Redact Wire Capture
A wire capture is the highest-density leak surface in any investigation: a single .jsonl from a proxied session can carry the bearer token, the account email, the device hash, and the home path all in one request frame. This skill scrubs those in place with class-preserving substitutions — keeping enough of each secret's shape to stay analytically useful (Bearer sk-vendor-oat01-<REDACTED> still reads as "an OAuth bearer") — runs idempotently so re-redaction is a no-op, and finishes by asserting per file that no secret survived.
When to Use
- Exporting a MITM/proxy capture (
mitmproxy, HAR, raw request/response logs) from a sanctioned probe into notes or a guide
- Moving capture artifacts (
.jsonl, .json, .log, .stdout) toward a public mirror
- Sanitizing a wire dump before attaching it to a bug report or upstream disclosure
- Re-running redaction on a capture dir that may already be partly scrubbed (must be safe to repeat)
Inputs
- Required: A capture directory containing text-mode artifacts
- Required: The secret-class list (token prefixes, id formats, the personal identifiers to scrub) — kept private
- Optional: An allow-list of public identifiers (marketplace/skill names, public usernames) that must be left intact
- Required:
tools/redact-artifact.py for the per-file scrub-and-assert step (there is no directory-wide gate; #853 records why)
Procedure
Step 1: Enumerate Secret Classes, Keep the Class Marker
For each secret, decide what to strip and what to keep. The goal is class-preserving redaction: remove the secret, keep the prefix or shape that tells a reader what class it was, so the capture stays analytically legible.
| Class | Synthetic shape | Redact to | Keep |
|---|
| OAuth bearer | sk-vendor-oat01-<base64…> | sk-vendor-oat01-<REDACTED-BEARER> | prefix (token class) |
| API key | sk-vendor-api03-<…> | sk-vendor-api-<REDACTED-KEY> | prefix |
| service id | srv_<20+ alnum> | srv_<REDACTED> | prefix |
| UUID | 8-4-4-4-12 hex | <REDACTED-UUID> | shape only |
| email | usr@example.com | <REDACTED-EMAIL> | nothing |
| home path | /home/<user>/… | /home/<REDACTED-USER>/… | path structure |
| device/session hash | 64-hex under "deviceId" | <REDACTED-DEVICE-HASH> | the key, not the value |
Expected: Every secret class has a from-shape and a to-form; the to-form preserves the class marker but not the secret.
On failure: If a value's class is ambiguous (could be a public id or a session id), treat it as secret. A false redaction is recoverable from the private source; a false keep is a leak.
Step 2: Apply Class-Preserving, Idempotent Substitutions In Place
Scrub the text-mode files in place. Every substitution must be idempotent — the to-form must not re-match the from-shape, so a second run changes nothing.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
CAP="${1:?capture dir required}"
mapfile -t FILES < <(find "$CAP" -type f \( -name '*.jsonl' -o -name '*.json' \
-o -name '*.log' -o -name '*.txt' -o -name '*.stdout' -o -name '*.stderr' \))
[ "${#FILES[@]}" -gt 0 ] || { echo "no text files under $CAP"; exit 0; }
sed -i -E 's/sk-vendor-oat01-[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/sk-vendor-oat01-<REDACTED-BEARER>/g' "${FILES[@]}"
sed -i -E 's/sk-vendor-api[0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/sk-vendor-api-<REDACTED-KEY>/g' "${FILES[@]}"
sed -i -E 's/srv_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/srv_<REDACTED>/g' "${FILES[@]}"
sed -i -E 's/[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}/<REDACTED-UUID>/g' "${FILES[@]}"
sed -i -E 's/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+@example\.com/<REDACTED-EMAIL>/g' "${FILES[@]}"
sed -i -E 's#/home/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/#/home/<REDACTED-USER>/#g' "${FILES[@]}"
sed -i -E 's/"deviceId":"[0-9a-f]{64}"/"deviceId":"<REDACTED-DEVICE-HASH>"/g' "${FILES[@]}"
The <REDACTED-…> suffix replaces the variable part, so the pattern [A-Za-z0-9_-]+ no longer matches <REDACTED-BEARER> on a second pass. That is what makes the script a safe no-op to re-run.
