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cloud-pentest

Post-access cloud exploitation for AWS, GCP, and Azure — what to do AFTER you obtain credentials or reach a metadata endpoint. Covers IAM enumeration and privilege escalation (iam:PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AssumeRole chains, GCP service-account impersonation, Azure managed-identity abuse), IMDSv1/v2 metadata credential theft, STS token abuse, S3/GCS/Blob bucket takeover and object exfil, Lambda/Cloud Functions env-var secrets, cross-account and cross-service pivoting, and turning leaked keys into demonstrated impact (read PII, assume admin, exfil data). Assumes authorized scope only. Use when you have AWS/GCP/Azure keys, an SSRF hitting 169.254.169.254 / metadata.google.internal, a leaked service-account JSON, or a token, and need to escalate and prove impact. For finding buckets/origins first, use cloud-recon; for the SSRF entry point, see web2-vuln-classes. 中文触发词:云渗透、AWS提权、IAM枚举、元数据凭证、云安全审计

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安装前可以查看交给 AI 代理的指令内容。

CLOUD PENTEST — Post-Access Exploitation

Recon finds the door; this is what you do inside. A leaked AKIA... key or a metadata token is not a finding on its own — the finding is what that identity can DO. Enumerate the identity, find the privesc path, prove real impact. Never touch data you're not authorized to.


AUTHORIZATION FIRST

[ ] Target cloud account/subscription is explicitly in scope
[ ] You have written authorization (program scope, engagement doc)
[ ] Read-only enumeration before ANY state change
[ ] No exfil of real customer data — prove access with a benign canary/own-account object
[ ] Discovered accounts/roles you can pivot to are NOT auto-authorized — confirm scope

Stop here if any box is unchecked.


0. IDENTIFY THE IDENTITY (do this first, always)

You haveFirst callTells you
AWS keysaws sts get-caller-identityaccount id, principal ARN, user vs role
AWS metadatacurl .../iam/security-credentials/<role>temp creds + role name
GCP SA JSON / tokengcloud auth ... / curl metadata ...tokenproject, service account, scopes
Azure token / MIIMDS .../identity/oauth2/tokentenant, object id, resource access

Never assume privilege. Enumerate what this identity actually has before planning.


1. AWS — ENUMERATE THEN ESCALATE

Enumerate (read-only):

aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam get-account-authorization-details 2>/dev/null   # full policy dump if allowed
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <u>
aws iam list-role-policies / list-attached-role-policies
# No IAM read? Brute the effective perms with enumerate-iam / then map with a policy tool

Classic privesc paths (need the matching permission):

Permission heldEscalation
iam:CreatePolicyVersionWrite a new default *:* version onto an attached policy
iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances / lambda:CreateFunctionLaunch compute AS an admin role
iam:AttachUserPolicy / PutUserPolicyAttach AdministratorAccess to yourself
sts:AssumeRole (over-broad trust)Assume a more privileged role
iam:CreateAccessKey on another userMint keys for a privileged user
lambda:UpdateFunctionCode on privileged fnRun code with the function's role
iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicyRewrite trust policy to let you assume it

Impact proof (benign): list a bucket you were told is in scope, sts assume-role into the admin role and get-caller-identity to show the new ARN, or read a canary object. Don't touch real PII.


2. METADATA (IMDS) — SSRF LANDS HERE

IMDSv1 (no token): GET http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>
IMDSv2 (token):    PUT .../latest/api/token  (X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600)
                   then GET with  X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: <token>
GCP:  GET http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
      header: Metadata-Flavor: Google
Azure: GET http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/
      header: Metadata: true

Got temp creds → jump to section 1 (AWS) / 3 (GCP) / 4 (Azure) and enumerate what THAT role can do. SSRF alone is Medium; SSRF → metadata creds → data/admin is Critical.


3. GCP — IMPERSONATION IS THE PIVOT

gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=sa.json   # or use the token
gcloud projects get-iam-policy <project>
gcloud iam service-accounts list
PermissionEscalation
iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken / actAsImpersonate a higher-priv SA (--impersonate-service-account)
iam.serviceAccountKeys.createMint a key for a privileged SA
iam.roles.update on a custom role you holdAdd permissions to yourself
cloudfunctions.functions.update / deployRun code as the function's SA
storage.objects.get on a sensitive bucketRead secrets/state

Owner/Editor at project level = effectively admin. Check for the default Compute SA having Editor — extremely common.


4. AZURE — MANAGED IDENTITY & RBAC

az account show
az role assignment list --assignee <objectId> --all
az resource list
PathEscalation
Managed identity with ContributorDeploy/modify resources, run commands on VMs (az vm run-command)
Microsoft.Authorization/*/writeAssign yourself Owner
Key Vault access policy / RBACRead secrets, certs, keys
Automation Account / RunbookExecute as the automation identity
Storage account key readFull blob access

5. STORAGE — S3 / GCS / BLOB

[ ] List: aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request  (public?)
[ ] Read/Write ACL: get-bucket-acl / put-object test (own canary file only)
[ ] Bucket policy allows *? cross-account?
[ ] Versioning / logging exposes old secrets?
[ ] Website / static hosting → subdomain takeover angle (see web2-vuln-classes)

Writable public bucket serving a live site = Critical (content injection / takeover). Readable bucket with secrets/PII = High/Critical.


6. SECRETS HARVEST (post-access)

[ ] Lambda/Cloud Function/App env vars (often hold API keys, DB creds)
[ ] SSM Parameter Store / Secrets Manager (if perms allow)
[ ] EC2 user-data / instance tags
[ ] Terraform state in the bucket you just read
[ ] CI/CD variables reachable from the identity

Each secret → re-run "identify the identity" for the NEW credential. Chain until you hit admin or crown-jewel data, then stop and write it up.


7. REPORT LINE (per finding)

Entry: <leaked key | SSRF→metadata | public bucket | SA JSON>
Identity: <ARN / SA / object id> — <what it could do>
Escalation: <exact permission → action that raised privilege>
Impact proven: <assumed admin ARN | read canary | listed in-scope resource>
Blast radius: <accounts/services/data reachable>
Fix: <least-privilege policy | IMDSv2 enforce | block-public-access | rotate>

Impact must be demonstrated with a concrete call, using benign/own-account objects. "The key might allow…" is not a finding — show get-caller-identity after the escalation.

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