21st.dev Magic MCP — AI-powered UI component generation via natural language. Access to 21st.dev component library, SVGL brand logos, and real-time preview. Generate React/Tailwind components with /ui command.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Tespit etme exposed AWS credentials in source code repositories, CI/CD pipelines, and configuration files using TruffleHog, git-secrets, and AWS-native Tespit mechanisms to prevent credential theft and unauthorized account access.
インストールする前に、エージェントに与えられる指示の中身を確認できます。
Kullanma: for real-time credential monitoring (use AWS GuardDuty or Amazon Macie), for managing secrets (use AWS Secrets Manager or HashiCorp Vault), or for Tespit etme non-credential sensitive data like PII (use Amazon Macie or DLP tools).
brew install trufflehog or pip install trufflehog)brew install git-secrets)iam:ListAccessKeys, iam:GetAccessKeyLastUsed)Install TruffleHog v3 and verify it can tespit etmethe AWS credential patterns.
pip install trufflehog
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/main/scripts/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
trufflehog --version
trufflehog git https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys --only-verified
Scan entire git history including all branches and commits for AWS access keys, secret keys, and session tokens.
trufflehog git file:///path/to/repo --only-verified --json > trufflehog-results.json
trufflehog github --org=your-organization --token=$GITHUB_TOKEN --only-verified
trufflehog git https://github.com/org/repo.git --only-verified --branch=main
trufflehog gitlab --group=your-group --token=$GITLAB_TOKEN --only-verified
trufflehog filesystem /path/to/project --only-verified
Parse TruffleHog results to identify verified (still-active) credentials versus rotated or test keys.
cat trufflehog-results.json | python3 -c "
import json, sys
for line in sys.stdin:
Bul:ing = json.loads(line)
if 'AWS' in Bul:ing.get('tespit etme (orName)', ''):
print(f\"tespit etme (or): {Bul:ing['tespit etme (orName)']}\")
print(f\"Verified: {Bul:ing.get('Verified', False)}\")
print(f\"Source: {Bul:ing.get('SourceMetadata', {})}\")
print(f\"Commit: {Bul:ing.get('SourceMetadata', {}).get('Data', {}).get('Git', {}).get('commit', 'N/A')}\")
print(f\"File: {Bul:ing.get('SourceMetadata', {}).get('Data', {}).get('Git', {}).get('file', 'N/A')}\")
print('---')
"
aws iam get-access-key-last-used --access-key-id AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
aws iam list-access-keys --user-name target-user \
--query 'AccessKeyMetadata[*].[AccessKeyId,Status,CreateDate]' --output table
Prevent credentials from being committed in the first place using git-secrets as a pre-commit hook.
git secrets --install # In each repository
git secrets --register-aws
git secrets --add 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'
git secrets --add 'aws_secret_access_key\s*=\s*.{40}'
git secrets --add 'aws_session_token\s*=\s*.+'
git secrets --scan-history
git secrets --install ~/.git-templates/git-secrets
git config --global init.templateDir ~/.git-templates/git-secrets
Add TruffleHog scanning as a CI/CD gate to block Dağıt:ments containing exposed credentials.
name: Secrets Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
trufflehog:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: TruffleHog Scan
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
with:
extra_args: --only-verified --results=verified
secrets_scan:
stage: test
image: trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest
script:
- trufflehog git file://$CI_PROJECT_DIR --since-commit $CI_COMMIT_BEFORE_SHA --only-verified --fail
allow_failure: false
Execute incident response procedures when verified credentials are found exposed.
