Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through hash verification.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Systematically remove malware, backdoors, and attacker persistence mechanisms from infected systems while ensuring complete eradication and preventing re-infection.
インストールする前に、エージェントに与えられる指示の中身を確認できます。
# Windows - Check all known persistence locations
# Autoruns (Sysinternals) - comprehensive autostart enumeration
autorunsc.exe -accepteula -a * -c -h -s -v > autoruns_report.csv
# Registry Run keys
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /s
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run" /s
# Scheduled tasks
schtasks /query /fo CSV /v > schtasks_all.csv
# WMI event subscriptions
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding
# Services
Get-Service | Where-Object {$_.Status -eq 'Running'} | Select-Object Name, DisplayName, BinaryPathName
# Linux persistence
cat /etc/crontab
ls -la /etc/cron.*/
ls -la /etc/init.d/
systemctl list-unit-files --type=service | grep enabled
cat /etc/rc.local
ls -la ~/.bashrc ~/.profile ~/.bash_profile
# Scan with YARA rules specific to the malware family
yara -r -s malware_rules/specific_family.yar C:\ 2>/dev/null
# Scan with multiple AV engines
# ClamAV scan
clamscan -r --infected --remove=no /mnt/infected_disk/
# Check for known malicious file hashes
find / -type f -newer /tmp/baseline_timestamp -exec sha256sum {} \; 2>/dev/null | \
while read hash file; do
grep -q "$hash" known_malicious_hashes.txt && echo "MALICIOUS: $file ($hash)"
done
# Check for web shells
find /var/www/ -name "*.php" -newer /tmp/baseline -exec grep -l "eval\|base64_decode\|system\|passthru\|shell_exec" {} \;
# Check for unauthorized SSH keys
find / -name "authorized_keys" -exec cat {} \; 2>/dev/null
# Remove identified malicious files (after forensic imaging)
# Windows
Remove-Item -Path "C:\Windows\Temp\malware.exe" -Force
Remove-Item -Path "C:\Users\Public\backdoor.dll" -Force
# Remove malicious scheduled tasks
schtasks /delete /tn "MaliciousTaskName" /f
# Remove WMI persistence
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name='MalFilter'" | Remove-WMIObject
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Filter "Name='MalConsumer'" | Remove-WMIObject
# Remove malicious registry entries
reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "MalEntry" /f
# Remove malicious services
sc stop "MalService" && sc delete "MalService"
# Linux - Remove malicious cron entries, binaries, SSH keys
crontab -r # Remove entire crontab (or edit specific entries)
rm -f /tmp/.hidden_backdoor
sed -i '/malicious_key/d' ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
systemctl disable malicious-service && rm /etc/systemd/system/malicious-service.service
# Reset all compromised user passwords
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Get-ADUser -Filter * -SearchBase "OU=CompromisedUsers,DC=domain,DC=com" |
Set-ADAccountPassword -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString "TempP@ss!$(Get-Random)" -AsPlainText -Force)
# Reset KRBTGT password (twice, 12+ hours apart for Kerberos golden ticket attack)
Reset-KrbtgtPassword -DomainController DC01
# Wait 12+ hours, then reset again
Reset-KrbtgtPassword -DomainController DC01
# Rotate service account passwords
Get-ADServiceAccount -Filter * | ForEach-Object {
Reset-ADServiceAccountPassword -Identity $_.Name
}
# Revoke all Azure AD tokens
Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ForEach-Object {
Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken -ObjectId $_.ObjectId
}
# Rotate API keys and secrets
# Application-specific credential rotation
# Identify and patch the entry point vulnerability
# Windows Update
Install-WindowsUpdate -KBArticleID "KB5001234" -AcceptAll -AutoReboot
# Linux patching
apt update && apt upgrade -y # Debian/Ubuntu
yum update -y # RHEL/CentOS
# Application-specific patches
# Update web application frameworks, CMS, etc.
# Verify patch was applied
Get-HotFix -Id "KB5001234"
# Full system scan with updated signatures
# CrowdStrike Falcon - On-demand scan
curl -X POST "https://api.crowdstrike.com/scanner/entities/scans/v1" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $FALCON_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"ids": ["device_id"]}'
# Verify no persistence mechanisms remain
autorunsc.exe -accepteula -a * -c -h -s -v | findstr /i "unknown verified"
# Check for any remaining suspicious processes
Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.Path -notlike "C:\Windows\*" -and $_.Path -notlike "C:\Program Files*"}
# Verify no unauthorized network connections
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established |
Where-Object {$_.RemoteAddress -notlike "10.*" -and $_.RemoteAddress -notlike "172.16.*"} |
Select-Object LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess
# Run YARA rules again to confirm no artifacts remain
yara -r malware_rules/specific_family.yar C:\ 2>/dev/null
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| Persistence Mechanism | Method attacker uses to maintain access across reboots |
| Root Cause Remediation | Fixing the vulnerability that enabled initial compromise |
| Credential Rotation | Resetting all potentially compromised passwords and tokens |
| KRBTGT Reset | Invalidating Kerberos tickets after golden ticket attack |
| Indicator Sweep | Scanning all systems for known malicious artifacts |
| Validation Scan | Confirming eradication was successful before recovery |
| Re-imaging | Rebuilding systems from clean images rather than cleaning |
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sysinternals Autoruns | Enumerate all Windows autostart locations |
| YARA | Custom rule-based malware scanning |
| CrowdStrike/SentinelOne | EDR-based scanning and remediation |
| ClamAV | Open-source antivirus scanning |
| PowerShell | Scripted cleanup and validation |
| Velociraptor | Remote artifact collection and remediation |
まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。
概要と使いどころ
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images using dd and dcfldd while preserving evidence integrity through hash verification.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Perform static analysis of Android APK malware samples using apktool for decompilation, jadx for Java source recovery, and androguard for permission analysis, manifest inspection, and suspicious API call detection.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Parses API Gateway access logs (AWS API Gateway, Kong, Nginx) to detect BOLA/IDOR attacks, rate limit bypass, credential scanning, and injection attempts. Uses pandas for statistical analysis of request patterns and anomaly detection. Use when investigating API abuse or building API-specific threat detection rules.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Analyze advanced persistent threat (APT) group techniques using MITRE ATT&CK Navigator to create layered heatmaps of adversary TTPs for detection gap analysis and threat-informed defense.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Queries Azure Monitor activity logs and sign-in logs via azure-monitor-query to detect suspicious administrative operations, impossible travel, privilege escalation, and resource modifications. Builds KQL queries for threat hunting in Azure environments. Use when investigating suspicious Azure tenant activity or building cloud SIEM detections.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。