「threat-model」の検索結果

Use when Codex is already in the threat-modeling phase of a security scan, the user explicitly invokes $threat-model, or the user explicitly asks to create, update, or persist a repository threat model. Do not use as the primary trigger for full PR, commit, branch, patch, or repository scans.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when Codex is already in the threat-modeling phase of a security scan, the user explicitly invokes $threat-model, or the user explicitly asks to create, update, or persist a repository threat model. Do not use as the primary trigger for full PR, commit, branch, patch, or repository scans.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when Codex is already in the threat-modeling phase of a security scan, the user explicitly invokes $threat-model, or the user explicitly asks to create, update, or persist a repository threat model. Do not use as the primary trigger for full PR, commit, branch, patch, or repository scans.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Enterprise-review-grade threat model from `harness threat-model {path}`. Categorizes MCP-surface threats; emits `worst: 'clean'|'low'|'medium'|'high'` + per-threat findings. Pure-read.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

[omh] Attack paths into an operated system: turn a system's components and data flows into assets, trust boundaries, attack scenarios, controls, and the security test that proves each control holds. Use when the user says: application-threat-model, application threat model, threat model, threat modeling, threat modelling, threat modeling session, threat modeling workshop, security threat model.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Use when an application or system — including one built quickly with AI coding agents — needs a security review with regulatory grounding: a STRIDE threat model, a LINDDUN privacy threat model, a dependency exposure screen against live CVE / CISA-KEV / EPSS data, or a selected, non-exhaustive screen of which EU security obligations (GDPR, NIS2, Cyber Resilience Act, AI Act) may apply and which need determination. Orchestrates the server-enforced threat-modeling workflows of the Ansvar Gateway MCP connector and grounds every regulatory statement in officially published text fetched at answer time — scope, role, and application-date limits stated, never a compliance verdict. Never simulates a workflow and never answers legal questions from model memory.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

MCP threat-model artifact for a scaffolded harness. Reports allowed/denied tools, dangerous permissions count, secrets reachability, network/shell/file-write grants, default-deny posture. Verdict: clean (exit 0) / medium (exit 1) / high (exit 2). The 'enterprise gold' artifact for PR + compliance review.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Create a repository-grounded AppSec threat model covering assets, trust boundaries, attackers, abuse paths, and mitigations. Use only for explicit threat-modeling requests, not general architecture or code review.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Run a structured threat-modeling session for a new feature, system, or architecture — STRIDE, attack trees, data flow diagrams, abuse cases. Use when the user mentions 'threat model,' 'threat modeling,' 'STRIDE,' 'attack tree,' 'abuse case,' 'data flow diagram,' 'DFD,' 'security architecture review,' 'security review,' 'design review,' 'pre-implementation security,' 'shift left,' 'what could go wrong,' or needs strategic security thinking before code is written.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyze a codebase and produce a structured threat model at .turbo/threat-model.md covering assets, trust boundaries, attack surfaces with existing mitigations, attacker stories, and calibrated severity. Use when the user asks to "create a threat model", "threat model", "threat model this codebase", "security analysis", "analyze the attack surface", "what are the threats", or "identify security risks".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Conduct LINDDUN privacy threat modeling across all seven categories: Linking, Identifying, Non-repudiation, Detecting, Data Disclosure, Unawareness, and Non-compliance. Includes DFD-based analysis, threat trees, privacy-specific mitigation strategies, and integration with STRIDE security threat modeling.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Complete guide to LINDDUN privacy threat modeling methodology covering seven threat categories: Linking, Identifying, Non-repudiation, Detecting, Data Disclosure, Unawareness, and Non-compliance. Includes DFD-based analysis, threat tree catalogs, mitigation mapping to privacy design patterns, and step-by-step process.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools, innerHTML/eval/exec, dependency upgrades, or cross-tenant access.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Threat-model a sensitive design with STRIDE on request. Read-only analysis of threats, controls, and implementation constraints.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Composite Phase-2 audit worker (ADR-150). Bundles harness oia-manifest + threat-model + mcp-scan into one timestamped audit record stored in the `metaharness-audit` memory namespace. Designed for cron-scheduled drift detection.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Security audit, hardening, threat modeling (STRIDE/PASTA), Red/Blue Team, OWASP checks, code review, incident response, and infrastructure security for any project.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Conduct a defensible cybersecurity risk assessment using the NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1 methodology: prepare scope and a risk model, identify threat sources and threat events, identify vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions, determine likelihood and impact, compute risk, and communicate results as a prioritized risk register. Use when an organization needs an actual risk *assessment* (not a maturity score), when a control framework (CSF, ISO 27001, RMF, SOC 2, PCI) requires a documented risk analysis as input, when leadership asks "what are our top risks and how bad are they", when assessing risk for a new system or major change, or when building a risk register from scratch. This is the methodology that feeds framework selection, ATO packages, and treatment decisions. Keywords: risk assessment, NIST 800-30, threat modeling, likelihood and impact, risk register, risk analysis, threat sources, vulnerabilities, risk determination, qualitative risk, risk matrix, residual risk, risk treatment.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Build a threat model for a target codebase. Three modes: "interview" walks an application owner through the four-question framework and produces a threat model from their answers; "bootstrap" derives a threat model from the code plus past vulnerabilities (CVEs, git history, pentest reports) when no owner is available; "bootstrap-then-interview" chains the two when both owner and codebase are present. All write THREAT_MODEL.md in a shared schema. Use when asked to "threat model", "build a threat model", "map the attack surface", or "what should we be worried about in this codebase".

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Static source-code vulnerability scan. Reads a target directory (and THREAT_MODEL.md if present), spawns parallel review subagents per focus area, and writes VULN-FINDINGS.json + .md for /triage to consume. Read-only — no building, running, or network. For execution-verified crashes, use vuln-pipeline instead. Use when asked to "scan for vulns", "review this code for security issues", "find bugs in <dir>", or as the step between /threat-model and /triage.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Analyze git repositories to build a security ownership topology (people-to-file), compute bus factor and sensitive-code ownership, and export CSV/JSON for graph databases and visualization. Use when the user explicitly wants a security-oriented ownership or bus-factor analysis grounded in git history (for example: orphaned sensitive code, security maintainers, CODEOWNERS reality checks for risk, sensitive hotspots, or ownership clusters). Do NOT use for general maintainer lists, non-security ownership questions, or threat modeling (use security-threat-model).

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Use when the user asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats or abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do NOT use for general architecture summaries, code review, security best practices (use security-best-practices), or non-security design work.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。

Perform language and framework specific security best-practice reviews and suggest improvements. Use when the user explicitly requests security best practices guidance, a security review or report, or secure-by-default coding help. Supports Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, and Go. Do NOT use for general code review, debugging, threat modeling (use security-threat-model), or non-security tasks.

日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。