「endpoints」の検索結果

x402 agentic payments (Coinbase's HTTP 402 protocol). Custody-free tools to pay x402-protected endpoints (build the EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization the payer signs, assemble the X-PAYMENT header), call a facilitator (verify/settle/supported), and monetize your own API by generating PaymentRequirements. USDC on Base. Triggers: x402, HTTP 402, pay per request, agentic payment, machine payment, X-PAYMENT, transferWithAuthorization, EIP-3009, facilitator, monetize API, pay for API, agent pays.

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Build a production 1:1 stablecoin swap with LI.FI Intents — an interface or backend where the amount the user sends equals the amount they receive (no visible gas or solver fees), same-chain or cross-chain, filled by LI.FI's solver network and verifiable on-chain. USE THIS SKILL WHEN USER WANTS TO: - Build a 1:1 stablecoin swap interface ("send 100 USDC, receive 100 USDC"), same- or cross-chain - Add stablecoin transfers with a guaranteed output amount to an app, backend, or bot - Build enterprise/fintech-grade transfers with no visible gas or solver fees for the end user - Implement the LI.FI Intents quote -> approve -> escrow open -> status loop for stablecoins - Move USDC / USDT 1:1 across chains under an onboarded LI.FI integrator - Understand how the LI.FI integrator ID / Partner Portal enables 1:1 quoting - Use the @lifi/intent TypeScript SDK to quote, build, open, and track an intent order This skill is self-contained and covers the integration end to end via the `@lifi/intent` SDK (the primary path), with the raw `order.li.fi` REST endpoints as a language-agnostic option. For the wider LI.FI product surface (classic swaps/bridges, Composer, Earn), use the `lifi` skill.

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Use when designing, implementing, debugging, or reviewing Nexent relational schemas, FastAPI endpoints, backend services, database access, SQL migrations, or backend/SDK configuration. Includes table/field naming, types, JSONB boundaries, audit fields, keys, and indexes even before code paths exist. Skip frontend-only work and unrelated SDK algorithms.

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Route C# and .NET requests to the exact installed specialist or smallest dotnet/skills marketplace plugin. USE FOR: "which specialist should own this" or "how do I add the skill" requests involving ASP.NET Core endpoints, Blazor, MAUI binding, Windows Forms specialist selection or installation, EF Core queries, test or framework migration, runtime CPU/allocation evidence, file-based C#, editor/compiler defects, a surviving MSBuild `.binlog`, or a plugin missing from `/skills`; also use for C# semantics when no narrower specialist exists. DO NOT USE FOR: requests that already name the exact installed specialist to invoke, or work unrelated to C# or .NET.

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Review and validate claims using counter-hypothesis testing. Use when verifying technical content, checking references, validating API endpoints, or performing quality assurance on deliverables.

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Mobile app pentest for bug bounty (Android APK + iOS IPA) — runtime-first workflow: install app, proxy through Burp/mitmproxy, drive the UI, capture packets, then test the API exactly like a web target; escalate to decompile (apktool/jadx) and Frida/objection only when traffic is SSL-pinned, encrypted, or absent. Covers APK/IPA decompile for hardcoded secrets + hidden API endpoints + base URLs the web app never exposes, exported-activity and deeplink intent injection, WebView addJavascriptInterface bridge abuse, SSL pinning bypass (objection patchapk / Frida CertificatePinner + checkServerTrusted hooks), OkHttp interceptor chain to recover request signing, JNI native-lib triage, and the quick apktool/grep secret + endpoint sweep. Use when the program scope includes a mobile app, when web recon dries up and you need a fresh attack surface, or when traffic is pinned and you must MitM it.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Okta-as-IdP red-team attack chain — tenant discovery, user enumeration (multiple vectors), authentication flow analysis (factors enumeration, push-notification fatigue, SMS bypass), password spray with lockout discipline, Okta-specific phishing primitives (kits, FastPass abuse, OIDC redirect_uri tampering), MFA enumeration, post-compromise admin API surface. Many enterprise orgs use Okta instead of (or alongside) Entra ID. Distinct endpoints, distinct rate-limiting, distinct factor flows. Use when recon shows `<tenant>.okta.com`, `<tenant>.okta-emea.com`, `<tenant>.oktapreview.com`, or autodiscover-style records pointing at Okta IdP.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt WebSocket vulnerabilities — Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH), missing/weak Origin validation on the WS handshake, no per-message authentication, message tampering, socket.io namespace/room authorization bypass, and handshake-layer Upgrade smuggling. Use when target has WebSocket endpoints (ws:// or wss://), socket.io / SignalR / Phoenix Channels, real-time features, chat, live dashboards, notifications, or trading platforms.

