Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through hash verification.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Analyze Windows LNK shortcut files and Jump List artifacts to establish evidence of file access, program execution, and user activity using LECmd, JLECmd, and manual binary parsing of the Shell Link Binary format.
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Windows LNK (shortcut) files and Jump Lists are critical forensic artifacts that provide evidence of file access, program execution, and user behavior. LNK files are created automatically when a user opens a file through Windows Explorer or the Open/Save dialog, storing metadata about the target file including its original path, timestamps, volume serial number, NetBIOS name, and MAC address of the host system. Jump Lists, introduced in Windows 7, extend this by maintaining per-application lists of recently and frequently accessed files. These artifacts persist even after the target files are deleted, making them invaluable for establishing that a user accessed specific files at specific times.
| Location | Description |
|---|---|
%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ | Recent files accessed |
%USERPROFILE%\Desktop\ | User-created shortcuts |
%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\ | Start Menu shortcuts |
%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\ | Office recent documents |
| Offset | Size | Field |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | 4 | HeaderSize (always 0x0000004C) |
| 0x04 | 16 | LinkCLSID (always 00021401-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) |
| 0x14 | 4 | LinkFlags |
| 0x18 | 4 | FileAttributes |
| 0x1C | 8 | CreationTime (FILETIME) |
| 0x24 | 8 | AccessTime (FILETIME) |
| 0x2C | 8 | WriteTime (FILETIME) |
| 0x34 | 4 | FileSize of target |
| 0x38 | 4 | IconIndex |
| 0x3C | 4 | ShowCommand |
| 0x40 | 2 | HotKey |
# Parse all LNK files in Recent folder
LECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\suspect\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent" --csv C:\Output --csvf lnk_analysis.csv
# Parse a single LNK file with full details
LECmd.exe -f "C:\Evidence\Users\suspect\Desktop\Confidential.docx.lnk" --json C:\Output
# Parse LNK files with additional detail levels
LECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\suspect\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent" --csv C:\Output --csvf lnk_all.csv --all
# Parse Automatic Jump Lists
JLECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\suspect\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations" --csv C:\Output --csvf jumplists_auto.csv
# Parse Custom Jump Lists
JLECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\suspect\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations" --csv C:\Output --csvf jumplists_custom.csv
# Parse all jump lists with detailed output
JLECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\suspect\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations" --csv C:\Output --csvf jumplists_auto.csv --ld
These are OLE Compound files (Structured Storage) identified by AppID hash in the filename:
| AppID Hash | Application |
|---|---|
| 5f7b5f1e01b83767 | Windows Explorer Pinned/Frequent |
| 1b4dd67f29cb1962 | Windows Explorer Recent |
| 9b9cdc69c1c24e2b | Notepad |
| a7bd71699cd38d1c | Notepad++ |
| 12dc1ea8e34b5a6 | Microsoft Paint |
| 7e4dca80246863e3 | Control Panel |
| 1cf97c38a5881255 | Microsoft Edge |
| f01b4d95cf55d32a | Windows Explorer |
| 9d1f905ce5044aee | Microsoft Excel |
| a4a5324453625195 | Microsoft Word |
| d00655d2aa12ff6d | Microsoft PowerPoint |
| bc03160ee1a59fc1 | Outlook |
Created when users pin items to application jump lists. These files contain sequential LNK entries.
import struct
import os
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
FILETIME_EPOCH = datetime(1601, 1, 1)
def filetime_to_datetime(filetime_bytes: bytes) -> datetime:
"""Convert Windows FILETIME (100-ns intervals since 1601) to datetime."""
ft = struct.unpack("<Q", filetime_bytes)[0]
if ft == 0:
return None
return FILETIME_EPOCH + timedelta(microseconds=ft // 10)
def parse_lnk_header(lnk_path: str) -> dict:
"""Parse the Shell Link header from an LNK file."""
