Auditing Azure Active Directory Configuration

Ne Zaman Kullanılır

• performing yaparken a security assessment of an Azure tenant's identity configuration
• compliance yaparken: audits require review of authentication policies, MFA enforcement, and role assignments
• onboarding yaparken a new Azure tenant after merger or acquisition
• investigating yaparken suspicious sign-in activity or compromised accounts
• validating yaparken conditional access policies adequately protect against identity-based attacks

Kullanma: for on-premises Active Directory auditing (use PingCastle or BloodHound AD), for Azure resource-level RBAC auditing without identity context, or for real-time threat Tespit (use Microsoft Defender for Identity).

Ön Gereksinimler

• Global Reader or Security Reader role in the target Microsoft Entra ID tenant
• Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK kurulu (Install-Module Microsoft.Graph)
• Az CLI authenticated to the target tenant (az login --tenant TENANT_ID)
• ScoutSuite with Azure provider configured for automated assessment
• Erişim: Azure AD audit logs and sign-in logs (requires Azure AD Premium P1/P2)

İş Akışı

Adım 1: Enumerate Tenant Configuration and Security Defaults

Assess the tenant's baseline identity security settings including security defaults and legacy authentication status.

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Directory.Read.All","Policy.Read.All","AuditLog.Read.All"

Get-MgOrganization | Select-Object DisplayName, Id, VerifiedDomains

Get-MgPolicyIdentitySecurityDefaultEnforcementPolicy | Select-Object IsEnabled

Get-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicy | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5

Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {
    $_.Conditions.ClientAppTypes -contains "exchangeActiveSync" -or
    $_.Conditions.ClientAppTypes -contains "other"
} | Select-Object DisplayName, State

Adım 2: Audit Privileged Role Assignments

Review directory role assignments to identify over-privileged users, permanent admin accounts, and risky role configurations.

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/filterByIds" \
  --body '{"ids":["62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10"]}' | \
  az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles?filter=displayName eq 'Global Administrator'" \
  --query "value[0].id" -o tsv

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments?\$expand=principal" \
  --query "value[*].{Role:roleDefinitionId, Principal:principal.displayName, PrincipalType:principal.@odata.type}" \
  -o table

az ad user list --query "[].{UPN:userPrincipalName, DisplayName:displayName}" -o table

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments?\$filter=principalOrganizationId eq 'TENANT_ID'" \
  -o json

Adım 3: Review Conditional Access Policies

Audit conditional access policies for coverage gaps, particularly around MFA enforcement, device compliance, and location-based restrictions.

Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Select-Object DisplayName, State, @{
    N='GrantControls'; E={$_.GrantControls.BuiltInControls -join ', '}
} | Format-Table -AutoSize

Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {$_.State -eq "enabledForReportingButNotEnforced"} |
    Select-Object DisplayName

Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {
    $_.GrantControls.BuiltInControls -contains "mfa"
} | Select-Object DisplayName, State, @{
    N='Users'; E={$_.Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers -join ', '}
}

Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {
    $_.Conditions.Users.ExcludeGroups.Count -gt 0
} | Select-Object DisplayName, @{
    N='ExcludedGroups'; E={$_.Conditions.Users.ExcludeGroups -join ', '}
}

Adım 4: Identify Stale Accounts and Guest Users

Bul: accounts that have not signed in recently, disabled accounts with active role assignments, and risky guest user configurations.

az ad user list --query "[?signInActivity.lastSignInDateTime < '2025-11-25T00:00:00Z'].{UPN:userPrincipalName, LastSignIn:signInActivity.lastSignInDateTime, Enabled:accountEnabled}" -o table

az ad user list --filter "userType eq 'Guest'" \
  --query "[].{UPN:userPrincipalName, DisplayName:displayName, CreatedDate:createdDateTime}" \
  -o table

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments?\$expand=principal" \
  --query "value[?principal.userType=='Guest'].{Role:roleDefinitionId,Guest:principal.userPrincipalName}" \
  -o table

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/reports/authenticationMethods/userRegistrationDetails" \
  --query "value[?!isMfaRegistered].{UPN:userPrincipalName,MfaRegistered:isMfaRegistered}" \
  -o table

Adım 5: Analyze Sign-In Logs for Risky Activity

Review sign-in logs to identify anomalous authentication patterns, failed MFA challenges, and risky sign-in Tespits.