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Hunt server-side template injection (SSTI) across Jinja2 (Flask/Django), Twig (Symfony), Freemarker (Java), ERB (Rails), Spring, Velocity, Mako, Thymeleaf, Smarty. Detection probes use double-curly and dollar-curly math expressions evaluated server-side. Once an engine is fingerprinted, escalate to RCE via the engine-specific class-walker, callback-registrar, or Execute-utility patterns documented in disclosed reports. Detection patterns: error messages reveal engine, blank or numeric eval reveals expression mode. Targets: email templates, PDF/report generators, CMS preview features, error pages with user input. Use when hunting RCE via template rendering, when content shows engine fingerprints, when finding endpoints that compose strings with user input before render.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt shadow / zombie / undocumented API surface (OWASP API9 Improper Inventory Management) — enumerate the full API version history (v1/v2/beta/legacy paths, header- and subdomain-based versioning), pull and diff every reachable OpenAPI/Swagger spec (including ones only findable via the Wayback Machine), and behaviorally diff old vs. current versions for auth/rate-limit/validation regressions rather than just response-shape differences. Distinct from hunt-api-misconfig, which owns exploitation once you have a spec or endpoint (mass assignment, JWT, OData, Swagger-chain attacks); distinct from hunt-subdomain, which owns host-level discovery. This skill owns the version-inventory and behavioral-diff workflow itself. Use when the target has versioned API paths, multiple specs, a changelog referencing deprecated endpoints, or a mobile app whose hardcoded backend calls look older than the current web app's.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID (admin@target.com<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see admin@target.com), signature stripping (remove Signature element entirely, server should reject but doesn't), key confusion (signed by attacker's IdP, accepted by SP), audience-restriction not validated, replay attack (same Assertion accepted twice within validity window). Tools: SAML Raider Burp extension, samlmagic, manual XML manipulation. Detection: any /saml endpoint, /Shibboleth.sso, /sso/saml/, Microsoft ADFS endpoints. Validate: account takeover via altered NameID, admin role injection via altered AttributeStatement. Use when hunting SSO flows, when SAML AssertionConsumerService is reachable, when chaining IdP-trust to SP-impersonation.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities — server reflection enabled (enumerate all services/methods), missing authentication / metadata-stripping on internal endpoints, plaintext gRPC over HTTP/2, internal endpoint disclosure, proto file leakage, gRPC-Web/grpc-gateway transcoding injection, and HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DoS (CVE-2023-44487). Use when target exposes port 50051 / 443 / 8443 / 9090 with HTTP/2, when grpcurl/grpcui detects reflection, when an Envoy or grpc-gateway proxy is fronting a microservice, or when recon reveals a microservice architecture.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6-digit OTP without rate limit (10^6 attempts at server speed), (5) race condition on OTP validation, (6) recovery-code dump via /api/me, (7) backup factor downgrade (SMS factor with no rate limit). Plus the chain: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = ATO without MFA challenge. Detection: trace auth flow in Burp, find every state transition, check if MFA is middleware-gated vs per-endpoint, check OTP entropy and rate limit on OTP-validate. Validate: attacker session reaching post-MFA state. Use when hunting auth bypass, MFA flows, chaining primitives toward ATO.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php.jpg), case (PHP, .Php, .pHP), .htaccess upload to enable execution, SVG with <script>, HTML/SVG XSS, DOCX with embedded XXE, ZIP slip (../../../etc/passwd in archive), polyglot files. Detection: any /upload, /avatar, /profile-picture, /attachment, /import endpoint. Test: upload PHP/JSP/ASPX shells, request via direct URL, check response. Validate: actual code execution (whoami output) for RCE; reflected XSS in profile-photo URL. Use when testing file upload features, avatar/attachment endpoints, import/export functions, XML/DOCX/ZIP processors. Real paid examples.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: __proto__ injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers.

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Generates RESTful API documentation (OpenAPI 3.0 / Swagger spec) by scanning route definitions in code for Flask, FastAPI, Express, Gin, and other frameworks. Trigger when users ask about API documentation, OpenAPI, Swagger, endpoint docs, generating docs from code, or extracting endpoints.

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Use this skill when adding authentication, handling user input, working with secrets, creating API endpoints, or implementing payment/sensitive features. Provides comprehensive security checklist and patterns.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Plug-in vision for text-only models. Hard rule: when a file path or URL with an image extension (.png, .jpg, .jpeg, .webp, .gif, .heic, .heif) appears anywhere in the conversation (typed by the user, injected as a `[Image: source: <path>]` line, or inside a tag) and you cannot see that image's content, run this skill on it before any other approach: no self-built OCR, no PIL, no tesseract. Also triggers on pasted-image placeholders such as `[Image #1]` and `[Unsupported Image]`. If you can actually see the image, do not use this skill. When unsure, run `modlens guard` before the first read of a session: a deny verdict means the active model has native vision and must read the image itself. Runs the modlens CLI to convert the image into structured JSON evidence: every word transcribed, layout regions, semantics, visual clues. Also use when the user asks how to install, configure, or switch modlens providers (Gemini API key, OpenAI-compatible endpoints, Claude API or Claude Code CLI).

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Turn a website's observable HTTP traffic into a best-effort OpenAPI 3.1 spec by analyzing a `browser-trace` capture. Use when the user wants to discover/extract API endpoints from a browser session, build an OpenAPI doc from network traffic, or document a third-party site's XHR/fetch surface for client integration.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Prediction Markets reference method. Use when studying this focused method, not to run an API request. External API-key access for its legacy endpoints is not published in this release.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Earnings IV Crush reference method. Use when studying this focused method, not to run an API request. External API-key access for its legacy endpoints is not published in this release.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。