threat-model

A threat model answers "what could go wrong with this system, who would do it, and what should we do about it?" independently of whether any specific bug has been found yet. It is the map; vulnerability discovery is the metal detector. A good threat model tells the pipeline where to look and tells triage which findings matter.

Litmus test: If patching one line of code makes an entry disappear, it was a vulnerability, not a threat. A threat ("attacker achieves RCE via untrusted media parsing") still stands after every known bug is fixed; a vulnerability ("dr_wav.h:412 doesn't bounds-check chunk_size") does not. This skill produces threats. Vulnerabilities appear only as evidence that raises a threat's likelihood score.

Invocation: /threat-model [bootstrap-then-interview|bootstrap|interview] <target-dir> [flags]

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Step 0 — Safety preamble (always runs first)

This skill performs static analysis only. It reads source, git history, and any vulnerability reports the user supplies, and writes a single output file (docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md). It does not build, execute, fuzz, or modify the target, and does not make network requests against the target's infrastructure.

Before proceeding, confirm and state in your first response:

1. The target directory exists and is a local checkout you can read.
2. You will not execute any code from the target directory.
3. If --vulns points at a URL or you are asked to "fetch CVEs", you will query only public advisory databases (NVD, GitHub Security Advisories, the project's own issue tracker) and never the target's live deployment.

If the user asks you to validate a threat by running an exploit, decline. This repository vendors only the static skills; there is no execution pipeline here (Ouroboros adaptation).

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Step 1 — Route to a mode

Parse $ARGUMENTS:

First token	Route to
interview	Read interview.md in this directory and follow it.
bootstrap	Read bootstrap.md in this directory and follow it.
bootstrap-then-interview	Bootstrap first, then interview seeded from the draft. See below.
anything else, or empty	Ask the user: "Is someone who owns or built this system available to answer questions in this session?" Yes and the codebase is checked out → recommend bootstrap-then-interview. Yes but no codebase → interview.md. No → bootstrap.md.

All modes write the same artifact (THREAT_MODEL.md, schema in schema.md) so downstream consumers (pipeline recon/judge, verifier agents) do not need to know which mode produced it.

	interview	bootstrap
Needs	An application owner present in the session	A local checkout; optionally past vulns
Method	Four-question framework: conversational walk through what are we working on → what can go wrong → what are we going to do about it → did we do a good job	Five stages: parallel research swarm → synthesize sections 1-3 + vuln table → generalize vulns into threat classes → STRIDE gap-fill → emit
Best for	New systems, design reviews, systems where the risk lives in business logic the code doesn't show	Inherited systems, third-party code, OSS dependencies, anything with a CVE history
Provenance tag	interview	bootstrap

Context durability. Interview mode is multi-turn; tool results from early reads may be evicted before you need them. To stay resilient:

• Do not read interview.md or bootstrap.md in full up front. Read the mode file (or the relevant section of it) at the point you need it, one question or stage at a time.
• If a re-read via the Read tool is refused as "file unchanged", the prior result was evicted; reload with cat <path> via Bash instead.

Interview backbone (so you can proceed even if interview.md is unavailable mid-session):

Q	Question	Fills schema sections
Q1	What are we working on?	section 1 context, section 2 assets, section 3 entry points
Q2	What can go wrong?	section 4 threat rows (id, threat, actor, surface, asset)
Q3	What are we going to do about it?	section 4 impact/likelihood/status/controls; section 5 deprioritized; section 8 recommended mitigations
Q4	Did we do a good job?	validate ranking, coverage check, section 6 open questions

bootstrap-then-interview mode

When the owner is available and the codebase is checked out, this is the recommended path: the owner's time goes to refining a code-grounded draft instead of describing the system from scratch.

1. Tell the owner: "I'll read the code first and come back with a draft (about 5-10 min), then we'll walk it together. Want that, or would you rather start cold?" Only proceed if they opt in; otherwise fall back to interview.md.
2. Read bootstrap.md and follow it end-to-end. Write docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md.
3. Immediately continue into interview mode: read interview.md and follow it with --seed docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md in effect. The section 6 open questions from bootstrap become your Q1-Q4 prompts; the owner confirms, corrects, and adds rather than starting from nothing.
4. Overwrite docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md with the refined model. Set provenance mode: bootstrap-then-interview.

The same flow is available manually: run bootstrap first, then interview --seed <THREAT_MODEL.md> in a later session.

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Step 2 — Shared output contract

All modes MUST emit docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md conforming to schema.md in this directory. Read schema.md immediately before you write the file, not at routing time; in interview mode the gap between routing and emit can be many turns, and an early read will be evicted before it's used.

Ouroboros adaptation: every target uses the harness checkout's docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md. Run from that checkout root with CHECKPOINT_ROOT unset or equal to it; never change the publication root to match the read target. This owner-facing model is intentionally tracked, unlike ignored scan and triage findings. For every mode, stage the content in a new operator-controlled payload file under the trusted payload staging contract and publish with python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py append docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md --replace --from "<payload-file>". Do not use Write directly on the final report, and stop if the helper refuses.

After writing the file, print to the user:

1. The path to THREAT_MODEL.md.
2. The top 5 threats by likelihood × impact (id, one-line description, L×I).
3. For bootstrap: any open questions the code could not answer (these seed a later interview pass).
4. For interview: any owner statements that could not be verified in code (these seed follow-up code review).

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References

• docs/security/README.md for how this skill fits the Ouroboros security loop (Ouroboros adaptation; the upstream docs/security.md / docs/prompting.md live in the reference harness).