「trust」の検索結果

MUST read before searching X/Twitter with the x_search tool. When xAI is connected: date-bound every time-sensitive query (from_date >= yesterday, widen to 7 days), scope trusted accounts with allowed_x_handles, phrase queries as latest/recent with since:/from:/filter: operators, split into 2-3 searches by account and by keyword, and reconcile against web_search. Triggers: X search, Twitter search, tweets, posts on X, what people are saying on X, x_search, social signal.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when an agent, harness, gateway, MCP workflow, or multi-step automation claims completion and the available traces, checkpoints, approvals, tool calls, or deployment records must be judged without trusting self-reported success.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Access and test Vercel deployments protected by Vercel Authentication, SSO, or Deployment Protection with agent-browser. Use when a preview or production URL redirects to a Vercel login page, returns a protection 401 or 403, or needs short-lived Trusted Sources OIDC authentication instead of a static bypass secret or public exception.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kubernetes API analysis, service-account trust, RBAC edges, admission and controller behavior, cluster secrets, workload mutation, and namespace-scoped drift. Use when the user asks to inspect kube API permissions, service-account tokens, RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding edges, admission webhooks, controller-created pods, secret exposure, or why live workloads differ from manifests. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for firmware images, partition tables, boot chains, update packages, extracted filesystems, embedded configs, and device-facing trust boundaries. Use when the user asks to unpack firmware, map partition layout, inspect bootloader or init chains, recover update keys or credentials, trace config loading, or explain how a device surface reaches the decisive artifact. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for cloud metadata services, instance identity, workload identity, link-local credential paths, role assumption, and metadata-to-privilege trust edges. Use when the user asks to inspect metadata-service access, instance credentials, pod or workload identity, link-local token paths, SSRF-to-metadata escalation, or explain how metadata-derived credentials turn into accepted cloud or control-plane privilege. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for crypto, encoding, steganography, APK, IPA, and mobile trust-boundary challenges. Use when the user asks to decode a blob, recover a transform chain or key, inspect hidden media payloads, hook an APK or IPA signer, inspect app storage, or replay mobile request-signing logic. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Active Directory, Kerberos, LDAP, OAuth, enterprise messaging, Windows host forensics, credential material, and lateral-movement challenges. Use when the user asks to trace tickets or tokens, inspect mailbox rules, analyze Windows host evidence, understand an AD trust path, or explain a lateral-movement chain across sandbox-linked nodes. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use for authorized security testing of desktop thick clients including local storage, update channels, IPC, traffic, and client-side trust boundaries.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Android APK hooking, Frida tracing, request-signing recovery, SSL pinning bypass, JNI boundary inspection, and app trust-boundary analysis. Use when the user asks to hook an APK, inspect signer logic, trace Java or native boundaries, bypass pinning or root checks, inspect shared prefs or app databases, or replay accepted mobile requests. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Pre-build product and feature risk review for founders, product managers, and AI-assisted builders. Use this skill when the user is about to build a landing page, MVP, SaaS product, internal tool, agent workflow, or major feature and needs to check demand, positioning, monetization, retention, trust, distribution, and adoption risk before implementation starts.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Implement Linkerd service mesh patterns for lightweight, security-focused service mesh deployments. Use when setting up Linkerd, configuring traffic policies, or implementing zero-trust networking with minimal overhead.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Review the implementation source code of MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers, clients, and tool handlers against a security baseline — authentication, sessions, rate limiting, input-schema validation, official-SDK usage, RCE vectors, and the OWASP MCP Top 10 — producing a report with file/line evidence. Use this skill when: - Reviewing an MCP server implementation for security before release - Checking a server against the baseline controls (MCP-01 to MCP-05) and the OWASP MCP Top 10 - Auditing tools for RCE vectors (command/code injection, unsafe deserialization, path traversal, SSTI, dependency hijacking, SSRF) - Verifying auth, session, rate-limiting, and input-validation controls on a network-exposed server - Reviewing MCP client code that handles untrusted server responses and session IDs - Requests like "review this MCP server for security" or "is my MCP server implementation secure?"

