WCAG 2.2 AA compliance, ARIA patterns, keyboard navigation, screen reader optimization
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
HIPAA compliance - PHI protection, technical/administrative/physical safeguards, minimum necessary standard, BAA requirements, de-identification, access logging
インストールする前に、エージェントに与えられる指示の中身を確認できます。
PHI = Individually identifiable health information transmitted or maintained in any form.
| # | Identifier | Example | De-Identification Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Names | John Smith | Remove |
| 2 | Geographic data (< state) | 123 Main St, ZIP | Truncate ZIP to 3 digits |
| 3 | Dates (except year) | DOB, admission date | Generalize to year |
| 4 | Phone numbers | (555) 123-4567 | Remove |
| 5 | Fax numbers | (555) 123-4568 | Remove |
| 6 | Email addresses | john@example.com | Remove |
| 7 | SSN | 123-45-6789 | Remove |
| 8 | Medical record numbers | MRN-001234 | Replace with random ID |
| 9 | Health plan beneficiary # | BEN-98765 | Remove |
| 10 | Account numbers | ACC-12345 | Remove |
| 11 | Certificate/license # | LIC-54321 | Remove |
| 12 | Vehicle identifiers | VIN, plate # | Remove |
| 13 | Device identifiers | Serial #, IMEI | Remove |
| 14 | Web URLs | patient-portal.com/user/123 | Remove |
| 15 | IP addresses | 192.168.1.1 | Remove |
| 16 | Biometric identifiers | Fingerprint, voiceprint | Remove |
| 17 | Full-face photographs | Profile photo | Remove |
| 18 | Any unique identifying # | Custom patient ID | Replace with random |
interface PHIDetectionResult {
field: string;
identifierType: string;
confidence: 'high' | 'medium' | 'low';
recommendation: 'encrypt' | 'remove' | 'truncate' | 'pseudonymize';
}
const PHI_PATTERNS: Record<string, RegExp> = {
ssn: /\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/,
phone: /\b\(?(\d{3})\)?[-.\s]?\d{3}[-.\s]?\d{4}\b/,
email: /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z|a-z]{2,}\b/,
mrn: /\bMRN[-\s]?\d{4,}\b/i,
dob: /\b(0[1-9]|1[0-2])\/(0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])\/\d{4}\b/,
ip: /\b\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\b/,
};
function scanForPHI(text: string): PHIDetectionResult[] {
const results: PHIDetectionResult[] = [];
for (const [type, pattern] of Object.entries(PHI_PATTERNS)) {
if (pattern.test(text)) {
results.push({
field: type,
identifierType: type,
confidence: 'high',
recommendation: 'encrypt',
});
}
}
return results;
}
// Role-Based Access Control for PHI
interface HIPAARole {
name: string;
phiAccess: 'none' | 'minimum_necessary' | 'treatment' | 'admin';
allowedOperations: ('read' | 'write' | 'delete' | 'export')[];
requiresMFA: boolean;
}
const HIPAA_ROLES: Record<string, HIPAARole> = {
receptionist: {
name: 'Receptionist',
phiAccess: 'minimum_necessary',
allowedOperations: ['read'],
requiresMFA: true,
},
nurse: {
name: 'Nurse',
phiAccess: 'treatment',
allowedOperations: ['read', 'write'],
requiresMFA: true,
},
physician: {
name: 'Physician',
phiAccess: 'treatment',
allowedOperations: ['read', 'write'],
requiresMFA: true,
},
admin: {
name: 'System Admin',
phiAccess: 'admin',
allowedOperations: ['read', 'write', 'delete', 'export'],
requiresMFA: true,
},
billing: {
name: 'Billing Staff',
phiAccess: 'minimum_necessary',
allowedOperations: ['read'],
requiresMFA: true,
},
};
function enforceMinimumNecessary(
role: HIPAARole,
requestedFields: string[],
allFields: string[]
): string[] {
if (role.phiAccess === 'treatment') {
return requestedFields; // Treatment = full access to relevant PHI
}
if (role.phiAccess === 'minimum_necessary') {
// Only return non-clinical fields
const nonClinicalFields = ['patientId', 'name', 'dob', 'insuranceId'];
return requestedFields.filter((f) => nonClinicalFields.includes(f));
}
return [];
}
interface HIPAAAuditLog {
id: string;
timestamp: string;
userId: string;
userRole: string;
action: 'view' | 'create' | 'update' | 'delete' | 'export' | 'print';
patientId: string;
resourceType: string; // 'medical_record', 'lab_result', 'prescription'
resourceId: string;
accessReason: string; // 'treatment', 'payment', 'operations'
ipAddress: string;
userAgent: string;
sessionId: string;
success: boolean;
details?: string;
}
async function logPHIAccess(entry: HIPAAAuditLog): Promise<void> {
// HIPAA requires immutable, tamper-evident logs
// Minimum 6 yil retention
await auditStore.append({
...entry,
integrity: computeHMAC(entry),
});
// Alert on suspicious access patterns
if (await isAnomalousAccess(entry)) {
await alertSecurityTeam({
type: 'suspicious_phi_access',
entry,
reason: 'Anomalous access pattern detected',
});
}
}
async function isAnomalousAccess(entry: HIPAAAuditLog): Promise<boolean> {