aws iam update-access-key \
--user-name compromised-user \
--access-key-id AKIAEXPOSEDKEY123456 \
--status Inactive
aws iam create-access-key --user-name compromised-user
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=AccessKeyId,AttributeValue=AKIAEXPOSEDKEY123456 \
--start-time 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z \
--query 'Events[*].[EventTime,EventName,EventSource,SourceIPAddress]' \
--output table
aws iam delete-access-key \
--user-name compromised-user \
--access-key-id AKIAEXPOSEDKEY123456
java -jar bfg.jar --replace-text credentials.txt repo.git
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| TruffleHog | Open-source secrets Tespit tool that scans git history, filesystems, and cloud services for exposed credentials using regex patterns and verification APIs |
| Verified Secret | A credential that TruffleHog has confirmed is still active by making an API call to the target service (e.g., AWS STS GetCallerIdentity) |
| git-secrets | AWS Labs pre-commit hook tool that prevents committing strings matching AWS credential patterns to git repositories |
| Access Key Rotation | The practice of regularly replacing AWS access key pairs to limit the window of exposure if a key is compromised |
| BFG Repo Cleaner | Tool for removing sensitive data from git history without rewriting the entire repository, faster than git filter-branch |
| GitHub Secret Scanning | GitHub-native feature that scans public repositories for known credential patterns and notifies the credential provider |
Context: GitHub secret scanning notifies that an AWS access key was pushed to a public repository. The key belongs to a developer with production S3 and DynamoDB access.
Approach:
aws iam update-access-key --status Inactiveaws cloudtrail lookup-events filtering by the exposed AccessKeyId to check for unauthorized usagetrufflehog git to Bul: any other exposed credentialsPitfalls: Simply deleting the commit or force-pushing does not remove credentials from GitHub's cache or forks. The key must be deactivated at the AWS level immediately. GitHub secret scanning may have already notified AWS, triggering automated key deactivation.
AWS Credential Exposure Scan Report
======================================
Scan Target: github.com/acme-corp (42 repositories)
Scan Date: 2026-02-23
Tool: TruffleHog v3.63.0
Mode: Full git history scan with verification
VERIFIED Bul:INGS (Active Credentials):
[CRED-001] AWS Access Key - VERIFIED ACTIVE
Key ID: AKIA...WXYZ
Repository: acme-corp/backend-api
File: Dağıt:/config.env
Commit: a1b2c3d (2025-08-15)
Author: developer@acme.com
IAM User: svc-backend-Dağıt:
Permissions: S3, DynamoDB, SQS (production)
Status: CRITICAL - Key active and used from 3 IP addresses
Action Required: Immediate deactivation and rotation
[CRED-002] AWS Secret Key - VERIFIED ACTIVE
Repository: acme-corp/data-pipeline
File: scripts/etl_config.py
Commit: d4e5f6g (2025-11-22)
Author: data-engineer@acme.com
Status: HIGH - Key active, last used 2 days ago
UNVERIFIED Bul:INGS (Potential Credentials):
Total pattern matches: 15
Likely test/example keys: 12
Requires manual review: 3
SUMMARY:
Repositories scanned: 42
Commits analyzed: 125,847
Verified active credentials: 2
Unverified credential patterns: 15
Repositories with pre-commit hooks: 8 / 42
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概要と使いどころ
21st.dev Magic MCP — AI-powered UI component generation via natural language. Access to 21st.dev component library, SVGL brand logos, and real-time preview. Generate React/Tailwind components with /ui command.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
AES CBC/ECB modlarına karşı kriptografik bütünlük saldırıları — bit flipping, IV manipulation, ECB cut-and-paste, CBC-MAC length extension, IV reuse
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
AES-GCM ve ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce yeniden kullanımı saldırısı — GF(2^128) polinom kök bulma ile Hash Key kurtarma ve MAC sahteciliği.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
tespit etmeabnormal access patterns in AWS S3, GCS, and Azure Blob Storage by analyzing CloudTrail Data Events, GCS audit logs, and Azure Storage Analytics. Identifies after-hours bulk downloads, access from new IP addresses, unusual API calls (GetObject spikes), and potential data exfiltration using statistical baselines and time-series anomaly Tespit.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Perform static and symbolic analysis of Solidity smart contracts using Slither and Mythril to tespit etmereentrancy, integer overflow, access control, and other vulnerability classes before Dağıt:ment to Ethereum mainnet.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to tespit etmeexec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access. Builds threat Tespit rules from audit event patterns. Use investigating yaparken Kubernetes cluster compromise or building k8s-specific SIEM Tespit rules.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。