypass techniques via fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, CMSTP, and environment variable manipulation; scheduled task abuse for writable task actions and new task creation; registry autorun exploitation for persistence and escalation; PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) for remote and local privilege escalation; and credential harvesting from SAM database extraction, DPAPI blob decryption, LSA secret dumping,...

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Speed-optimized offensive checklist for rapid assessment: quick-win vulnerability patterns, fast recon shortcuts, automated scanner configurations, and triage shortcuts. Use for time-boxed assessments, CTF-speed engagements, or initial rapid surface mapping.

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Insecure deserialization exploitation across Java, PHP, .NET, Python, Node.js, and Ruby. Covers gadget chain construction with ysoserial/phpggc/ysoserial.net, ObjectInputStream and BinaryFormatter sink identification, pickle __reduce__ RCE, phar:// wrapper abuse, Jackson polymorphic typing, Json.NET TypeNameHandling, ViewState tampering, node-serialize IIFE injection, Ruby Marshal.load and YAML.load gadgets, framework-specific chains for Spring/Hibernate/Laravel/Symfony, modern attack surfaces including Kubernetes admission webhooks and message queue consumers, WAF bypass through encoding layers and content-type manipulation, and serialVersionUID/JMX/RMI vectors. Activate when the engagement involves deserialization sinks, serialized data in cookies or request bodies, gadget chain development, magic method abuse, ysoserial payload generation, or any review of marshalling and unmarshalling logic in target applications.

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Okta-as-IdP red-team attack chain — tenant discovery, user enumeration (multiple vectors), authentication flow analysis (factors enumeration, push-notification fatigue, SMS bypass), password spray with lockout discipline, Okta-specific phishing primitives (kits, FastPass abuse, OIDC redirect_uri tampering), MFA enumeration, post-compromise admin API surface. Many enterprise orgs use Okta instead of (or alongside) Entra ID. Distinct endpoints, distinct rate-limiting, distinct factor flows. Use when recon shows `<tenant>.okta.com`, `<tenant>.okta-emea.com`, `<tenant>.oktapreview.com`, or autodiscover-style records pointing at Okta IdP.

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Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.

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Microsoft 365 / Entra ID red-team attack chain — current 2026 reality. AADSTS code reference, user enumeration vectors (with hardening status), Smart Lockout math, Conditional Access bypass options, ROPC + SAML SSO browser flow, Burp/Playwright templates. Built from authorized red-team work where ROPC spray surfaced pre-existing lockouts and CA-blocked credentials, plus real-time external attacker activity correlation. Use for any M365/Entra credential attack, password spray, user enumeration, CA-bypass exploration, or active-attacker-detection scenario.

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Analyze any codebase's source code in depth and produce structured analysis documents saved as markdown files. Use this skill whenever the user asks to understand how a codebase works — architecture, module design, call flows, data models, design patterns, performance characteristics, or any implementation detail. Trigger on phrases like "analyze the source", "explain this code", "how does X work", "where is Y implemented", "trace the flow of", "what happens when", "read through the code", "code walkthrough", "源码分析", "代码解读", "实现原理", "架构分析", "调用链路", "模块分析", or any code-exploration request. Works with any programming language: TypeScript/JavaScript, Java, Python, Go, Rust, C/C++, and more. Even if the user's question seems simple (e.g., "这个文件是干什么的"), use this skill — a thorough, source-backed analysis document is always more valuable than a surface-level guess.

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Monitor competitor blogs and industry publications to surface content opportunities

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Design desktop window systems that feel native on macOS and Windows: split views, inspectors, auxiliary windows, tiling, snap-safe sizes, default placement, and chrome density. Use when a Tauri/Electron/WinUI/SwiftUI app feels awkward, overlapping, over-chromed, or generic, or when you need a real geometry contract for multiple surfaces. NOT for mobile layouts, marketing pages, or CSS-only component styling without multi-window or multi-pane behavior.

