Analyze Windows event logs in Splunk to investigate suspicious logins, privilege changes, persistence, and movement between computers. Build detection searches and organize endpoint activity into timelines, with findings linked to MITRE ATT&CK attack techniques.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.
实测评分 未实测
查看安装方法安装前可以查看交给 AI 代理的指令内容。
Use this skill when:
Do not use for Linux/macOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.
WinEventLog:Security, WinEventLog:System, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational)Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625
| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users
by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status
| where count > 20
| eval attack_type = case(
Logon_Type=3, "Network Brute Force",
Logon_Type=10, "RDP Brute Force",
Logon_Type=2, "Interactive Brute Force",
1=1, "Other"
)
| eval status_meaning = case(
Status="0xc000006d", "Bad Username or Password",
Status="0xc000006a", "Incorrect Password (valid user)",
Status="0xc0000234", "Account Locked Out",
Status="0xc0000072", "Account Disabled",
1=1, Status
)
| sort - count
| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_users
Password Spray Detection:
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3
| bin _time span=10m
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts,
values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time
| where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts < unique_users * 3
| eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")
Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security"
(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!="127.0.0.1"
| sort _time
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen,
sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures,
sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes
by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| where failures > 10 AND successes > 0
| eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)/60, 1)
| sort - failures
New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720
| join TargetUserName type=left [
search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName="Administrators"
| rename MemberName AS TargetUserName
]
| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| eval alert = "New account created and added to Administrators group"
Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4672
SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM" SubjectUserName!="LOCAL SERVICE" SubjectUserName!="NETWORK SERVICE"
| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName
| where count > 0
| search privileges IN ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege",
"SeRestorePrivilege", "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege")
Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")
| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)")
| sort - count
Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):
index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)
| search task_info="*powershell*" OR task_info="*cmd*" OR task_info="*http*" OR task_info="*\\Temp\\*"
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_info
Registry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):
index=sysmon EventCode=13
TargetObject IN (
"*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\\*",
"*\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\*"
)
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details
| where NOT match(Image, "(explorer\.exe|msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe)")
| sort - count
WMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):
index=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21
| stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace
| where count > 0
Remote Service Exploitation (T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
| stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_destinations, values(ComputerName) AS targets
by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_destinations > 3
| sort - unique_destinations
| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_destinations, targets
PsExec Detection (T1021.002):
index=sysmon EventCode=1
(Image="*\\psexec.exe" OR Image="*\\psexesvc.exe"
OR ParentImage="*\\psexesvc.exe"
OR OriginalFileName="psexec.c")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine
RDP Lateral Movement (T1021.001):
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS rdp_targets, values(ComputerName) AS destinations
by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where rdp_targets > 2
| sort - rdp_targets
Create comprehensive timeline for a compromised host:
(index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon) Computer="WORKSTATION-042"
earliest="2024-03-14T00:00:00" latest="2024-03-16T00:00:00"
| eval event_description = case(
EventCode=4624, "Logon: ".TargetUserName." (Type ".Logon_Type.")",
EventCode=4625, "Failed Logon: ".TargetUserName,
EventCode=4688 OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:*Sysmon*" AND EventCode=1),
"Process: ".Image." CMD: ".CommandLine,
EventCode=4698, "Scheduled Task: ".TaskName,
EventCode=3, "Network: ".DestinationIp.":".DestinationPort,
EventCode=11, "File Created: ".TargetFilename,
EventCode=13, "Registry: ".TargetObject,
1=1, "Event ".EventCode
)
| sort _time
| table _time, EventCode, event_description, User, src_ip
Build reference lookups for Windows Event ID context:
| inputlookup windows_eventcode_lookup.csv
| table EventCode, Description, ATT_CK_Technique, Severity
If lookup doesn't exist, create it:
EventCode,Description,ATT_CK_Technique,Severity
4624,Successful Logon,T1078,Informational
4625,Failed Logon,T1110,Low
4648,Explicit Credential Logon,T1078,Medium
4672,Special Privileges Assigned,T1134,Medium
4688,New Process Created,T1059,Informational
4698,Scheduled Task Created,T1053.005,Medium
4720,User Account Created,T1136.001,High
4732,Member Added to Security Group,T1098,High
4768,Kerberos TGT Requested,T1558,Informational
4769,Kerberos Service Ticket,T1558.003,Low
4771,Kerberos Pre-Auth Failed,T1110,Low
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| EventCode 4624 | Successful logon event — Logon_Type 2 (interactive), 3 (network), 10 (RDP), 7 (unlock) |
| EventCode 4625 | Failed logon event — Status code indicates failure reason (bad password, account locked, disabled) |
| Sysmon EventCode 1 | Process creation with full command line, parent process, and hash information |
| Sysmon EventCode 3 | Network connection initiated by a process — source/dest IP, port, and process context |
| Logon Type 3 | Network logon (SMB, WMI, PowerShell Remoting) — key indicator of lateral movement |
| Logon Type 10 | Remote interactive logon via RDP/Terminal Services |
WINDOWS EVENT LOG ANALYSIS — HOST: WORKSTATION-042
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Period: 2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15
Events: 12,847 total (Security: 9,231 | Sysmon: 3,616)
Authentication Summary:
Successful Logons (4624): 487 (Type 3: 312, Type 10: 45, Type 2: 130)
Failed Logons (4625): 847 (from 192.168.1.105 — BRUTE FORCE)
Explicit Creds (4648): 12
Suspicious Findings:
[HIGH] 847 failed logons followed by success at 14:35 from 192.168.1.105
[HIGH] New user "backdoor_admin" created (4720) at 14:38
[HIGH] User added to Administrators group (4732) at 14:38
[MEDIUM] schtasks.exe creating persistence task at 14:42
[MEDIUM] PowerShell encoded command execution at 14:45
ATT&CK Mapping:
T1110.001 — Password Guessing (847 failed logons)
T1136.001 — Local Account Creation (backdoor_admin)
T1053.005 — Scheduled Task (persistence)
T1059.001 — PowerShell (encoded execution)
还没有评价。欢迎分享你的使用感受。
无需登录即可发表。欢迎分享使用感受、提问，或说明在哪些环境下无法运行。
还没有评论。来写第一条吧。
Assess exposure of Windows secrets protected by DPAPI, the operating system’s data protection service, during authorized security tests. Guide examination and decryption of saved credentials and browser data using available user sessions, credentials, or backup keys.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Assess Shadow Credentials account takeover during authorized Active Directory testing. Examine permissions that allow public key registration, validate authentication without a password reset, and document credential cleanup, detection opportunities, and access control changes needed for remediation.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Prepare for CMMC Level 2, a cybersecurity certification for defense contractors. Define the systems handling controlled information, review security requirements, calculate the SPRS assessment score, and organize remediation plans and evidence into a readiness report.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Create disk images for investigations using dd or dcfldd on Linux. The workflow covers write protection, bit-for-bit copying, hash checks to verify integrity, and documentation of the acquisition process.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Review Active Directory permissions with ldap3, a Python library for directory queries. Identify excessive access granted to non-administrative accounts, explain potential privilege escalation paths, and produce a JSON report with affected objects and remediation recommendations.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Inspect suspicious Android APK files without running them. Analyze permissions, app components, suspicious code patterns, and network indicators, then produce a JSON risk report to support malware triage and detection rule development.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。