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engagement-flow

Use when starting, planning, or running a multi-phase pentest or red-team engagement — to sequence the Cyber Kill Chain phases with quality gates instead of jumping straight to exploitation

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  • SKILL.md3.1 KB

SKILL.md(原文)

安装前可以查看交给 AI 代理的指令内容。

Engagement Flow

Overview

A pentest/red-team engagement is a phased pipeline with gates, not a pile of techniques run ad hoc. This skill sequences the 9-phase Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain and routes each phase to its commands, domain skills, and discipline checks. It is the offensive analog of brainstorming → writing-plans → executing-plans: scope the work, plan it, then execute phase by phase.

Don't jump to exploitation. Earlier phases earn the access that later phases need, and each gate keeps quality high before you advance.

The pipeline

digraph killchain {
    rankdir=LR;
    scope -> recon -> weaponize -> deliver -> exploit -> install -> c2 -> actions -> report;
    scope [label="0 SCOPE"]; recon [label="1 RECON"]; weaponize [label="2 WEAPONIZE"];
    deliver [label="3 DELIVER"]; exploit [label="4 EXPLOIT"]; install [label="5 INSTALL"];
    c2 [label="6 C2"]; actions [label="7 ACTIONS"]; report [label="8 REPORT"];
}

Each transition requires a gate (/engage.gate): required artifacts present, findings carry CWE+CVSS+ATT&CK+evidence, and the automated checks pass. Gate FAIL → fix the gap before advancing.

How to run it

  1. Pick the workflow preset for the engagement type (web-app, network, red-team, cloud, mobile, ad-domain, bug-bounty) and drive phases with the /engage.* commands.
  2. Phase 0 (scope): emit .engage/scope/scope.json. REQUIRED: scope-discipline.
  3. Phases 1-7: before any target interaction → scope-discipline; before any outward action → opsec-discipline; invoke the matching domain skill for the technique.
  4. Recall prior intel: at recon/weaponize, /engage.memory recall to start from what worked.
  5. Findings: REQUIRED: finding-discipline — nothing is [CONFIRMED] without proof.
  6. Phase 8 (report): record confirmed findings to engagement-memory; generate the report.
  7. Optional autopilot: engine/engine.py runs the phases under a budget/loop/trace with --resume (/engage.pickup); offensive actions stay operator-gated.

Red Flags — STOP, back up a phase

  • "Let me just start exploiting" (no scope.json / no recon → back to phase 0/1)
  • "Skip the gate, I'll document later" (gates exist so the report is complete and findings are real)
  • "Recon is done, I didn't check prior intel" (run /engage.memory recall)

Quick reference

PhaseCommandDiscipline / tooling
Scope/engage.scopescope-discipline → scope.json
Recon/engage.reconscope-discipline; /engage.memory recall
Exploit/engage.exploitopsec-discipline; finding-discipline
Actions/engage.actionsaction_guard gate; opsec-discipline
Report/engage.reportfinding-discipline; record to memory
Gate / resume/engage.gate, /engage.pickupautomated checks; engine trace

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