21st.dev Magic MCP — AI-powered UI component generation via natural language. Access to 21st.dev component library, SVGL brand logos, and real-time preview. Generate React/Tailwind components with /ui command.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Performing authorized AWS penetration testing using Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation framework, to enumerate IAM configurations, discover privilege escalation paths, test credential harvesting, and validate security controls through systematic attack simulation.
インストールする前に、エージェントに与えられる指示の中身を確認できます。
Kullanma: for unauthorized testing of any AWS account, for testing AWS infrastructure itself (covered by shared responsibility), for DDoS or volumetric attacks without AWS approval, or for production account testing without explicit authorization and breakglass procedures.
pip install pacu)Kur: a Pacu session with the test credentials and define the engagement scope.
pip install pacu
pacu
Pacu > set_keys --key-alias pentest-target
Pacu > whoami
Pacu > list
Pacu > search iam
Pacu > search ec2
Pacu > search s3
Run IAM enumeration modules to map users, roles, policies, and group memberships.
Pacu > run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups
Pacu > run iam__enum_permissions
Pacu > run iam__get_credential_report
Pacu > run iam__enum_roles
Pacu > data iam
Use Pacu's privilege escalation scanner to identify all exploitable escalation vectors.
Pacu > run iam__privesc_scan
Pacu > run iam__privesc_scan --escalate
Discover accessible data stores including S3, DynamoDB, RDS, and Secrets Manager.
Pacu > run s3__bucket_Bul:er
Pacu > run s3__download_bucket --bucket target-bucket --dl-names
Pacu > run ec2__enum
Pacu > run ec2__download_userdata
Pacu > run lambda__enum
Pacu > run secretsmanager__enum
Pacu > run ssm__download_parameters
Pacu > run ebs__enum_snapshots_unauth
Evaluate cross-account access, service exploitation, and persistence mechanisms.
Pacu > run sts__assume_role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::TARGET:role/CrossAccountRole
Pacu > run lambda__enum
Pacu > run ec2__enum
Pacu > run codebuild__enum
Pacu > run ecs__enum
Pacu > data all
Review whether security controls Detected the testing activities and compile Bul:ings.
aws guardduty list-Bul:ings \
--tespit etme (or)-id $(aws guardduty list-tespit etme (ors) --query 'tespit etme (orIds)[0]' --output text) \
--Bul:ing-criteria '{
"Criterion": {
"updatedAt": {"GreaterThanOrEqual": ENGAGEMENT_START_EPOCH}
}
}' --output json
aws securityhub get-Bul:ings \
--filters '{
"CreatedAt": [{"Start": "ENGAGEMENT_START_ISO", "End": "ENGAGEMENT_END_ISO"}]
}'
Pacu > export_keys --all
Pacu > data all > pacu-session-export.json
aws iam delete-user --user-name pacu-test-user 2>/dev/null
aws iam delete-access-key --user-name pacu-test-user --access-key-id AKIA... 2>/dev/null
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Pacu | Open-source AWS exploitation framework maintained by Rhino Security Labs, providing modular attack capabilities for authorized penetration testing |
| Privilege Escalation Scan | Automated analysis of IAM policies to identify known methods for elevating permissions from limited Erişim: administrative control |
| iam:PassRole | Critical IAM action allowing a principal to assign roles to AWS services, enabling indirect privilege escalation through Lambda, EC2, or Glue |
| Cross-Account Role Assumption | Using sts:AssumeRole to obtain temporary credentials in another AWS account through trust policy configurations |
| Rules of Engagement | Documented agreement defining the scope, methods, timing, and boundaries of a penetration testing engagement |
| Post-Exploitation | Activities performed after initial Erişim: demonstrate impact, including data access, lateral movement, and persistence establishment |
Context: A red team exercise simulates a scenario where an attacker obtains a developer's AWS access key from a leaked repository. The goal is to Belirle: the maximum impact achievable from this starting point.
Approach:
whoami to confirm identityiam__enum_permissions to map the developer's effective permissionsiam__privesc_scan to identify escalation paths from developer to adminiam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction, creating a Lambda with an admin rolePitfalls: Pacu modules can be noisy and generate many API calls in a short time. GuardDuty may trigger Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller Bul:ings from the tester's IP. Coordinate with the SOC team to whitelist the testing IP or establish a clear communication channel to distinguish testing from real attacks. Always clean up persistence artifacts after testing.
AWS Penetration Test Report (Pacu)
=====================================
Target Account: 123456789012
Engagement Period: 2026-02-20 to 2026-02-23
Starting Credentials: Developer role (read-only S3, Lambda invoke)
Authorization: Signed ROE document #PT-2026-015
ATTACK PATH SUMMARY:
Starting access: S3 read-only, Lambda invoke
Maximum access achieved: AdministratorAccess (full account compromise)
Time to admin: 47 minutes
Tespit by GuardDuty: Yes (after 12 minutes)
Tespit by Security Hub: Yes (after 18 minutes)
SOC response time: 45 minutes (missed the escalation window)
PACU MODULES EXECUTED:
iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups: SUCCESS
iam__enum_permissions: SUCCESS
iam__privesc_scan: 3 escalation paths found
s3__download_bucket: 4 buckets accessed
lambda__enum: 12 functions enumerated
secretsmanager__enum: 8 secrets retrieved
ESCALATION PATHS EXPLOITED:
[1] iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction -> AdminRole (CRITICAL)
[2] sts:AssumeRole -> CrossAccountProdRole (HIGH)
[3] iam:CreatePolicyVersion on dev-policy (CRITICAL)
DATA ACCESSED:
S3 objects downloaded: 1,247 files (2.3 GB)
Secrets Manager values: 8 secrets including DB credentials
SSM parameters: 23 parameters including API keys
tespit etme (ION) RESULTS:
GuardDuty Bul:ings generated: 7
Security Hub Bul:ings: 12
Custom CloudWatch alarms triggered: 3
SOC acknowledged: Yes (45 min response)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Apply permission boundaries to all developer roles
2. Remove iam:PassRole from non-admin principals
3. Reduce SOC response time to < 15 minutes for IAM escalation alerts
4. Implement SCP blocking iam:CreatePolicyVersion in non-admin OUs
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概要と使いどころ
21st.dev Magic MCP — AI-powered UI component generation via natural language. Access to 21st.dev component library, SVGL brand logos, and real-time preview. Generate React/Tailwind components with /ui command.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
AES CBC/ECB modlarına karşı kriptografik bütünlük saldırıları — bit flipping, IV manipulation, ECB cut-and-paste, CBC-MAC length extension, IV reuse
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
AES-GCM ve ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce yeniden kullanımı saldırısı — GF(2^128) polinom kök bulma ile Hash Key kurtarma ve MAC sahteciliği.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
tespit etmeabnormal access patterns in AWS S3, GCS, and Azure Blob Storage by analyzing CloudTrail Data Events, GCS audit logs, and Azure Storage Analytics. Identifies after-hours bulk downloads, access from new IP addresses, unusual API calls (GetObject spikes), and potential data exfiltration using statistical baselines and time-series anomaly Tespit.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Perform static and symbolic analysis of Solidity smart contracts using Slither and Mythril to tespit etmereentrancy, integer overflow, access control, and other vulnerability classes before Dağıt:ment to Ethereum mainnet.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to tespit etmeexec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access. Builds threat Tespit rules from audit event patterns. Use investigating yaparken Kubernetes cluster compromise or building k8s-specific SIEM Tespit rules.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。