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Security hardening reviewer for GitHub Actions workflow files (.github/workflows/*.yml). Reasons about the Actions threat model that pattern matchers and general code linters miss — untrusted-input script injection, privileged triggers running fork code, mutable action references, and over-scoped tokens. Use this skill when asked to review, audit, harden, or secure a GitHub Actions workflow, when writing a new workflow, or for any request like "is this workflow safe?", "review my CI for security issues", "why is pull_request_target dangerous here?", "pin my actions", or "lock down GITHUB_TOKEN permissions". Covers script injection via ${{ }} interpolation, pull_request_target / workflow_run privilege escalation, SHA-pinning of third-party actions, least-privilege permissions, GITHUB_ENV/GITHUB_OUTPUT injection, secret exposure, OIDC over long-lived credentials, and self-hosted runner exposure on public repositories.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when the user has written (or wants to write) a `ModularPipelineBlocks` subclass in a local Python file and needs to package it into a Hub-uploadable directory. Covers the workflow from a single `block.py` file to a published custom-block repo that consumers can load via `ModularPipeline.from_pretrained(<repo>, trust_remote_code=True)`.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Detect and defend against indirect prompt injection hidden in web pages, documents, and images consumed by an agent, via content extraction (HTML/PDF/OCR), normalization, and scanning with LLM Guard's PromptInjection scanner or Hugging Face Prompt Guard 2. Use when an agent ingests untrusted external content and you need to screen it for injected instructions before the LLM processes it.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Build a two-tier PKI Certificate Authority hierarchy (offline Root CA plus issuing Intermediate CA) using OpenSSL and the Python cryptography library, covering certificate extensions, CRL distribution points, OCSP responder configuration, and certificate policy management. Use when standing up an internal CA, issuing or revoking X.509 certificates, or designing PKI trust hierarchies for TLS, code-signing, or client-authentication use cases.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Deploys Cisco Duo multi-factor authentication across enterprise applications, VPN, RDP, and SSH access points, covering Duo Authentication Proxy setup, adaptive authentication policies, device trust assessment, and phishing-resistant WebAuthn/FIDO2 deployment aligned with NIST 800-63B AAL2/AAL3. Use when adding or hardening MFA for remote access, VPN, or privileged logins with Duo.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Every product will be AI-powered. The question is whether you'll build it right or ship a demo that falls apart in production. This skill covers LLM integration patterns, RAG architecture, prompt engineering that scales, AI UX that users trust, and cost optimization that doesn't bankrupt you. Use when: keywords, file_patterns, code_patterns.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when the user asks to prepare for SOC 2 audits, map Trust Service Criteria, build control matrices, collect audit evidence, perform gap analysis, or assess SOC 2 Type I vs Type II readiness.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Security audit and vulnerability scanner for AI agent skills before installation. Use when: (1) evaluating a skill from an untrusted source, (2) auditing a skill directory or git repo URL for malicious code, (3) pre-install security gate for Claude Code plugins, OpenClaw skills, or Codex skills, (4) scanning Python scripts for dangerous patterns like os.system, eval, subprocess, network exfiltration, (5) detecting prompt injection in SKILL.md files, (6) checking dependency supply chain risks, (7) verifying file system access stays within skill boundaries. Triggers: "audit this skill", "is this skill safe", "scan skill for security", "check skill before install", "skill security check", "skill vulnerability scan".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Suggest, pick, or vet a business, startup, or product name that stays true to the founder's cultural origin while working professionally in the markets they want to sell into. Use when someone is naming a company, brand, or product and cares about how it lands across languages and regions — for example a name that sounds right at home but might read oddly to English speakers, or an authentic name they want to check before committing. Trigger this for any request about choosing a business name, checking if a name "works" abroad, spotting bad meanings in other languages, or making a name sound trustworthy in a specific market — even if the person doesn't say the word "skill".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Security leadership for growth-stage companies. Risk quantification in dollars, compliance roadmap (SOC 2/ISO 27001/HIPAA/GDPR), security architecture strategy, incident response leadership, and board-level security reporting. Use when building security programs, justifying security budget, selecting compliance frameworks, managing incidents, assessing vendor risk, or when user mentions CISO, security strategy, compliance roadmap, zero trust, or board security reporting.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。