Expected: After one pass, every secret is replaced by its class-preserving form; a second pass reports zero changes.
On failure: If a second run keeps changing files, a substitution is non-idempotent (its to-form still matches its from-shape) — anchor or narrow it so the redacted form is inert.
Step 3: Protect Public Identifiers
Not everything that looks like an identifier is a secret. Public marketplace names, public skill names, and an intentionally-public username are part of the finding and must survive. Apply the allow-list before any broad catch-all so a generic rule does not eat a legitimate public name.
Expected: Public identifiers on the allow-list appear unchanged in the redacted capture; only private values are scrubbed.
On failure: If a public identifier was scrubbed, the catch-all ran too early or too broad — move the allow-list ahead of it and re-derive the redacted output from the private source.
Step 4: Verify Through the Redaction Gate
Re-run a verification pass over each scrubbed file. There is no tree-wide gate to hand the
directory to, and #853 records why: a scanner asking "is this tree clean?" has no corpus to be
right about, so the verification belongs inside the transform that produced the file. Redact each
file through redact-artifact, which refuses to return output in which a listed term survives.
# One `source<TAB>replacement` pair per secret you are scrubbing, plus --also-deny for any
# encoding of it your mapping does not spell. The tool exits 1 if a term survives and 2 if it
# cannot run at all, so a `|| exit` is a real gate rather than a hopeful one.
for f in "$CAP"/*.json; do
python3 tools/redact-artifact.py --type text --mapping "$CAP/../secrets.tsv" \
--also-deny "$BEARER_B64" "$f" --in-place || {
echo "capture still leaks at $f; extend the secret-class list"; exit 1; }
done
Expected: Every file exits 0. A non-zero exit is the gate working, and the two codes mean
different things: 1 is a finding — a listed term survived the mapping. 2 is
could-not-measure — an empty mapping, an unreadable or non-UTF-8 file, or markup whose structure
tier examined nothing — and it must never be reported to an operator as a leak. The || branch
below says "still leaks", so treat it as covering 1 only; on 2, fix the input and re-run.
On failure: A surviving hit means a secret class is unhandled — add it to Step 1/Step 2, re-run the scrub from the private source, and re-verify. Never delete the offending line by hand; the next capture will reproduce it.
Validation
Common Pitfalls
- Non-idempotent substitutions. If the redacted form still matches the pattern, re-runs keep mutating and CI flaps. Make every to-form inert.
- Stripping the class marker. Replacing a whole bearer with
<REDACTED> loses the analytical signal that it was an OAuth bearer. Keep the prefix, drop the secret.
- Catch-all before allow-list. A broad rule that runs first will scrub the public marketplace name you meant to keep. Allow-list first.
- Forgetting binary/secondary artifacts. Captures often include
.har, .stdout, and nested attachments. Enumerate every text-mode type, not just .jsonl.
- Hand-deleting leaking lines. The capture is a function of the probe; editing the output by hand desyncs it from the source and the leak returns next run.
- Encoding ≠ redaction. A base64'd token in a request body is still the token; the gate's structure tier must treat the decoded shape as a leak.
Related Skills
enforce-redaction-gate — how to build a redaction boundary when you hold the deny-list; it teaches the two-tier design this skill's per-file assertion implements the decidable half of
conduct-empirical-wire-capture — produces the captures this skill scrubs; redaction is the mandatory step between capture and any public reference
redact-for-public-disclosure — the methodology umbrella governing what may be referenced publicly at all
redact-visualization-for-disclosure — the sibling transform for rendered diagrams rather than wire dumps
security-audit-codebase — overlapping secret-scanning techniques, oriented to live-credential leakage rather than capture sanitization