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Audit or design server-side indexes, directories, reputations, or aggregates that are DERIVED from traffic a platform witnesses (chain heads, run verdicts, heartbeats, publish activity) so that consent gates the derivation, not merely the read: no shadow index over non-consenting principals, post-consent-only evidence windows, retention bounds and delete-propagation into derived rows, activity-oracle threat modeling, and audit-logged ranking discretion. Use when building a capability directory / whois from witnessed activity, a reputation ledger from settled outcomes, vitals aggregation across tenants, or any "the yellow pages can't lie because they index signatures" feature. Keywords: shadow index, derived index, consent gates derivation, activity oracle, phone book not a log, delist propagation, ranking weight audit, k-anonymous aggregate, subpoena surface. NOT for the consent-screen UX and scope-ladder mechanics themselves (use local-first-tenancy-boundary), reputation scoring math and Sybil economics (use agent-identity-continuity-reputation), or discovery-layer architecture L1/L2/L3 (use agent-discovery-directories-guilds).

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Classify every destructive/gated action an agent body can attempt (git, filesystem, network, shell, github) into block/approve/allow tiers, and audit whether the pre-tool and post-tool governance backing that classification is real: blocked actions proven zero-side-effect by a negative fixture, every denial backed by a receipt and a transcript event, every block-tier denial paired with a safe alternative, and no unmanaged or same-UID body ever marked "contained." Use when building or reviewing Agent Harbor's C5 governance gate (destructive git blocker, approval request/result, denial receipts), gating a new tool surface before it can run destructive commands, or auditing whether an existing "destructive-action blocked" claim actually has evidence behind it. NOT for proving an existing sandbox boundary actually contains an adversary once an action is isolated (use sandboxed-adversarial-test-harness), deciding where in a DAG to place a human review node or designing the approval UX itself (use human-gate-designer), or designing the general work-receipt schema across an entire agent task (use agent-work-receipt-designer).

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Own whether a multi-document product-architecture binder is internally consistent, complete against its stated customer/contingency/architecture coverage, and honest about which older product ambitions it has absorbed, superseded, deferred, contradicted, orphaned, or rejected. Use when running a binder Architect of Record pass, before an implementation chain cites a binder chapter as ready, when a proof-gate owner is missing, or when reconciling the binder against the older ambition corpus (website, plans, examples, ADRs). NOT for auditing a single Claude Skill bundle's structure or frontmatter (use skill-hygiene), rendering a single-PM accept/reject verdict on one finished deliverable (use port-daddy-user-surrogate-pm-review), or sequencing/stewarding a roadmap's sidequests once a gap or operator decision has been surfaced (use legible-roadmap-with-sidequests).

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Design and scaffold new skills, subagents, and MCP surfaces. Use when choosing which primitive to create. NOT for invoking existing agents, generic coding help, or deployment work.

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Safety-case design for always-on agents with episodic memory. Covers data hygiene, privacy and security risk surfaces, cost controls, scope, user dependency concerns, retention, incident containment, and responsible deployment evidence. It identifies hazards and asks for named controls, tests, owners, and residual uncertainty; it does not provide legal, clinical, youth-safety, or jurisdictional determinations. Activate on: "agent safety", "always-on agent privacy", "agent cost control", "persistent agent risks", "AI companion safety", "agent data hygiene", "runaway agent costs", "parasocial AI risk", "/always-on-agent-safety". NOT for: architecture design (use always-on-agent-architecture), input design (use always-on-agent-inputs), application brainstorming (use always-on-agent-applications), healthcare compliance specifically (use hipaa-compliance).

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Audit a compliance-ladder design (C0-C6) and transcript-fidelity ladder (T0-T5) plus their adapter conformance fixtures — Codex, Claude Code, Cloudflare, Ollama/LM Studio, custom stdio/HTTP agents — for the two failure modes that make a C-badge or T-fidelity label a lie: the ladder disagreeing with itself across doc/schema/ui/probe surfaces, and a level being reachable by self-report because no daemon-witnessed negative probe actually tries to forge it. Use when designing or freezing a compliance ladder, wiring an adapter conformance probe suite, deciding whether a numeric C-badge or T-label is safe to ship, or investigating a self-attestation or observed-to-controlled bypass risk. NOT for auditing a cryptographic protocol or whitepaper for adversarial soundness (`redteam-review`), writing TLA+/formal invariants for a daemon monitor (`runtime-verification-for-agents`), or agent identity, successor linkage, and reputation across restarts (`agent-identity-continuity-reputation`).

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