Assess Node.js applications for unsafe input handling and configuration weaknesses. The skill covers prototype pollution, where shared object properties are altered, plus template and command injection, proxy trust issues, and file exposure, with checks for observable impact.
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Test CDN-backed websites for cache poisoning and Web Cache Deception, where private pages are mistakenly cached as public content. The skill guides cache behavior checks, input testing, and independent-client verification to establish reproducible impact.
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Inspect NTLM authentication responses from public IIS, SharePoint, and Exchange services to identify exposed internal domains, server names, and timestamps. Assess the disclosure in context and prepare reproducible evidence without completing authentication.
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Guide bug bounty work from checking authorized scope and discovering assets to testing web and AI features. Validate practical impact, investigate related weaknesses, and organize reproducible evidence into a vulnerability report.
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Review API configuration and input handling for unauthorized field updates, prototype pollution that alters shared object defaults, and manipulation of backend URLs. The skill also covers exposed API specifications and access control weaknesses in OData queries.
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Test whether an application accepts forged JWTs, signed tokens that carry identity and role information. The skill covers signature bypasses, algorithm confusion, and untrusted keys, then guides verification of access to another user's data or protected functions.
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Investigate HTTP request smuggling, where a proxy and server disagree on request boundaries. The skill guides checks for different server setups, HTTP/2 conversion issues, and evidence that the mismatch affects another client's requests.
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Investigate GraphQL APIs for unauthorized data access, unsafe updates, and permission inconsistencies with REST APIs. The skill covers schema discovery, checks across users and organizations, and validation steps that turn suspected weaknesses into reproducible findings with concrete impact.
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Prepare Bugcrowd submissions with accurate vulnerability categories, evidence-based severity requests, and explanations of program scope. Structure references between related reports, document QA testing conditions, and draft responses when a finding is downgraded or considered out of scope.
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Rigorous, defensible email-spoofability verdict and SPF supply-chain risk analysis computed from published DNS alone. Deepens the record-level SPF/DMARC/DKIM/BIMI/MTA-STS/DNSSEC fetch recipes in the offensive-osint arsenal (§16.14) with the reasoning that section doesn't do: a priority-ordered composite verdict for whether an attacker can actually land header-From-spoofed mail in an inbox, and by which vector (exact-domain vs subdomain) — grounded in the single most-misunderstood distinction in email security: the envelope MAIL FROM that SPF authenticates vs the visible header From: that only DMARC governs. Explains precisely why SPF -all/~all alone is NOT spoof-proof without DMARC enforcement, and why SPF +all bypasses DMARC even under p=reject pct=100. Covers RFC 7208 §4.6.4's 10-DNS-lookup / 2-void-lookup PermError fail-open condition with a runnable stdlib-only lookup-counter script, plus the SPF-include-takeover supply-chain vector (an attacker re-registering a dead include inherits SPF-pass authority over the victim domain) with strict transient-vs-NXDOMAIN discrimination discipline so a temporary SERVFAIL is never mistaken for a takeover lead. Fully passive: DNS TXT reads only, no mail sent, no RCPT TO probe, no API keys. Use when auditing a domain's real spoofing resistance (not just its published records), explaining to a client why 'we have SPF -all' does not mean they're covered, investigating an SPF PermError or an unusually long include chain, evaluating a dead SPF include as a takeover lead, or writing a defensible spoofability finding for a deliverable.