const recentAccess = await auditStore.getRecent(entry.userId, '1h');
// Flag: >50 records in 1 hour (potential data exfiltration)
if (recentAccess.length > 50) return true;
// Flag: access outside business hours
const hour = new Date(entry.timestamp).getHours();
if (hour < 6 || hour > 22) return true;
// Flag: accessing patient not in user's care
if (entry.accessReason === 'treatment') {
const isAssigned = await isPatientAssigned(entry.userId, entry.patientId);
if (!isAssigned) return true;
}
return false;
}
// Data integrity verification for PHI
import { createHash } from 'crypto';
interface IntegrityRecord {
recordId: string;
hash: string;
algorithm: 'sha256';
computedAt: Date;
}
function computeRecordHash(record: Record<string, unknown>): string {
const canonical = JSON.stringify(record, Object.keys(record).sort());
return createHash('sha256').update(canonical).digest('hex');
}
async function verifyIntegrity(recordId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const record = await db.medicalRecords.findUnique({ where: { id: recordId } });
const storedHash = await db.integrityRecords.findUnique({ where: { recordId } });
if (!record || !storedHash) return false;
const currentHash = computeRecordHash(record);
return currentHash === storedHash.hash;
}
// TLS enforcement for PHI transmission
import https from 'https';
import fs from 'fs';
const tlsOptions: https.ServerOptions = {
key: fs.readFileSync(process.env.TLS_KEY_PATH!),
cert: fs.readFileSync(process.env.TLS_CERT_PATH!),
minVersion: 'TLSv1.2', // HIPAA minimum
ciphers: [
'TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384',
'TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256',
'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
].join(':'),
honorCipherOrder: true,
};
// End-to-end encryption for PHI in transit between systems
function encryptPHIForTransmission(phi: string, recipientPublicKey: string): string {
const symmetricKey = randomBytes(32);
const encryptedData = encryptAES256GCM(phi, symmetricKey);
const encryptedKey = publicEncrypt(recipientPublicKey, symmetricKey);
return JSON.stringify({ encryptedData, encryptedKey: encryptedKey.toString('base64') });
}
| Topic | Frequency | Audience |
|---|---|---|
| HIPAA overview | Annual | All staff |
| PHI handling procedures | Annual | PHI access staff |
| Security awareness | Annual + onboarding | All staff |
| Incident reporting | Annual | All staff |
| Phishing awareness | Quarterly | All staff |
| Role-specific PHI policies | Annual | Clinical staff |
// Minimum Necessary middleware
function minimumNecessaryFilter(role: string, endpoint: string) {
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
const fieldPermissions = getFieldPermissions(role, endpoint);
// Override response to filter fields
const originalJson = res.json.bind(res);
res.json = (data: unknown) => {
const filtered = filterFields(data, fieldPermissions);
return originalJson(filtered);
};
next();
};
}
// Field access matrix
const FIELD_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, Record<string, string[]>> = {
receptionist: {
'/api/patients': ['id', 'name', 'dob', 'phone', 'appointmentTime'],
'/api/patients/:id': ['id', 'name', 'dob', 'phone', 'insuranceId'],
},
nurse: {
'/api/patients': ['id', 'name', 'dob', 'vitals', 'medications', 'allergies'],
'/api/patients/:id': ['*'], // Full treatment access
},
billing: {
'/api/patients': ['id', 'name', 'insuranceId', 'billingCodes'],
'/api/patients/:id': ['id', 'name', 'insuranceId', 'billingCodes', 'procedures'],
},
};
| Scenario | Minimum Necessary Applies? |
|---|---|
| Treatment (doctor-to-doctor) | NO - full PHI allowed |
| Patient's own request | NO - full access to own data |
| Required by law | NO - as required |
| Payment/billing | YES - only billing-relevant fields |
| Healthcare operations | YES - limit to necessary |
| Research (with authorization) | YES - de-identified preferred |
## BAA Checklist
- [ ] Permitted uses and disclosures of PHI defined
- [ ] BA will not use/disclose PHI beyond contract
- [ ] BA will implement appropriate safeguards
- [ ] BA will report security incidents and breaches
- [ ] BA will ensure subcontractors comply
- [ ] BA will make PHI available for patient access
- [ ] BA will make PHI available for amendment
- [ ] BA will provide accounting of disclosures
- [ ] BA will make internal practices available to HHS
- [ ] BA will return or destroy PHI at termination
- [ ] CE may terminate if BA violates terms
| Vendor Type | Examples | PHI Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud hosting | AWS, GCP, Azure | Infrastructure |
| EHR systems | Epic, Cerner | Full PHI |
