18 件 ・ 関連度順
概要と使いどころ
Create, populate, and manage safety analysis spreadsheets (FMEA, FHA, HARA, custom) and fault trees (FTA) in Safety Analysis Manager. Use when the user asks to perform FMEA, hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, safety analysis, or work with Safety Analysis Manager documents. Requires Simulink Fault Analyzer.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
"Conduct FMEA to systematically identify, prioritize, and mitigate potential failure modes. Use this skill when the user needs to assess product or process risks, prioritize corrective actions, or build a risk register — even if they say 'failure mode analysis', 'risk assessment', 'what could go wrong', or 'RPN calculation'.".
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Medical device risk management specialist implementing ISO 14971 throughout product lifecycle. Provides risk analysis, risk evaluation, risk control, and post-production information analysis. Use when user mentions risk management, ISO 14971, risk analysis, FMEA, fault tree analysis, hazard identification, risk control, risk matrix, benefit-risk analysis, residual risk, risk acceptability, or post-market risk.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Structured incident investigation using Five Whys, Fishbone, blameless Postmortem, Fault Tree, Kepner-Tregoe, and FMEA — traces failures to systemic root causes rather than blaming humans. USE WHEN root cause, RCA, 5 whys, fishbone, postmortem, incident analysis, fault tree, why does this keep failing, blameless, recurring bug. NOT FOR systemic loops (use SystemsThinking).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Use when asked 写8D报告, 客户投诉8D, 质量问题8D, 客诉回复报告, 8D 怎么写, 根本原因分析报告, or write an 8D problem-solving report for a customer complaint or internal quality issue in a Chinese factory. Produces a bilingual (Chinese and English) 8D report from D0 to D8 with the problem described by 5W2H, dated containment actions and suspect-stock quantities, root cause for both occurrence and escape (流出) with 5 Why and fishbone evidence, verified corrective actions, prevention through updated PFMEA, control plan and SOP, and closure criteria, in the format customers expect.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Add, configure, and manage faults on Simulink, Simscape, and System Composer model signals for robustness analysis and safety validation. Use when injecting faults (stuck, noise, gain, offset) onto block inports/outports, enabling fault simulation, or analyzing fault effects. Covers sensor failures, signal corruptions, actuator faults, FMEA validation, and robustness testing. Requires Simulink Fault Analyzer.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
CAPA system management for medical device QMS, covering root cause analysis, corrective action planning, and effectiveness verification. Use for CAPA investigations, 5-Why and fishbone analysis, and corrective action tracking.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Medical device risk management specialist implementing ISO 14971 throughout product lifecycle. Provides risk analysis, risk evaluation, risk control, and post-production information analysis.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Think and work like an expert Mechanical Design Engineer. Use when a task calls for Mechanical Design Engineer judgment. Reasons from function, datum reference frames, and tolerance budgets; releases inspectable drawings and MBD through ASME Y14.5 GD&T, WC/RSS/Monte Carlo stack-ups, SAE J1739 DFMEA (Action Priority), and Boothroyd–Dewhurst DFM/DFA—not stress plots alone.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Think and work like an expert Mechanical Engineer. Use when a task calls for Mechanical Engineer judgment. Reasons from equilibrium, failure physics, and code-backed allowables; designs through requirements, GD&T, DFMEA, and hand/FEA/test validation with explicit governing failure modes.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Think and work like an expert Automotive Engineer. Use when a task calls for Automotive Engineer judgment. Reasons from vehicle-level requirements, regulatory limits, energy/exergy budgets, and distribution-based durability through DFMEA/DVP&R, DoE calibration (INCA, CANape, HIL), Pacejka tire and multibody models, rainflow fatigue, and source-path NVH analysis while treating undocumented build-level and cal-ID deltas, unmet emissions preconditioning and OBD readiness, ADAS sensor misalignment, and cross-domain torque-arbitration conflicts as first-class failure modes.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Computes availability for redundant and series designs, failover, SPOFs, fault trees, FMEA, Weibull, and error budgets. Use when asking what uptime a design gives.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Use when a task needs the judgment of a biomedical/bioengineering engineer — running a design control phase (inputs, outputs, verification, validation) for a medical device, scoring a Design FMEA and deciding whether a failure mode needs mitigation, planning a human factors/usability validation study, building a design traceability matrix, or writing a design verification or risk-mitigation report. Distinct from a regulatory-affairs-specialist (owns the submission/clearance process, not the engineering itself) and from a clinical-data-manager/biostatistician (trial data and analysis, not device design).