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Org-grade attack-surface mapping: given a company's legal identity, discover its ENTIRE owned internet footprint — corporate family -> owned domains -> owned netblocks/ASN -> live assets — with attribution discipline, not just DNS breadth. The org-first attribution pyramid (legal entity -> LEI/registration -> corporate family -> owned domains -> owned netblocks/ASN -> live assets). Corporate-identity resolution via the GLEIF LEI API (legal name -> LEI, exact-LEI direct-children expansion, downward-only depth-capped BFS, NEVER a name re-resolution), SEC-EDGAR full-text search + Exhibit-21 subsidiary entity names, OpenCorporates entity corroboration, Wikidata SPARQL corporate graph (P856/P355/P749/P1830). Domain attribution via reverse-WHOIS (WhoisXML preview-then-purchase quota guard, SecurityTrails associated-domains — both paid), crt.sh O= certificate-transparency organization pivot (keyless), infrastructure correlation (shared NS/MX/SaaS-TXT, netblock membership, reverse-DNS PTR), and the independent-evidence combiner (1-prod(1-w_i), rule of three, OwnerTier NONE/WEAK/MODERATE/STRONG/CONFIRMED) — discover-only `related:` candidates are NEVER auto-scanned. Netblock/ASN attribution via org-first RIR queries (ARIN Whois-RWS org-handle search, RIPE DB organisation + inverse-org search) that recover 'dark netblocks' with no DNS link to the seed, ASN discovery (RIPEstat + BGPView union), the HYPERSCALER-SCOPE GUARD (never attribute a whole AWS/GCP/Azure/Cloudflare announced range to a tenant — keep only the seed-containing block, tag shared_hosting_cdn), and org-identity-seeded internet-scan-index queries (Shodan/Censys/ZoomEye/FOFA/BinaryEdge org: filters + an always-on keyless crt.sh fallback). Promote-to-scan triage ranks forgotten discover-only netblocks by remote-access exposure (gateway-vendor/KEV/control-plane/datastore port scoring) into an operator queue. Attribution confidence rubric + anti-patterns (namesake grafting via GLEIF name re-resolution, single-signal ownership, hyperscaler over-attribution, privacy-WHOIS pivot poisoning, RIR org-name collisions). Passive/keyless-first OSINT only — every paid-key dependency is enrichment on top of a keyless core, never a hard requirement. Use when mapping an organization's full corporate-family internet footprint, resolving a legal entity to its LEI/subsidiaries, discovering domains/netblocks/ASNs an org owns beyond its one seed domain, auditing M&A/shadow-IT sprawl, or scoping an engagement that starts from a company NAME rather than a domain.
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Comprehensive OSINT methodology for external red-team operations and authorized attack-surface assessments. Covers the 6-stage recon pipeline (seed → asset expansion → enrichment → exposure analysis → convergence → operator-armed active validation) with connector-resilience and stage-vs-gating discipline, asset-graph discipline, severity rubric, confidence upgrade workflows, time budgeting, identity-fabric mapping, breach×identity correlation with per-person identity dossiers, detectability tagging, detection-aware probing, WAF/CDN bypass, vulnerability prioritization, phishing infrastructure planning, bug bounty submission, and client deliverable templates. Use when planning or executing reconnaissance against authorized targets, mapping an organization's external attack surface, investigating a person/entity, or producing client deliverables.
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End-to-end external OSINT engagement autopilot. Run the FULL osint-methodology pipeline to completion in ONE go for an authorized domain — engagement folder, Stages 1-5 (seed, expansion, enrichment, exposure, convergence), multi-agent per-host content+JS fan-out, headline verification, auto-generated findings, and a consolidated multi-tab .xlsx deliverable. Stops ONLY for Stage 6 (active exploitation) arming and out-of-scope sibling assets. Use whenever asked to "run OSINT / recon / attack-surface" on a target — do NOT deliver a thin passive first pass.
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FAIR-aligned exposure quantification: turns a pile of recon findings into a defensible 0-100 + A-F org risk score (Likelihood x Impact, three ownership-aware factors: exposure/threat/impact), an ownership + proof demotion cap so unproven or weakly-owned findings can't inflate the number, a $-denominated FAIR loss-magnitude estimate (IBM/Ponemon per-record cost bands, cross-source record dedup, threat-factor annualization), attack-path amplification (curated red-team chain catalog + generic graph-walk engine, with a kill-chain vs shared-fate honesty gate), and a board-ready one-pager deliverable (hero $ + letter grade + top-3 findings + top attack path + the ask). Extends osint-methodology's severity rubric and client deliverable templates with quantification. Passive analysis only -- operates on findings already collected, no target traffic, no API keys. Use when asked to score risk, quantify exposure, estimate breach cost, build a board report, translate technical findings to dollars, or explain why a grade or dollar figure came out the way it did.
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Organization-grade identity-fabric mapping: tenant/federation fingerprinting and the pre-auth user-ENUMERATION oracle methodology — enumeration and fingerprint only, never credential submission. Covers domain-to-tenant resolution (Microsoft getuserrealm.srf Managed/Federated namespace check, Entra OIDC metadata tenant-GUID extraction, Autodiscover v2), keyless Microsoft tenant-federation mapping (GetFederationInformation SOAP -> sibling-domain discovery, discover-only ROE, FEDERATED_WITH provenance edge held out of attack-path pivoting), Okta org-slug derivation + OIDC fingerprint + governed custom-domain enumeration, ADFS passive/active fingerprint + version inference, Google Workspace MX-correlated detection, generic OIDC (Auth0/Keycloak/Ping Identity/OneLogin/Duo) discovery, SAML metadata (5 paths), Azure AD Seamless-SSO Negotiate-challenge detection, Microsoft Defender for Identity (MDI) sensor-API presence check, the user-enumeration oracle methodology for Microsoft GetCredentialType (IfExistsResult semantics: exists / doesn't-exist / exists-in-federated-tenant / throttled) and Okta /api/v1/authn (errorCode differential), Medium-detectability discipline with a hard 20-candidate-per-tenant cap and admin/role interest-based ranking, and name x confirmed-email-pattern login-candidate synthesis that FAILS CLOSED with zero output when no org pattern is confirmed. Grounded directly in a production ASM implementation's sso_idp.py, tenant_recon.py, and core/email_patterns.py modules. Deepens — does not duplicate — offensive-osint skill's Identity Fabric endpoint reference with the tenant-federation MAP, the oracle WORKFLOW, and the candidate-SYNTHESIS methodology that reference lacks. Use when fingerprinting an organization's identity provider, mapping its tenant/federation boundary, running an authorized pre-auth user-enumeration pass, or synthesizing login candidates from harvested names to feed that oracle — never for password spray, credential submission, or auth bypass.