| Email (if PHI sent) | Google Workspace, M365 | Communication |
| Payment processing | Stripe (if health billing) | Billing PHI |
| Analytics (if PHI) | Custom analytics | Usage data |
| Backup services | Veeam, Backblaze | Full PHI |
| Shredding services | Iron Mountain | Physical PHI |
interface DeIdentifiedRecord {
randomId: string; // Not derived from original ID
ageGroup: string; // '>89' or age bucket
zipCode3: string; // First 3 digits (if population > 20K)
diagnosisCode: string;
procedureCode: string;
// ALL 18 identifiers removed
}
function deIdentifySafeHarbor(record: PatientRecord): DeIdentifiedRecord {
const age = calculateAge(record.dateOfBirth);
return {
randomId: generateRandomId(), // NOT derived from patient ID
ageGroup: age > 89 ? '90+' : `${Math.floor(age / 10) * 10}-${Math.floor(age / 10) * 10 + 9}`,
zipCode3: record.zipCode.substring(0, 3),
diagnosisCode: record.diagnosisCode,
procedureCode: record.procedureCode,
// name: REMOVED
// dob: REMOVED (age bucket only)
// ssn: REMOVED
// mrn: REMOVED
// phone: REMOVED
// email: REMOVED
// address: REMOVED (zip3 only)
};
}
## Expert Determination Requirements
1. Apply statistical/scientific methods
2. Determine re-identification risk is "very small"
3. Document methods and results
4. Expert must have appropriate knowledge and experience
5. Re-identification risk typically < 0.04 (1 in 25)
// Column-level encryption for PHI fields
import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, scryptSync } from 'crypto';
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
const KEY = scryptSync(process.env.PHI_ENCRYPTION_KEY!, 'salt', 32);
function encryptPHIField(value: string): EncryptedField {
const iv = randomBytes(16);
const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, KEY, iv);
const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(value, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
return {
data: encrypted.toString('base64'),
iv: iv.toString('base64'),
tag: cipher.getAuthTag().toString('base64'),
};
}
function decryptPHIField(encrypted: EncryptedField): string {
const decipher = createDecipheriv(
ALGORITHM,
KEY,
Buffer.from(encrypted.iv, 'base64')
);
decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(encrypted.tag, 'base64'));
return decipher.update(encrypted.data, 'base64', 'utf8') + decipher.final('utf8');
}
| Tier | Description | Penalty Per Violation | Annual Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Did not know | $100 - $50,000 | $25,000 |
| 2 | Reasonable cause | $1,000 - $50,000 | $100,000 |
| 3 | Willful neglect (corrected) | $10,000 - $50,000 | $250,000 |
| 4 | Willful neglect (not corrected) | $50,000+ | $1,500,000 |
| Anti-Pattern | HIPAA Violation | Dogru Yol |
|---|---|---|
| PHI in logs/debug output | Minimum necessary | Filter PHI before logging |
| PHI in error messages | Minimum necessary | Generic error messages |
| Unencrypted PHI at rest | Technical safeguard | AES-256 encryption |
| Shared login credentials | Access control | Individual accounts + MFA |
| No audit trail | Audit controls | Immutable access logging |
| PHI in URL parameters | Transmission security | POST body + TLS |
| PHI in email (unencrypted) | Transmission security | Encrypted messaging or portal |
| No BAA with cloud vendor | Administrative safeguard | Execute BAA before use |
| No access expiration | Access control | Auto-expire + review |
| PHI on personal devices | Physical safeguard | MDM + encryption policy |
まだレビューはありません。使ってみた感想をお寄せください。
概要と使いどころ
WCAG 2.2 AA compliance, ARIA patterns, keyboard navigation, screen reader optimization
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
axe-core integration, WCAG 2.2 AA checklist, keyboard navigation testing, screen reader testing, and ARIA pattern validation.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Steam-style achievement system with XP, levels, streaks, and skill trees. Gamifies the development workflow. 25 achievements across 5 categories.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Framework for measuring and tracking agent response quality over time. Detects regressions before they reach production. Use when evaluating agent changes, auditing quality, or establishing performance baselines.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Agent Context Isolation
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
Agent ve skill dosyalarinin yapisal dogrulamasi. Frontmatter kontrol, naming convention, zorunlu bolum kontrolu, tutarlilik denetimi. Yeni agent/skill eklendiginde veya mevcut dosyalar duzenlediginde otomatik calistirilir.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。