21st.dev Magic MCP — AI-powered UI component generation via natural language. Access to 21st.dev component library, SVGL brand logos, and real-time preview. Generate React/Tailwind components with /ui command.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Tespit etme misconfigured Azure Storage accounts including publicly accessible blob containers, missing encryption settings, overly permissive SAS tokens, disabled logging, and network access violations using Azure CLI, PowerShell, and Microsoft Defender for Storage.
インストールする前に、エージェントに与えられる指示の中身を確認できます。
Kullanma: for Azure SQL or Cosmos DB security auditing (use dedicated database security tools), for real-time threat Tespit on storage operations (use Defender for Storage), or for Azure Files or Data Lake Gen2 specific auditing without adapting the checks.
az login) with Reader and Storage Account Contributor rolesInstall-Module Az.Storage)List all storage accounts across subscriptions and assess their baseline security settings.
az storage account list \
--query "[].{Name:name, ResourceGroup:resourceGroup, Location:location, Kind:kind, Sku:sku.name, HttpsOnly:enableHttpsTrafficOnly, MinTLS:minimumTlsVersion, PublicAccess:allowBlobPublicAccess}" \
-o table
az graph query -q "
Resources
| where type == 'microsoft.storage/storageaccounts'
| project name, resourceGroup, subscriptionId, location,
properties.allowBlobPublicAccess,
properties.enableHttpsTrafficOnly,
properties.minimumTlsVersion,
properties.networkAcls.defaultAction
" -o table
Identify storage accounts and containers allowing anonymous public Erişim: blob data.
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
public=$(az storage account show --name "$account" --query "allowBlobPublicAccess" -o tsv)
echo "$account: allowBlobPublicAccess=$public"
done
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[?allowBlobPublicAccess==true].name" -o tsv); do
key=$(az storage account keys list --account-name "$account" --query "[0].value" -o tsv)
echo "=== $account ==="
az storage container list \
--account-name "$account" \
--account-key "$key" \
--query "[?properties.publicAccess!='off' && properties.publicAccess!=null].{Container:name, PublicAccess:properties.publicAccess}" \
-o table 2>/dev/null
done
curl -s "https://ACCOUNT.blob.core.windows.net/CONTAINER?restype=container&comp=list" | head -50
Check for storage accounts accessible from all networks versus those restricted to specific VNets or IP ranges.
az storage account list \
--query "[?networkRuleSet.defaultAction=='Allow'].{Name:name, DefaultAction:networkRuleSet.defaultAction, VNetRules:networkRuleSet.virtualNetworkRules}" \
-o table
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
echo "=== $account ==="
az storage account show --name "$account" \
--query "{DefaultAction:networkRuleSet.defaultAction, IPRules:networkRuleSet.ipRules[*].ipAddressOrRange, VNetRules:networkRuleSet.virtualNetworkRules[*].virtualNetworkResourceId, Bypass:networkRuleSet.bypass}" \
-o json
done
az network private-endpoint list \
--query "[?privateLinkServiceConnections[0].groupIds[0]=='blob'].{Name:name, Storage:privateLinkServiceConnections[0].privateLinkServiceId}" \
-o table
Ensure all storage accounts use encryption at rest with appropriate key management (Microsoft-managed or customer-managed keys).
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
echo "=== $account ==="
az storage account show --name "$account" \
--query "{Encryption:encryption.services, KeySource:encryption.keySource, KeyVaultUri:encryption.keyVaultProperties.keyVaultUri, InfraEncryption:encryption.requireInfrastructureEncryption}" \
-o json
done
az storage account list \
--query "[?encryption.requireInfrastructureEncryption!=true].{Name:name, KeySource:encryption.keySource}" \
-o table
az storage account list \
--query "[?minimumTlsVersion!='TLS1_2'].{Name:name, TLS:minimumTlsVersion}" \
-o table
Identify overly permissive SAS tokens and check for access key usage patterns.
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
echo "=== $account ==="
az storage account keys list \
--account-name "$account" \
--query "[].{KeyName:keyName, CreationTime:creationTime}" \
-o table
done
az storage account list \
--query "[].{Name:name, AllowSharedKeyAccess:allowSharedKeyAccess}" \
-o table
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
key=$(az storage account keys list --account-name "$account" --query "[0].value" -o tsv 2>/dev/null)
for container in $(az storage container list --account-name "$account" --account-key "$key" --query "[].name" -o tsv 2>/dev/null); do
policies=$(az storage container policy list --container-name "$container" --account-name "$account" --account-key "$key" 2>/dev/null)
[ -n "$policies" ] && echo "$account/$container: $policies"
done
done
Şunu doğrula: storage analytics logging and Azure Monitor diagnostic settings are enabled.