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Organization-grade cloud and supply-chain attack-surface discovery: S3/GCS/Azure Blob bucket discovery via observed-name mining (CNAME/cert-SAN/Wayback) and bounded two-class permutation (6 prefixes x 15 suffixes on trusted tokens, bounded target-bound expansion on subdomain stems), existence (HEAD/GET) vs public-listing confirmation, object-key triage into 9 value tiers (database dumps, credentials, IaC state, kubeconfig, VCS dirs, config, archives, PII, logs), dangling-CNAME bucket-takeover detection, and the ownership-gated severity model that stops an unattributable public bucket from becoming a false CRITICAL; the fully offline AWS-account-ID recovery from a leaked AKIA/ASIA/AROA access key (base32 decode, runnable stdlib Python, canonical test vector, AWS-documentation-example-ID screening); dependency-confusion confirmation for npm/PyPI (internal-signal classifier -- private-registry binding vs org-namespace match -- paired with a read-only public-registry 404 check and the npm scope-claimability nuance the public search API misses); and passive cloud-native/container/Kubernetes/CI control-plane fingerprinting (Lambda URLs, API Gateway, Cloud Run, App Service, kubelet/etcd/K8s API/dashboard, Jenkins/GitLab/Argo CD) as an org-attribution and exposure surface. Passive/discovery only -- no exploitation, no credential submission, no active control-plane confirmation (a stage-6 validate_cloud active tier is described but out of scope). Use when enumerating a target's cloud storage footprint, recovering an AWS account ID from a leaked key, confirming a supply-chain dependency-confusion vector, or fingerprinting cloud-native/K8s/CI infrastructure for an authorized external recon engagement.
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Turns one-shot external recon into a continuous monitoring program. Covers the scheduled re-scan-and-diff loop (baseline snapshot -> interval sleep -> re-scan -> asset/finding delta -> threshold-gated webhook alert), the scan-to-scan diff engine (new/removed/changed assets by a tracked-attribute table, new/resolved findings by a stable cross-scan fingerprint), adversary CTI / chatter monitoring across six public feeds (ransomwatch, ransomware.live, HackerNews Algolia search, Reddit security-subreddit RSS, GitHub Gist code-search, public Telegram channel scraping) with a source-kind-aware severity engine (leak-site/forum/telegram/paste tiers, CRITICAL through INFO), literal/glob/regex watchlist pattern matching, full-corpus capture with retroactive rescan on new watchlist entries, infrastructure-tracking-over-time discipline (certificate-transparency, passive-DNS, port/service, and typosquat re-enumeration cadence, and what a genuine 'perimeter drift' event looks like in the diff output), a five-state finding-lifecycle state machine (open/triaged/risk_accepted/resolved/false_positive) with per-severity SLA and fingerprint-based cross-scan dedup and auto-resolve/reopen rules, the alert-fatigue trap where a lifecycle-unaware rule re-fires on an already-accepted finding, a durable retry/backoff alert-outbox pattern ('queued is not delivered'), and copy-paste bash-cron plus PowerShell-Scheduled-Task recipes for a re-scan+diff loop with the Slack-compatible webhook payload shape. Passive OSINT and analysis only -- no new active-intrusion technique. Use when setting up ongoing monitoring for a retainer or MSSP engagement, tuning alert thresholds to avoid fatigue, triaging a finding's lifecycle status, investigating adversary chatter about a brand, building a 'what changed on the perimeter since last week' report, or deciding whether a persisting finding should re-alert.
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Build, validate, and run the claude-osint skills repo — check SKILL.md frontmatter, run the secret_scan.py and h1_reference.py helpers, run sync-skill-content.sh, run the smoke test. Use when asked to run, build, test, validate, or smoke-test claude-osint or its OSINT skills/scripts.
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