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Find dependency confusion risks, where a public package can replace an internal package with the same name. Review dependency files, identify exposed names, and guide registry restrictions and recurring CI checks to prevent substitution.
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Organization-grade cloud and supply-chain attack-surface discovery: S3/GCS/Azure Blob bucket discovery via observed-name mining (CNAME/cert-SAN/Wayback) and bounded two-class permutation (6 prefixes x 15 suffixes on trusted tokens, bounded target-bound expansion on subdomain stems), existence (HEAD/GET) vs public-listing confirmation, object-key triage into 9 value tiers (database dumps, credentials, IaC state, kubeconfig, VCS dirs, config, archives, PII, logs), dangling-CNAME bucket-takeover detection, and the ownership-gated severity model that stops an unattributable public bucket from becoming a false CRITICAL; the fully offline AWS-account-ID recovery from a leaked AKIA/ASIA/AROA access key (base32 decode, runnable stdlib Python, canonical test vector, AWS-documentation-example-ID screening); dependency-confusion confirmation for npm/PyPI (internal-signal classifier -- private-registry binding vs org-namespace match -- paired with a read-only public-registry 404 check and the npm scope-claimability nuance the public search API misses); and passive cloud-native/container/Kubernetes/CI control-plane fingerprinting (Lambda URLs, API Gateway, Cloud Run, App Service, kubelet/etcd/K8s API/dashboard, Jenkins/GitLab/Argo CD) as an org-attribution and exposure surface. Passive/discovery only -- no exploitation, no credential submission, no active control-plane confirmation (a stage-6 validate_cloud active tier is described but out of scope). Use when enumerating a target's cloud storage footprint, recovering an AWS account ID from a leaked key, confirming a supply-chain dependency-confusion vector, or fingerprinting cloud-native/K8s/CI infrastructure for an authorized external recon engagement.
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Detect and prevent public-over-private name resolution in npm, PyPI, and Maven.
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Find npm and PyPI packages that imitate trusted package names to exploit typing mistakes. Compare spelling similarity, publication dates, downloads, and maintainer details, then rank suspicious candidates and produce reports or blocklists for further review.
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Investigate malicious software delivered through trusted updates or dependencies. Compare suspect files with legitimate versions, examine signing anomalies and injected code, and organize evidence to assess the infection path and downstream impact.
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Assess dependency confusion, where a build retrieves a public package instead of an intended private one. Discover internal package names, review registry settings, plan callback-based proofs of execution, and document fixes across major package ecosystems.
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External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.
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Supply-chain testing via package-manager dependency confusion: when internal package names resolve to attacker-controlled public registries, leading to malicious install and script execution. Use for npm/pip/gem/Maven/Composer/Docker manifest review and authorized red-team supply-chain exercises.
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Software supply chain security — SBOM generation and analysis, dependency confusion and typosquatting detection, malicious package indicators, CI/CD pipeline hardening, and artifact provenance/signing (SLSA, Sigstore)
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Supply-chain testing via package-manager dependency confusion: when internal package names resolve to attacker-controlled public registries, leading to malicious install and script execution. Use for npm/pip/gem/Maven/Composer/Docker manifest review and authorized red-team supply-chain exercises.
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Investigate supply chain attack artifacts including trojanized software updates, compromised build pipelines, and sideloaded dependencies to identify intrusion vectors and scope of compromise.
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Investigate supply chain attack artifacts including trojanized software updates, compromised build pipelines, and sideloaded dependencies to identify intrusion vectors and scope of compromise.
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Detects typosquatting attacks in npm and PyPI package registries by analyzing package name similarity using Levenshtein distance and other string metrics, examining publish date heuristics to identify recently created packages mimicking established ones, and flagging download count anomalies where suspicious packages have disproportionately low usage compared to their legitimate targets. The analyst queries the PyPI JSON API and npm registry API to gather package metadata for automated comparison. Activates for requests involving package typosquatting detection, dependency confusion analysis, malicious package identification, or software supply chain threat hunting in package registries.
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Investigate supply chain attack artifacts including trojanized software updates, compromised build pipelines, and sideloaded dependencies to identify intrusion vectors and scope of compromise.
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Deep-dive offensive methodology for dependency confusion and namespace attacks across all major package ecosystems. Covers npm scope confusion exploiting the gap between public and private scoped packages and .npmrc misconfigurations where registry mappings fail to pin internal scopes exclusively. Addresses PyPI namespace attacks through --extra-index-url resolution ordering, NuGet feed priority exploitation when multiple package sources are configured without clear directives, Maven and Gradle repository ordering where artifact resolution traverses repositories sequentially, Go module proxy abuse through GOPROXY misconfiguration, Ruby gems namespace squatting, and Docker image tag confusion with unqualified image references. Provides complete proof-of-concept methodology using safe callbacks including DNS canary via interactsh or Burp Collaborator and HTTP beacon with no destructive payload. Covers reconnaissance techniques for discovering internal package names through GitHub repository analysis, error ...
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External recon for software supply-chain attack surface — package-namespace squatting candidates, dependency-confusion vulnerabilities, GitHub Actions injection openings, container image registry exposure, SBOM mining, internal-package-name leakage, and CI/CD configuration exposure. Reconnaissance and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks are EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE and require explicit written sign-off because they can affect the entire npm/PyPI ecosystem. Use when the target has a public GitHub org, when their build artifacts/SBOMs are reachable, when their docker images are on Docker Hub/GHCR, or when you find internal package names in their JS bundles.
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