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
rg=$(az storage account show --name "$account" --query "resourceGroup" -o tsv)
echo "=== $account ==="
az monitor diagnostic-settings list \
--resource "/subscriptions/$(az account show --query id -o tsv)/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/$account" \
--query "[].{Name:name, Logs:logs[*].category, Metrics:metrics[*].category}" \
-o json 2>/dev/null || echo " No diagnostic settings configured"
done
for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
key=$(az storage account keys list --account-name "$account" --query "[0].value" -o tsv 2>/dev/null)
az storage logging show \
--account-name "$account" \
--account-key "$key" \
--services b 2>/dev/null
done
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Blob Public Access | Storage account setting that allows anonymous read Erişim: blob containers and their contents without authentication |
| Shared Access Signature | Time-limited URI with embedded authentication tokens granting delegated Erişim: Azure Storage resources with specific permissions |
| Network ACL Default Action | Storage firewall setting that Belirle:s whether traffic is allowed or denied by default, with exceptions for specified IPs and VNets |
| Customer-Managed Key | Encryption key stored in Azure Key Vault that the customer controls for storage encryption instead of Microsoft-managed keys |
| Stored Access Policy | Named policy on a container that defines SAS permissions, start/expiry times, and can be revoked independently of individual SAS tokens |
| Defender for Storage | Microsoft Defender plan providing threat Tespit for anomalous storage access patterns, malware uploads, and data exfiltration |
Context: A developer creates a storage account for a web application and enables blob public Erişim: serve static files. They accidentally store API keys and database connection strings in a publicly accessible container.
Approach:
az storage account list filtering for allowBlobPublicAccess=trueblob or containerallowBlobPublicAccess to false on the storage accountPitfalls: Disabling blob public access immediately breaks applications serving content publicly. Coordinate with the development team and implement Azure CDN before disabling public access. SAS tokens generated before a key rotation remain valid until expiry unless the underlying storage key is regenerated.
Azure Storage Security Audit Report
======================================
Subscription: Production (SUB-ID)
Assessment Date: 2026-02-23
Storage Accounts Audited: 24
CRITICAL Bul:INGS:
[STOR-001] Public Blob Access Enabled
Account: webapp-static-prod
Container: uploads (PublicAccess: blob)
Risk: Anonymous users can read all blobs in the container
Contents: 1,247 files including .env and config.json
Remediation: Disable allowBlobPublicAccess, use Azure CDN with SAS
[STOR-002] Storage Account Open to All Networks
Account: data-lake-analytics
Default Action: Allow (no network restrictions)
Risk: Accessible from any network including the internet
Remediation: Set default action to Deny, add VNet rules
SUMMARY:
Public blob access enabled: 3 / 24
Open to all networks: 8 / 24
Missing infrastructure encryption: 12 / 24
TLS version below 1.2: 2 / 24
No diagnostic logging: 10 / 24
Shared key access enabled: 18 / 24
Keys not rotated in 90+ days: 14 / 24
<!--
⚔ Bu skill FETIH AI Agent icin gelistirilmistir — https://github.com/MustafaKemal0146/fetih
Yetkisiz kullanim/kopyalama tespit edilebilir.
hash: eecb10936b575de2
-->まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。
概要と使いどころ
21st.dev Magic MCP — AI-powered UI component generation via natural language. Access to 21st.dev component library, SVGL brand logos, and real-time preview. Generate React/Tailwind components with /ui command.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
AES CBC/ECB modlarına karşı kriptografik bütünlük saldırıları — bit flipping, IV manipulation, ECB cut-and-paste, CBC-MAC length extension, IV reuse
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
AES-GCM ve ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce yeniden kullanımı saldırısı — GF(2^128) polinom kök bulma ile Hash Key kurtarma ve MAC sahteciliği.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
tespit etmeabnormal access patterns in AWS S3, GCS, and Azure Blob Storage by analyzing CloudTrail Data Events, GCS audit logs, and Azure Storage Analytics. Identifies after-hours bulk downloads, access from new IP addresses, unusual API calls (GetObject spikes), and potential data exfiltration using statistical baselines and time-series anomaly Tespit.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Perform static and symbolic analysis of Solidity smart contracts using Slither and Mythril to tespit etmereentrancy, integer overflow, access control, and other vulnerability classes before Dağıt:ment to Ethereum mainnet.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to tespit etmeexec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access. Builds threat Tespit rules from audit event patterns. Use investigating yaparken Kubernetes cluster compromise or building k8s-specific SIEM Tespit rules.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。