Offensive testing of perimeter network appliances and VPN crypto — IKE/IPsec (aggressive-mode, transform/DH enum, NAT-T), Check Point SIC/OPSEC, safe firmware/patch-level inference for FortiGate/PAN-OS/Cisco ASA/Citrix feeding CVE applicability, NTLM Type-2 target-info decode, handshake-completion TLS-version probing, and an RST-TTL forgery discriminator. The active/offensive counterpart to the static firewall-review skill. Use when a perimeter firewall/VPN/appliance is in scope and you must test it (not just audit a config), without reinventing raw-socket protocol tooling each engagement.
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実行スコア 未検証
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firewall-review audits a config statically; infrastructure covers generic ports/DNS/SMB. Neither tests a live perimeter appliance or its VPN crypto — so IKE builders, SIC/OPSEC fingerprinting, and TTL discriminators were reinvented from raw sockets each engagement, often shallowly, and CVE applicability was left UNDETERMINED across whole estates. This skill provides the deterministic, tested tools and the precondition-gated methodology. Non-destructive only — every tool observes/decodes/infers; none fires an exploit, and CVE applicability is a precondition check, never a blind "vulnerable."
| Tool | Does | Anti-footgun |
|---|---|---|
tools/ike_enum.py | IKEv1 aggressive-mode detection, IKEv1/IKEv2 transform + DH-group enum, NOTIFY / NAT-T decode (wraps ike-scan, raw ISAKMP SA_INIT builder fallback) | Aggressive-mode support (PSK-hash leak) is the finding; enumerate, don't crack in-band |
tools/checkpoint_sic_opsec.py | Fingerprint SIC (18190/1), OPSEC LEA/ELA (18183/4), CA (18192/18210), FW1 (256/264), Gaia Portal; emit a CVE-precondition map incl. CVE-2024-24919 | CVE-2024-24919 is applicable ONLY when the RA/Mobile-Access marker is observed — else undetermined |
tools/appliance_version_infer.py | Safe firmware/patch-level inference for FortiGate / PAN-OS / Cisco ASA / Citrix from headers, login markers, cert CN/serial → CVE applicability | Never asserts applicable on a low-confidence / unknown version — returns undetermined |
tools/tls_handshake_probe.py | Which TLS versions are supported, by completed handshake per pinned protocol | Fixes the openssl s_client exit/SECLEVEL false-positive — an aborted handshake ≠ support |
tools/ntlm_decode.py | Decode an NTLM Type-2 (CHALLENGE) AV_PAIR block → NetBIOS/DNS host, domain, forest, OS build | Info-leak finding from an unauthenticated challenge; no auth attempted |
tools/perimeter_forensics.py | RST-TTL forgery discriminator (real host vs firewall forging a RST) + IKE NOTIFY decode | Never asserts "internal host behind FW" on RSTs alone — a firewall forges RSTs indistinguishably at this layer; returns undetermined without an open-service TTL baseline |
appliance_version_infer.py (vendor + version guess + confidence) and, for Check Point, checkpoint_sic_opsec.py. A version guess of undetermined/low-confidence stays undetermined — do not score CVEs against it.ike_enum.py: flag IKEv1 aggressive mode (leaks the PSK hash → a finding), enumerate accepted transforms + weak DH groups (1/2/5), and decode NAT-T/NOTIFY. IKEv2-only where IKEv1 RA is absent (a CVE requiring IKEv1 aggressive mode is not_applicable there — see severity-calibration.md rule 5).tls_handshake_probe.py per host: report only handshake-completed versions; TLS 1.0/1.1 completion is the weak-protocol finding (not an openssl exit code).ntlm_decode.py) for internal host/domain/OS intel; record it as an information-disclosure finding.applicability) and mark applicable / undetermined / not_applicable. Enrich the CVE via python3 tools/nvd-lookup.py. An undetermined applicability is reported as such — never inflated to a confirmed vuln.perimeter_forensics.py --classify-ttls before asserting anything: distinguish a real host RST from a filter-forged RST (needs an open-service TTL baseline; otherwise undetermined).applicability (severity-calibration.md rules 4-5).openssl s_client non-zero exit — require a completed handshake (tls_handshake_probe.py).undetermined.firewall-review (config audit). Generic network: infrastructure.../coordination/reference/severity-calibration.md (rules 4-5).まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。
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Offensive AI security testing and exploitation framework. Systematically tests LLM applications for OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities including prompt injection, model extraction, data poisoning, and supply chain attacks. Integrates with pentest workflows to discover and exploit AI-specific threats.
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API security testing - GraphQL, REST API, WebSocket, and Web-LLM attack techniques.
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Stitches confirmed single-asset findings into multi-hop attack paths across the organization. Builds a graph where nodes are assets and edges are confirmed exploit hops citing the findings that enable them.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Acquire an authenticated session THROUGH MFA/OTP on an in-scope target and emit a reusable session artifact (Playwright storageState + Bearer) so executors can test the post-auth attack surface. Use when the highest-value authenticated classes (BOLA/IDOR/mass-assignment/injection on the real data APIs) are blocked because login is gated by SMS-OTP or TOTP MFA. Distinct from the authentication skill (which ATTACKS auth); this one legitimately authenticates and hands the session to the rest of the engagement.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Authentication security testing - auth bypass, JWT attacks, OAuth flaws, password attacks, 2FA bypass, CAPTCHA bypass, and bot detection evasion.
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Smart contract security testing and blockchain CTF exploitation. Covers Solidity vulnerability analysis, EVM storage manipulation, delegatecall attacks, CREATE/CREATE2 address prediction, and common DeFi exploit patterns. Use when analyzing Solidity contracts, solving blockchain challenges, or testing smart contract security.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。