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Comprehensive Lean Six Sigma consulting skill supporting all belt levels (White Belt to Master Black Belt). Use this skill for DMAIC/DMADV project execution, Lean waste elimination (VSM, 8 Wastes/DOWNTIME, 5S), statistical analysis (process capability Cp/Cpk, control charts, hypothesis testing), and Six Sigma training/education. Triggers include "improve process", "reduce defects", "sigma level", "DMAIC project", "value stream mapping", "Kaizen", "process capability", "control chart", "root cause analysis", "5 Whys", "Fishbone diagram", "FMEA", "DOE", or requests involving process improvement methodologies.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Knowledge base from the FAA System Safety Handbook (Dec 30, 2000). Use for system safety as a specialty within systems engineering: the five-step safety risk management process (mandated by FAA Order 8040.4 and the AMS), the severity-by-likelihood risk matrix and acceptance bands, the Safety Order of Precedence, system-description models (5M, SHEL(L)), the hazard-analysis activities (PHL/PHA/RHA/SSHA/SHA/O&SHA/HHA), integrated system hazard analysis, the analysis techniques (FTA, FMEA/FMECA, Fault Hazard, Common Cause, Sneak Circuit, Energy Trace), closed-loop hazard tracking (Safety Action Record), and the specialty domains the handbook covers — acquisition-lifecycle safety and contracting (OSA/CSA/SSPP/ISSPP), software safety (control-capability ranking, SHCM, DO-178B), test & evaluation safety, facilities safety, commercial launch safety (AST licensing, expected casualty, MPL/DAMP), system safety training, and Operational Risk Management (ORM) with human/organizational factors. Scope limits: this is a year-2000 FAA how-to; it predates the modern FAA/ICAO Safety Management System (SMS) and Just Culture regulatory frameworks, and many cited orders, advisory circulars, and launch-licensing rules have since been restructured. It is FAA/NAS-centric, leans on MIL-STD-882C, and does not define the SE life-cycle processes themselves (use nasa-npr-7123 / dau-se-guidebook) or reproduce third-party standard text (MIL-STD-882, DO-178B, ISO/IEC/IEEE).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Knowledge base from NASA-STD-8729.1A — NASA's R&M (Reliability and Maintainability) standard covering spaceflight and support systems (Revision A, 2017-06-13). Use for NASA's objectives-driven R&M framework — the R&M objectives hierarchy (one Top Objective decomposed into four sub-objectives, paired with tailorable strategies), how R&M requirements are established inside the SMA Plan required by NPR 7120.5, the SMA Technical Authority concurrence/independent-evaluation governance, milestone vs. readiness review gates, the reliability/maintainability/availability vocabulary (Ai vs. Ao, the failure causal chain, risk as a triplet), and the R&M Evidentiary Methods catalogue (FMEA/FMECA, FTA, RBDA, RCM, LORA, plus the space-environment and parts-pedigree analyses). Scoped to NASA spaceflight and support systems and to assurance planning: it is an objectives-and-strategies standard, so it deliberately does NOT prescribe step-by-step analysis procedures (those live in the referenced NASA Preferred Reliability Practices) and is thin on facility R&M, detailed math/derivations, and non-NASA or commercial life cycles.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Knowledge base from MIL-HDBK-338B (Electronic Reliability Design Handbook). Use for electronic reliability engineering: R/M/A theory, reliability specification/allocation/prediction, parts management and derating, reliable circuit and fault-tolerant design, environmental and human performance reliability, FMEA/FMECA/FTA/sneak circuit analysis, design reviews and testability, FRACAS, reliability demonstration and growth testing, and systems-level R&M parameters. Covers selected Part 2 design-guidance topics only; skips large annex/part-stress tables. Guidance handbook — not a contractual requirement text. Does not replace MIL-HDBK-217 prediction libraries, service-specific reliability regs, or safety standards (see mil-std-882).
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Knowledge base from FAA-HDBK-006D (2020), the FAA's System Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RMA) Handbook for National Airspace System (NAS) hardware and software. Use for RMA figures of merit (MTBF, MTBO, MTTR, the availability variants), the bathtub curve and probability distributions, the four-stage RMA lifecycle mapped to the FAA Acquisition Management System (AMS), the six-task RMA technical-management/acquisition process, service-thread criticality and the NAS-RD severity-to-target table, the RMA analysis toolbox (RBD, FMEA/FMECA, FTA, Ishikawa, Monte Carlo, Bayesian, FRACAS, ALT, reliability-growth/recovery tests), software reliability (early prediction + reliability growth), and tailorable example RMA requirements for a Program Requirements Document. Scope limits: it is FAA/NAS-specific guidance (not a requirement, by its own statement), centred on hardware-plus-software availability — it brackets out human/service/facility/communications availability, names but does not reproduce the math derivations or external standards (MIL-STDs, IEEE 1633, RTCA DO-178C/DO-278A, SAE JA1011), is thin on detailed worked numerical examples and on safety-case method, and predates any current revision beyond 006D.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。