with open(lnk_path, "rb") as f:
header = f.read(76)
header_size = struct.unpack("<I", header[0:4])[0]
if header_size != 0x4C:
return {"error": "Invalid LNK header"}
link_flags = struct.unpack("<I", header[0x14:0x18])[0]
file_attrs = struct.unpack("<I", header[0x18:0x1C])[0]
result = {
"header_size": header_size,
"link_flags": hex(link_flags),
"file_attributes": hex(file_attrs),
"creation_time": filetime_to_datetime(header[0x1C:0x24]),
"access_time": filetime_to_datetime(header[0x24:0x2C]),
"write_time": filetime_to_datetime(header[0x2C:0x34]),
"file_size": struct.unpack("<I", header[0x34:0x38])[0],
"has_target_id_list": bool(link_flags & 0x01),
"has_link_info": bool(link_flags & 0x02),
"has_name": bool(link_flags & 0x04),
"has_relative_path": bool(link_flags & 0x08),
"has_working_dir": bool(link_flags & 0x10),
"has_arguments": bool(link_flags & 0x20),
"has_icon_location": bool(link_flags & 0x40),
}
return result
Recent research (IEEE 2025) shows that Windows 11 produces different LNK and Jump List artifacts:
$ LECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent" --csv /analysis/lnk_output
LECmd v1.11.0 - LNK File Parser
================================
Processing 47 LNK files...
--- LNK File: Q4_Report.xlsx.lnk ---
Source: C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\Recent\Q4_Report.xlsx.lnk
Target Path: C:\Users\jsmith\Downloads\Q4_Report.xlsm
Target Created: 2024-01-15 14:33:45 UTC
Target Modified: 2024-01-15 14:33:45 UTC
Target Accessed: 2024-01-15 14:35:12 UTC
File Size: 251,904 bytes
Drive Type: Fixed (C:)
Volume Serial: A4E7-3F21
Machine ID: DESKTOP-J5M1TH
MAC Address: 48:2A:E3:5C:9B:01
--- LNK File: update_client.exe.lnk ---
Source: C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\Recent\update_client.exe.lnk
Target Path: C:\ProgramData\Updates\update_client.exe
Target Created: 2024-01-15 14:34:02 UTC
Target Modified: 2024-01-15 14:34:02 UTC
Target Accessed: 2024-01-15 14:36:30 UTC
File Size: 1,258,496 bytes
Drive Type: Fixed (C:)
Volume Serial: A4E7-3F21
Machine ID: DESKTOP-J5M1TH
Working Dir: C:\ProgramData\Updates
Arguments: --silent --no-update-check
Run Window: Hidden
======================================================================
$ JLECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations" --csv /analysis/jumplist_output
JLECmd v1.5.0 - Jump List Parser
==================================
Processing 23 AutomaticDestinations files...
--- Application: Microsoft Excel (AppID: 12dc1ea8e34b5a6) ---
Entries: 15
Most Recent:
Entry 0: C:\Users\jsmith\Downloads\Q4_Report.xlsm (2024-01-15 14:35:12 UTC)
Entry 1: \\FILESERV01\Finance\Budget_2024.xlsx (2024-01-14 09:22:30 UTC)
Entry 2: C:\Users\jsmith\Documents\Expenses\Dec2023.xlsx (2024-01-10 16:45:00 UTC)
--- Application: Windows Explorer (AppID: f01b4d95cf55d32a) ---
Entries: 28
Most Recent:
Entry 0: C:\ProgramData\Updates\ (2024-01-15 14:36:25 UTC)
Entry 1: E:\Backup\ (2024-01-15 15:30:00 UTC)
Entry 2: \\FILESERV01\HR\Employees\ (2024-01-15 16:12:45 UTC)
--- Application: cmd.exe (AppID: 9b9cdc69c1c24e2b) ---
Entries: 5
Most Recent:
Entry 0: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe (2024-01-15 14:36:00 UTC)
Summary:
Total LNK files processed: 47
Total Jump List entries: 156
Suspicious artifacts: 3 (hidden window execution, USB drive access, network shares)
CSV exported to: /analysis/lnk_output/ and /analysis/jumplist_output/
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概要と使いどころ
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through hash verification.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Perform static analysis of Android APK malware samples using apktool for decompilation, jadx for Java source recovery, and androguard for permission analysis, manifest inspection, and suspicious API call detection.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
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日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。