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=riskLevelDuringSignIn ne 'none' and createdDateTime ge 2026-02-16T00:00:00Z" \
  --query "value[*].{User:userPrincipalName,Risk:riskLevelDuringSignIn,IP:ipAddress,App:appDisplayName,Status:status.errorCode}" \
  -o table

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=riskEventTypes_v2/any(r:r eq 'unfamiliarFeatures')" \
  --query "value[*].{User:userPrincipalName,Location:location.city,IP:ipAddress}" \
  -o table

az rest --method GET \
  --url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=clientAppUsed ne 'Browser' and clientAppUsed ne 'Mobile Apps and Desktop clients'" \
  --query "value[*].{User:userPrincipalName,ClientApp:clientAppUsed,Status:status.errorCode}" \
  -o table

Adım 6: Run ScoutSuite Automated Assessment

Execute ScoutSuite for comprehensive automated checks across the Azure tenant configuration.

python3 -m ScoutSuite azure --cli \
  --report-dir ./scoutsuite-azure-report \
  --all-subscriptions

open ./scoutsuite-azure-report/azure-report.html

Key Concepts

Term	Definition
Microsoft Entra ID	Microsoft's cloud identity and access management service, formerly Azure Active Directory, providing authentication and authorization
Conditional Access	Policy engine that evaluates signals (user, device, location, risk) to enforce access controls like MFA, device compliance, or block access
Security Defaults	Microsoft's baseline identity protection settings that enforce MFA registration, block legacy auth, and protect privileged actions
Privileged Identity Management	Azure AD Premium P2 feature enabling just-in-time privileged access with approval workflows and time-bound role activation
Legacy Authentication	Older authentication protocols (POP3, IMAP, SMTP, ActiveSync) that do not support MFA and are commonly exploited for credential attacks
Risky Sign-In	Microsoft Entra Identity Protection Tespit of sign-in anomalies including impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, and malware-linked IPs

Tools & Systems

• Microsoft Graph API: Primary programmatic interface for querying Entra ID configuration, policies, roles, and audit logs
• Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK: PowerShell module for Entra ID management and security auditing tasks
• ScoutSuite: Multi-cloud auditing tool with Azure provider support for IAM, storage, networking, and identity checks
• AzureADRecon: Community tool for comprehensive Azure AD reconnaissance and security assessment reporting
• Microsoft Defender for Identity: Cloud-based security solution for Tespit etme identity-based threats and compromised credentials

Common Scenarios

Scenario: Post-Acquisition Azure Tenant Security Assessment

Context: After acquiring a company, the security team needs to assess the Azure tenant identity posture before integrating it with the corporate Entra ID.

Approach:

1. Enumerate all Global Administrators and check for personal accounts in admin roles
2. Review conditional access policies to verify MFA is enforced for all users, not just admins
3. Identify guest users with privileged access that may indicate third-party vendor over-permissioning
4. Check for stale accounts (no sign-in for 90+ days) that could be targets for credential attacks
5. Review sign-in logs for legacy authentication usage that bypasses MFA
6. Verify Security Defaults or equivalent CA policies block legacy auth protocols
7. Produce a risk report with prioritized remediation steps before tenant integration

Pitfalls: Azure AD Premium P2 is required for risky sign-in Tespits and PIM. If the acquired tenant uses a lower license tier, many identity protection features will be unavailable. Guest users from partner tenants may have implicit access through dynamic groups that are not visible in standard role assignment queries.

Output Format

Azure Active Directory Security Audit Report
===============================================
Tenant: acme-acquired.onmicrosoft.com
Tenant ID: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
Audit Date: 2026-02-23
License: Azure AD Premium P2

IDENTITY CONFIGURATION:
  Security Defaults: Disabled (Conditional Access in use)
  Conditional Access Policies: 12 (8 enforced, 3 report-only, 1 disabled)
  Legacy Auth Blocked: Partial (blocked for admins only)

PRIVILEGED ACCESS:
  Global Administrators:              8 (recommended: <= 4)
  Permanent admin assignments:        6 (no PIM activation required)
  Service principals with admin:      3
  Guest users with privileged roles:  2

ACCOUNT HYGIENE:
  Total users:                        1,247
  Stale accounts (90+ days):          89
  Guest users:                        234
  Users without MFA registered:       156

SIGN-IN RISK:
  Risky sign-ins (last 30 days):      34
  Legacy auth sign-ins (last 7 days): 67
  Impossible travel Tespits:        5
  Unfamiliar location sign-ins:       12

CRITICAL Bul:INGS:
  1. 8 Global Administrators with permanent assignments (use PIM)
  2. Legacy authentication not blocked for non-admin users
  3. 156 users without MFA registration
  4. 2 guest users with Privileged Role Administrator role

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